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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation explores the historical struggle of Asian and Mexican origin 
farm workers in California during the twentieth century.  The study investigates how the 
battle for economic justice, in which farm workers engaged, did not center solely on 
issues of class.  Instead, I utilize the sociological lens of race theories to examine how 
farm workers confronted historically rooted forms of racism that acted differently against 
Asian and Mexican workers.  Moreover, the dissertation asserts that the complex 
trajectory of the farm workers movement was shifted and shaped by internal and external 
forces emanating from landowners, the state, and within the very constituency of the 
movement.  Therefore, I utilize sociological analysis of the historical narrative to analyze 
how a social movement transitions from failure to dormancy and then success.  Last, I 
provide insight into how and why the movement faded into decline.   
 While historical in its approach, I propose that my theoretical conclusions on 
racism, inter-minority cooperation and conflict, and social movement dynamics may be 
extrapolated to sociologically comprehend other historical periods, events, racial groups, 
and organizations.  Furthermore, the study’s focus upon Asian and Mexican origin 
working people is significant.  Both groups have received little attention in regards to 
interaction with each other.  Moreover, they are seldom defined as working class groups 
in US society, currently and historically. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE SOCIOLOGY OF RACE & CLASS AND THE CASE OF THE 
FARM WORKERS MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA 
 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
Race and class are central to studies of inequality in sociology.  In scholarly research on 
race and class stratification, sociologists endeavor to understand how deprived groups 
strive to rectify a persistent state of inequality.  Much of this work has focused on the 
struggle of African Americans and the Black civil rights movement.  Though helpful, 
there remains a need to sociologically analyze the historical narrative of racial and class 
struggle as it pertains to other groups of color.  Specifically, comparative work on Asian 
Americans and Latinos and their particular experiences with racism and racialization 
have only recently emerged as key areas of study within scholarship.  In following this 
thread in the emergent scholarship, this dissertation offers an approach to race and 
ethnicity that illuminates our thinking on race and class in such a way that does not 
necessarily privilege a Black/White paradigm.  In doing so, the study is informative on 
how race and class inequality are deeply ensconced in US society.  Further, the 
dissertation speaks specifically to how racial dynamics impact the workings of a poor 
people of color movement. 
I place stage center the plight of farm workers and the ebb and flow of farm 
worker mobilization efforts from the 1930s to the 1980s in California.  I argue that this 
case study enables a sturdy comparative analysis of race and ethnicity (CRE) as both 
Asian and Mexican workers are considered in what follows.  The creation of the field of 
CRE offers valuable theoretical tools to interpret and analyze the historical experiences of 
racial minority groups, particularly workers, as they interact with to each other.  By 
carrying out such a study, some may interpret the findings here to be part of “moving 
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beyond” the Black/White paradigm.  But I maintain that this approach will invigorate 
scholarship on all racial groups in various historical and social contexts.  
 In terms of comprehending the particular social movement dynamics of farm 
worker mobilization, the dissertation conceptualizes the farm workers movement of 
California as a “broad, historical trend.”1  Positioning the long span of farm worker 
activism as an event that occurred over the course of the twentieth century reorganizes 
our understanding of mobilization as a long term, historically rooted occurrence.  This 
conceptualization of the movement also elucidates for us the depths of endurance and 
persistence required for workers of color to attain justice.  As it were, farm workers 
struggled and contended with periods of unproductive activity, dormancy, peaks, and 
lows.  For working people of color, the valleys are long periods of time and peak 
moments are fleeting and difficult to sustain.  Nevertheless, the numerous phases of 
success and failure offer an invaluable opportunity to dissect key periods in farm worker 
history for sociological insight into racial and class inequality.   
In analyzing the following narrative, I seek to answer a few important questions:  
What prevents the successful movement of workers of color into a racially united front in 
the 1930s?  What allows an interracial coalition to take root in the 1960s?  And how does 
the coalition fall into a state of dissolution in the 1970s and 1980s?  In traversing the 
terrain of race and class, the study provides explanation of how notions of citizenship 
factor into farm worker struggle especially with the implementation of the Bracero 
Program.  Therefore, while the dissertation engages with capitalists as key actors that 
                                                 
11 Historian Jacquelyn Dowd Hall (2005) uses this term in her own conceptualization of the Black civil 
rights movement.  
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operated against farm workers’ interests, I take into account the role of the state as an 
entity that possessed abiding interests in the outcome of strike actions.    
In undertaking a broad range of years in the study, I detach farm worker 
historiography and sociology from their exclusive relationship to the United Farm 
Workers of America (UFW).  Indeed, the UFW is central to the farm workers movement, 
but this was not the case until 1965.  The dissertation is indeed concerned with the UFW 
and thus spends most of its efforts, albeit with a different approach, with analysis of 
primary data culled from UFW archives.  However, I argue that the astounding feat of 
engineering union contracts for farm workers, which the UFW accomplished in 1970, 
was resultant of solving some of the deeply rooted problems that had persisted for a long 
time.  Thus, the analysis must peer back into the history, which led up to the momentous 
events of the 1960s and 1970s.   
 One of these seemingly intractable problems was the division between workers of 
color within California’s agricultural labor force.  Filipino and Mexican workers had 
become the core of farm labor in the 1930s, attempted to forge labor unions during that 
decade, failed and then faced a long period of inactivity thereafter.  They labored for 
White landowners and Japanese tenant farmers.  How did Filipinos and Mexicans foster 
social movement success in the 1960s?  And what occurred to Japanese tenant farmers 
between the 1930s to the 1960s?  To answer these questions, the dissertation lays out the 
racial politics of the farm workers movement and more precisely, California 
agriculture—something that is frequently and quickly touched upon in work on the UFW 
but rarely, if ever, theorized and evaluated in a robust manner.   
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 Moreover, Japanese tenant farmers were central to California agriculture’s 
organization of capital and labor.  Rarely, if ever, do Japanese origin people gain a central 
spot in farm worker studies—particularly the majority of studies that focus often upon 
Mexican farm workers.  Consequently, as I demonstrate in the first two substantive 
chapters, my study brings into sharp relief the singular racial lens of most farm workers 
studies; the focus is upon Mexicans or one racial group.  In fact, it hardly seems that any 
analysis termed or catalogued as being a “farm worker study” ever alludes to Asian origin 
workers.  Furthermore, few, if any, of the studies actually direct their theoretical efforts 
towards a theory of race or even class.  Most of the scholarship focuses upon social 
movement dynamics.  While the social movement-based literature on the farm workers 
movement offers an important set of lessons, I assert that racial dynamics in the twentieth 
century history of California agriculture remain understudied.  This effort to shed light on 
these racial dynamics is a noteworthy contribution in light of the shift and turns which the 
sociology of race has taken in the twenty plus years since publication of Michael Omi 
and Howard Winant’s Racial Formation in the United States.  
RACIAL FORMATIONS AND THE POWER OF RACISM 
Omi and Winant’s (1994 [1986]) concept of racial formation has been a bedrock of or 
noted extensively in most significant studies of race, racism, and race relations since its 
emergence on the scene.  Emphasizing the “sociohistorical” dimensions of race and 
illustrating the evolutionary process by which race is defined, they argue that US history 
is suffused with a series of racial projects, both racist and anti-racist—the latter working 
toward equity and the former working against it.  Further, they position the state as both a 
manufacturing site and playing field (albeit uneven) in which race is defined and 
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contested.  In such a context, institutions and actors in the social world are subject to the 
process of racialization.  The usages of flexible concepts such as “racial formation” and 
“racialization” have proven beneficial to comparative race and ethnicity.  Their key 
contribution has been to provide a theoretical approach that places race at the center of 
the analysis.  Rather than identifying racial inequality as epiphenomenal of class 
inequities or cultural inferiority, a racial formation/racialization approach allows for 
specifically focused study on racism.  Subsequently, in the post-Omi and Winant era, we 
have witnessed significant pieces of scholarship that take care to place race at a central 
point of stratification analysis.   
 Current work by Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (1997, 2001, & 2006) has attempted to 
corral the supposedly unmanageable concept of race.  Some (Loveman 1999) have 
retorted to Bonilla-Silva’s theoretical interpretation that there exists a historically 
contingent system of racialization by invoking, or rather retreating to, ethnicity as the key 
site of analysis.  However, these critiques, though perhaps providing some insight, bog us 
down in either/or choices.  Bonilla-Silva’s point is simple: race matters.  But the 
implications of such a theoretical venture or not so easily stated and understood.   
First, it should be noted and it is surprising that the notation must be forthcoming, 
there is no assertion from sociology of race scholars such as Omi and Winant, Tomás 
Almaguer, Bonilla-Silva, and later to be included, Moon-Kie Jung, that race is a 
biologically “real” trait.  However, most certainly, the sociology of race would maintain 
that social actors, such as powerful haoles [White landowners and top-level managers in 
Hawaii agriculture] or White landowners in 1930s California, most assuredly bought into 
these racist, essentialist depictions of racial groups—particularly the workers of color 
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held in their employ.  These essentializing forces of racism aided in the design of racially 
unequal social systems that acted to stratify and locate various racial groups in specific 
hierarchical positions.   
Implicitly couched in the axiomatic sociological idea that there exists a socially 
constructed reality (Berger and Luckman 1966), scholars such as Bonilla-Silva note the 
real consequences of social systems.  Built upon a very simple sociological precept, 
Bonilla-Silva holds forth that material inequalities and divisions fall upon and are situated 
along lines of racial division.  Thus, race, though socially constructed, is no flimsy social 
edifice.  On the contrary, the construction of race in US history has operated to 
simultaneously create a real and measurable material inequality among racial groups.   
Ideologies of white supremacy, scientific racism, and systems of legalized inequality 
maintain privilege and superior positions for Whites.  Bonilla-Silva argues that groups of 
color are continually subjugated by what he labels a “racialized social system.”   Taking a 
cue from this set of ideas, I demonstrate in the dissertation how a racialized and racist 
social system incurs heavy damage on the farm laborer fortunes of Japanese, Filipino and 
Mexican origin workers.  These consequences, which the workers confront, are resultant 
of both race and class inequality.   
To the end of explicating the overlap of race and class, Moon-Kie Jung’s recently 
published papers (1999, 2002, & 2003) and book (2006) on Hawaii’s labor history have 
demonstrated the inextricable link between these two variables.  Jung explains how an 
interracial working class was created on the islands of Hawaii in the 1940s and why the 
cohesion of a multiracial workforce was not possible in the previous decade.  Critiquing 
yet remaining within the predominant Marxist analytic on Asian and Portuguese workers 
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in Hawaii, Jung disassembles the history of a multiracial plantation workforce to 
demonstrate that their achievement of interracial labor unionism was a long process and 
constituted far more than simplistic realization that, at long last, the workers understood 
the requirement for interracial cooperation.  An important component of the Jung model 
is that Portuguese, Filipino, and Japanese workers were conceived and self-identified as 
distinct racial groups with differentiated economic and political interests.  In effect, a 
racial hierarchy existed and it had to be deconstructed in order for the workers to foster a 
new vision of their own and other racial groups in order to build a racially and class 
conscious labor movement.   
Additionally, the work of Claire Jean Kim requires consideration in the analysis 
of interminority relations.  In particular, Kim’s (1999) conception of a “field of racial 
positions” is apropos for analysis of the predicament of Asian and Mexican origin farm 
workers.  Kim submits that in this racialized field of interactions Blacks are insiders in 
US society but still deemed an inferior racial group.  Conversely, Asian Americans are 
outsiders but are still reserved a spot as a superior group.  Asian Americans and Blacks 
thus experience conflictive group relations since Whites remain superior insiders within 
the historical and contemporary social reality of the US.  This mode of interaction 
between all three racial groups “triangulates” Asian Americans as a moderately ranked 
racial group—better than Blacks but never as good as Whites.  Extension of “triangulated 
racial analysis” to Latinos and Asians provides insight as to how and why Filipinos and 
Mexicans remained divided for so long in California agricultural history.  Further, a 
comprehension of reasons for the Filipino/Mexican split is necessary in order to explicate 
how the groups formed a racial coalition in the 1960s. 
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The dissertation follows the theoretical lines that Bonilla-Silva, Jung, and Kim 
thread out and utilizes the theoretical matter, which they offer, to sociologically 
comprehend key moments in California’s agricultural labor history.  However, my 
historical sociological approach jibes with other pieces of scholarship that have taken into 
account the historical transformations in race relations among workers who contend with 
the materially inequitable outcomes of racially unequal configurations (see Song 2004).  
For example, Almaguer (1994) maps out the racial hierarchy existent in late nineteenth 
century California in Racial Fault Lines (more will be said about this in the ensuing 
chapter).  Historian Chris Friday’s (1994) Organizing Asian American Labor, a central 
text in the small set of literature on Asian American labor history, is also illustrative of 
racial hierarchy analysis.  Friday categorizes Chinese workers in the salmon-canning 
industry as forming a “labor aristocracy” in comparison to other workers of color that 
labored in the same industry.   
Yet while a racial hierarchy approach is useful, I will point out that a hierarchical 
conception of racial inequality should not merely position groups as existing in isolation 
from each other and conclude its business.  On the contrary, a racial hierarchical model is 
instructive in detailing how racial groups have differing interests that are, in part, defined 
by the unique ways that these groups are subjected to White supremacy.  This is 
evidenced throughout the study as the mutually opposed class interests between Japanese 
tenant farmers and their Filipino and Mexican workforce become apparent.  Herein is 
where Kim’s “field of racial positions” thesis is instructive.  Filipinos, Japanese, and 
Mexicans all labored on California farms, but the situation was one in which Filipinos 
and Mexicans—in competition with each other for work—were employed by Japanese 
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farmers who rented land from White landowners.  The intense competition between 
Filipinos and Mexicans continued on for decades.  Moving into the 1940s, Mexican 
American workers became concerned with the presence of Mexican guest workers 
contracted through the Bracero Program.  Therefore, the field of racial positions, like 
processes of racial formation, is not static.  Racial dynamics between these groups shift 
and change over time.  Further, racism should be included as one dynamic within race 
relations that undergoes transformation.  
As a consequence of differentiated race, class, and nation-based positions, Jung 
(2002) explains that in the Hawaii case groups of color encounter diversiform racisms.  I 
assert that this conceptualization of racism as a mutable, oppressive force is an invaluable 
contribution to current sociological thinking on race relations not only in history but 
currently as well.  This is especially necessary for studies on Asian Americans and 
Latinos in the US  The complex manner in which both groups have confronted race and 
racism—even when brought out in a historical context—provides insight to the 
contemporary predicament with which both groups must contend.   
As to the historical struggle of Asian and Mexican origin farm workers, they 
certainly contested the intertwined condition of race and class inequality.  However, few 
sociologists (Isaac and Christiansen 2002) investigate the overlap of labor and civil rights 
struggles.  Scholarship from historians deftly points the way.  Flug (1990) and Levy 
(1990) offer insight on the struggle for Black freedom and labor rights.  Recently, 
Zaragosa Vargas’s (2005) aptly titled study, Labor Rights Are Civil Rights, speaks to the 
hinged experiences of racial and economic subjugation for Mexican origin workers.  
Taken together, these bits of analysis indicate race and class stratification do not 
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constitute one in the same disempowering forces.  However, they do interact and are thus 
mutually inclusive independent variables, which, in part, dictate the forms of inequality, 
which workers of color confront today and I would contend they confronted in the 
historical labor struggles of California agriculture.  
THERE AIN’T NO AMERICAN IN ASIAN AND LATINO 
What is qualitatively different about anti-Asian and anti-Latino racism in historical and 
contemporary US society?  Anthropologist Nicholas De Genova offers that in respect to 
racial and national identity, Asians and Latinos simply have never measured up to White, 
American identity.  De Genova (2006: 5) argues that being “American” in the US 
constitutes “the expression of a white nationalism.”  Even in a contemporary 
environment, we must root our comprehension of current imperialistic endeavors by the 
US government (i.e. the Iraq War) in a history of subjugating people of color by noting 
that they are not and cannot be White.  De Genova (Ibid: 12) adds that Latinos and Asian 
Americans “within the space of the US nation-state or its imperial projects” have been 
“rendered virtually indistinguishable from a conclusively racial condition of 
nonwhiteness.”   
So, what differentiates this oppressive state of condition for Asian and Latino 
people as opposed to Black Americans?  Both groups seem to have undergone variant 
forms of racialization as compared to Whites and Blacks.2  They are much more likely to 
be perceived as illegal immigrants or usurpers of the rightful position of Whites.  
Therefore, Latinos and Asian Americans are stationed in some space—I am reticent to 
                                                 
2 I understand that some Latinos such as Puerto Ricans are often regarded by themselves and others as 
Black.  For more on the overlap of Black and Puerto Rican identity, see Flores (1993).  When I refer to 
Latinos in this study—though a term broad in its grouping of people—I am referring to Mexican origin 
people.   
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say a “middle position”—that is not well explained with a simple notation of the 
opposing poles of Blackness and Whiteness.  Their experiences, currently and 
historically, are frequently identified as never being able to be quite White, but also never 
being moored into the lowliest position of being Black.   
An accessible and currently relevant example of this process is illustrated by the 
repeated attribution to Barack Obama, as he campaigned for the presidency in 2008, that 
he is a practitioner of Islam or that his election to the presidency would appeal to 
terrorism.  In this instance, there is a conflation of fictional racial/regional origins (Arab), 
religious practice (Islam’s automatic link to being Brown or Black), and of simply not 
being White.  This powerful set of bigotries constructs a Black man with a name that 
sounds “strange” or “foreign” as being an Arab and/or Muslim.  Constructing an 
individual in such a way is the incipient stage in a historically rooted racist logic, which 
concludes that Arab Muslims are all things antithetical to the core Anglo-American 
identity of White (harmless and civilized), Christian (not a reprobate), and English-
speaking (any other language or even English spoken with the accent of a non-native 
speaker signals hidden meanings and/or a lack of assimilation).  Indeed, it is a tragic 
commentary on the racial politics of the U.S. that Obama’s retort to such allegations must 
consist of invocation of his interracial (read: White) heritage and Christian faith.   Few 
politicians—such as the 2008 Republican nominee John McCain—would ever have to 
make such pronouncements as a preface to any message they wished to deliver to the 
country.  
A singular case as the Obama example provides is helpful in comprehending a 
racialized social system.  A larger case study on the plight of Asian and Mexican origin 
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workers in twentieth century California agriculture provides the historical comprehension 
of this racialized social system.  In the dissertation, I show how Mexican origin workers 
are understood time and again as the strong, sturdy, and serviceable workers that will 
carry out long hours of agricultural work with workhorse reliability.  Japanese and 
Filipino workers are seen as appropriate for farm labor as well, but more likely to 
embody a threat to the stability of the agricultural labor market as agitators.  The 
Japanese are a particularly powerful example of a racial group that is perceived as nearly 
the equal of superior Whites.   
The onset of World War Two and the internment process exhibit how the state 
and White growers suspected Japanese farmers of either procuring control of California 
agriculture or as potential enemies of the US state residing within the U.S. nation.  Asian 
and Mexican origin people become racialized and thus subject to racism as a result of 
their own roots in a colonized territory (Filipinos as colonial subjects to the US empire 
and Mexican origin people in what was formally Mexico—the U.S. Southwest) and as 
threats to the racial and national supremacy of White America (Japanese Americans 
being constructed as representative of the Japanese Empire).      
Testifying to a complex history of racial tension and inequality, the dissertation  
uncovers the complexities of race and racism within the farm workers movement.  As 
noted in the opening remarks of the introduction, the field of CRE has enabled this type 
of scholarship to take root.  Studies such as what follows in these ensuing chapters are 
seemingly brand new ways of thinking.  In fact, comparative work is nested in a longer 
tradition that formed in response to the assimilation paradigm thinkers of the twentieth 
century.  Indeed, within the twentieth century scholarship on race and ethnicity, 
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sociologists—particularly White sociologists—have possessed great optimism and a 
severe lack of criticism in regards to the opportunities groups of color have to assimilate 
into a core national identity.  Race is excluded from many of these early designs—the 
focal point is culture.  This is unfortunate as the privileging of cultural attributes in the 
explanation of racial inequality is a misdirected effort since full and complete integration, 
particularly in the economic, social and economic spheres, is yet to occur.   
For example, today Latinos remain leashed to a negative group identity, which 
objectifies them as too foreign for assimilation.3  This situation testifies to the 
unwillingness of the majority White citizenry to allow for inclusion of Latinos into US 
society.  In contradistinction to Latinos, a recent report (2008) offered by the National 
Commission on Asian American and Pacific Islander Research in Education indicates 
that Asian Americans in higher education are stereotyped as the “solution” minority in 
comparison to other racial minorities who fail to attain academic success.  However, the 
report shows that many students of Asian origin are neglected and often seen as a group 
that does not and should not require the aid usually provided to struggling students.  In 
fact, many Asian American students are actually in need of the full set of education 
services that other disadvantaged racial groups require.   
Indeed, Latinos in the first case are racialized as unfit for US citizenship—they 
are not privy to opportunities available in the country—while Asians are racialized as 
seemingly superior to other racial minority groups—they should be able to hold up on 
their own.  Thus, Asians in the US are treated to a backhanded, race-based (and racist) 
                                                 
3 Some commentators within the US media (Pat Buchanan and Lou Dobbs) and politicians (Rep. Tom 
Tancredo of Colorado) pose Mexicans, for example, as uncivilized heathens who cannot culturally conform 
to life in the US.  Ironically, Mexico’s Catholic religion and Romance language cannot cut it in our 
“Western” society. 
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compliment, which intonates Asian superiority versus other racial minority groups.  But I 
maintain that it is the bottom line that matters most.  No matter which group of color is 
positioned as inferior or superior relative to other groups of color, the structural 
consequences are that Latinos and Asian origin people are disallowed necessary 
resources for upward mobility.  
FROM ASSIMILATION TO A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RACE 
The presence of anti-Latino immigrant racism (which is directed at all Latinos, not only 
those who are actual migrants!) and the pervasively racist depiction of Asians as 
seemingly smarter than other racial minorities is indicative of a social reality that 
sociologist Robert Park argued would not be our destiny in the twentieth century.  Park 
proposed (1926) that a natural progression toward enmeshment into US culture would 
proceed unfettered for immigrants in the country.  Clearly, Park vested much faith in the 
belief that the future would look and be better since the root of the problem was one of 
cultural inequality. 
Moving into the latter part of the century, other studies would be framed with the 
assimilationist template forged by Park.  Gunnar Myrdal (1948) presented an analysis of 
race relations that asked what was happening and what needed to be done for African 
Americans in the US.  Myrdal’s answer reveals the same unflinching, Park-like faith that 
Blacks would receive the opportunity to culturally align themselves into the mainstream.  
But what of the inherent material inequities that often defines the plight of 
disenfranchised racial minorities?  As could be predicted, cultural solutions were 
reckoned to be the salve to the economic injustice that Blacks suffered.  Condescendingly 
classifying people of color as culturally inferior proved a fertile theoretical and political 
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ground for conservative and so-called liberal politicians.  US Senator Patrick Moynihan 
published one study (1965), which argued that Black families were weakly structured and 
that their shifty base proved to be the source of their disempowerment.  
In response to an almost blindly optimistic assessment of race and ethnic 
relations, more critical and Marxist scholars came to the fore in the 1960s and 1970s to 
critique the assimilation paradigm.  In particular, several Chicano scholars and 
scholarship on Chicanos (Acuña 1971; Barrera 1979; Moore 1970) founded their 
analyses on a structural interpretation of race inequality couched in the ideas of internal 
colonialism put into play by sociologist Robert Blauner (1972).  Their theoretical modus 
operandi argued not for cultural assimilation but for a revisionist approach to correct the 
historical record so that we would be placed on the correct theoretical track.  For 
example, the revisionist historical account of the US Southwest by Rodolfo Acuña turns 
Frederick Jackson Turner’s frontier thesis on its head.  In Occupied America, Acuña 
(1971) argues that Chicanos were colonized and thus forcefully incorporated in the US 
nation-state and even then were second-class citizens.    
The outcomes of the internal colonial model are essential to note because they, at 
long last, rejected any scholarly effort that posed racial minorities as culturally inferior.  
Further and most crucial for this set of introductory remarks, the internal model moves 
toward a focus on race.  In the late 1970s, political scientist Mario Barrera (1979) 
conceived of class dynamics that directly produced racial inequality.  Asserting that 
Chicanos in the US Southwest had been colonized and exploited for the economic gains 
of White capitalists, Barrera draws up an architecture of race and class domination that 
persistently privileges White over non-White seemingly without exception.  Having thus 
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been relegated to the lowest level of the labor market produced a subjugated racial status 
for Mexicans in the newly acquired US territory.   
In historical depictions of Asians in America, Cheng and Bonacich (1984) edit a 
set of articles, which advance a similar argument that Asian labor like Mexican labor 
played an identical historical role in building up the U.S., particularly in the West.  
Historian Ronald Takaki’s (1989) Strangers From a Different Shore provides an 
overview of the complex and varied experiences of Asians who settled in and had long 
been a part of the US.  Takaki, like his Chicano counterparts, focuses on the abuse that 
Asian laborers experienced and their historical role as cheap labor.  Even after such 
significant scholarly pieces however, there remained a distinct need to focus and theorize 
on the realities of racial division and compile an analysis that looks to the interactions 
between these groups of color.  In regards to carrying out this sort of sociological 
venture, the history of farm worker mobilization in California provides an ideal case 
study opportunity to draw up sociological theories of race and class that expands our 
understanding of Asian American and Latino experiences—in the past and present.  Even 
now, this type of comprehensive study is yet to be produced. 
 Previously mentioned Chicano historical sociologist Tomás Almaguer (1994: 
215) opined that “the absence of an explicitly sociological analysis of race relations in the 
American Southwest is a curious phenomenon…There is still no classic work of 
comparative analysis in the sociological literature of race relations specifically for this 
region.”  His own work has moved us along the way in creating such a scholarly piece.  
One of the original Chicano internal colonial theorists, Almaguer (1987) distanced 
himself from his own theoretical roots and argued for a comparative analytical approach 
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in Chicano Studies.  Other Chicana/o scholars joined in pointing the way toward new 
approaches in the late 1980s (Gutiérrez 1989; Ruiz 1986; Saragoza 1987).  However, it is 
a tall order to expect that one piece of sociological scholarship could unite and 
comprehensively study the variegated topography of race and ethnicity in US 
Southwestern history, particularly in California.  Rather than one definitive text or article, 
a body of comparative race and ethnic scholarship on the region is necessary.  This 
dissertation takes one modest step in that direction.  
 Fortunately, published monographs and papers (Guevarra 2003; Rony Fujita 
2000; Saito 1998; Molina 2006; Pulido 2006) in the last decade have been 
groundbreaking and laid down a path upon which comparative race and ethic studies may 
navigate its way.  Much of this work is not carried out by sociologists, but still offers 
sociological insight and models in their analyses.  One example is the straightforward 
analysis of mixed Filipino and Mexican identity that Guevarra (2003) depicts in his piece.  
The paper speaks to an urban group of people who are identified as “Mexipinos” in 
contemporary San Diego.  My study investigates and complements Guevarra’s work with 
a rural and historical case study that demonstrates Filipino and Mexican tension.  Natalia 
Molina (2006) illustrates how the rules of relativity are in effect with racial hierarchical 
analysis.  She shows how Mexicans held a more favorable position in relation to Asians 
in Los Angeles circa the 1930s.  I also take up this condition of relativity within the racial 
hierarchy and assert that in 1930s California agriculture, Mexicans actually held a middle 
position between Japanese and Filipinos.   
Finally, in terms of building successful, interracial mobilization, Laura Pulido 
(2006) and Leland Saito (1998) map out the trajectory and processes by which groups of 
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color come into a state of cohesion and mobilize successfully.  In my own social 
movement analysis, I offer a similar contribution on a social movement that has lacked an 
in-depth analysis of its interracial composition.  Rony Fujita (2000) provides helpful 
insight on the specific case of this dissertation with her own assertion that, indeed, the 
amalgamation of Filipinos and Mexicans into the UFW was an interracial merger.   
OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
To start out the analysis in Chapter 2, I argue that the process of racialization and racial 
hierarchies disabled efforts to create interracial labor unionism for farm workers of color 
in California during intense labor agitation in the 1930s.  Varying racial groups—
Japanese, Filipino, and Mexican workers—would find it impossible to unite across the 
chasms of race and class.  The three groups possessed different interests as a result of 
occupying specific positions on a racial and class hierarchy.  Japanese tenant farmers 
rented land from White landowners but employed large groups of Filipino and Mexican 
workers; Japanese interests lied in preventing successful strike action.  Filipino and 
Mexican workers were consigned to work in the fields, but even those groups’ interests 
did not converge as they competed for sparse work opportunities in the Depression era.  
Therefore, Filipinos and Mexicans, while constituting colonized people in the national 
(White) imagination, were at odds with each other and were not assessed as equals by 
prevalent notions of White supremacy.  Indeed, both race and class mattered for the 
Asian and Mexican origin labor force in California agriculture; they operated in tandem 
with each other to produce a racial hierarchy, which deemed some groups more capable 
than others. 
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Thereafter, Chapter 3 moves into the Bracero era of California agricultural labor 
history.  From 1942 to 1963, farm worker activists were unable to build, or rather rebuild 
after the tense debacle of the 1930s, any beachhead in advancing the cause of farm 
worker justice.  For over two decades, the primary concern among these activists was the 
usage of contracted Mexican laborers—often an exploited and abused group of workers.  
The argument went from farm labor organizers, even after the termination of the Bracero 
Program, that workers from Mexico lowered wages and disabled the organizing efforts 
conducted by and on behalf of farm workers.  Further, Mexicans were reckoned to be 
unassimilable to US society in general and unfit for entrance to the American working 
class.  Thus, the 1940s and 1950s were a period of social movement activity that existed 
in dormancy.  Labor organizers casted the Bracero Program as a tool wielded by 
employers as they pled to the state that the employment of labor from south of the border 
must be ended.  However, farm labor organizers cried out to a state apparatus that, in 
actuality, had deeply vested interests in the importation of Mexican workers.   
In Chapter 4, because of the confluence of amenable internal and external factors 
and the merger of two farm worker unions, the farm labor movement would experience 
success.  In 1965, California agriculture witnessed the assemblage of an interracial labor 
union and coalition as Filipino and Mexican workers formed what would become the 
UFW.   Overcoming a long history of racial animosity, a patchy record of success, and 
the formidable power of the state and big capital, the UFW struck bargaining agreements 
with the California agribusiness elite.  To this point, no analysis of the UFW or the farm 
workers movement has deeply studied and often simply ignores the significance of this 
racial and social movement organization merger.  In contending with their distinct 
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historical backgrounds and differentiated interests, Filipinos and Mexicans, after decades 
of competing for jobs in the fields, came together.  However, this event was in no way 
inevitable.  The chapter depicts how difficult building the coalition proved to be and in 
Chapter 5, the dissertation puts on display how fraught with tension the merger actually 
was. 
Therefore, the dissertation concludes by providing explanations as to how those 
internal and external factors, so crucial to social movement success, began to dissipate for 
farm workers.  The union had to rely heavily on outside help; thus, as external funds 
subsided so did some union efforts.  Hard fought and negotiated labor contracts came 
with inevitable expiration dates; the union could not renew those contracts because of 
competition with the Teamsters.  Big capital sided with the Teamsters against what they 
characterized as a radical, left-wing UFW.  The state of California, under the leadership 
of Ronald Reagan, was no friend of organized farm labor either and also made decisions 
that slowly chipped away at UFW success.   
Last, the interracial coalition between Filipinos and Mexicans became frayed.  
This erosion of the coalition is attributable, in part, to the smaller and older demographic 
which Filipino workers represented.  However, the composition of interracial labor 
unionism does not merely consist of people with variant racial and ethnic backgrounds.  
It is an ideological construct that requires maintenance and sustenance no matter who or 
what kind of people belong to the union.  The UFW would not maintain that ideology of 
interracial unity.  Instead, and sadly, the union began to displace Filipino workers—
ignoring them until they were phased out.  Additionally, workers from Mexico were 
disallowed from being part of a cross-sectional farm labor union.  The UFW, under the 
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leadership of Cesar Chavez, would forge ahead to unionize mostly Mexican American 
workers and would move ahead into decline.   
Last in my concluding remarks I argue that similar to the merger of Filipinos and 
Mexicans in the UFW, Latino Studies and Asian American Studies can, and frequently 
should, be part of the same pursuit.  Or at the very least, both sets of literature and 
communities (plural within both groups) must theoretically and politically inform each 
other.  Without making the typically bland reference that both represent the “two fastest 
growing groups” in the US, I contend that long before they were the “fastest growing 
groups,” their historical experiences have been either ignored or severely understudied.  
Moreover, they interacted, competed, and cooperated with each other long before they 
were termed as emergent groups in the twenty-first century.  Sociological analysis of 
their histories is helpful in filling an enormous scholarly void. 
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CHAPTER 2: THERE WILL BE NO “ONE BIG UNION:”  THE STRUGGLE 
FOR INTERRACIAL LABOR UNIONISM IN CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE, 
1933-1939  
 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Filipino, Japanese and Mexican farm workers partook in unsuccessful labor strikes in 
California from 1933 to 1939.  By focusing on this period of labor agitation, this chapter 
deals head on with the question of why striking farm workers were unable to mobilize 
successfully in the 1930s.  I argue that White racism prevented the formation of a 
successful, interracial farm worker union by creating a ladder of racial preferences that 
hierarchically ordered Japanese, Mexicans and Filipinos.  Previous studies on California 
farm worker mobilization efforts do not provide adequate analysis of the 1930s and the 
debilitating effects of racism on farm labor mobilization.  The chapter demonstrates how 
this racial hierarchy was constructed and maintained by landowners, the state, organized 
labor, and the White public.   
INTRODUCTION 
In the early twentieth century, large swaths of California farmland fell under the control 
of powerful owners in the state (Garcia 1980).  By 1929, Filipinos and Mexicans formed 
the core of “cheap, skilled, mobile and temporary” (McWilliams [1935, 1939] 1969: 65) 
agricultural labor in California.  Japanese in California indeed worked as farm laborers,   
but a considerable number were tenant farmers so that the Japanese occupied a middle 
ground between that of worker and owner.  The power of landowners over Filipino and 
Mexican workers and Japanese tenant farmers was considerable.  So much so, that by 
1930, 66 percent of all farm workers were held in the employ of only 7 percent of 
landowners (Chambers 1952: 5).  
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Filipinos and Mexicans were the main source of agricultural labor and often 
competed with each other for jobs and “to a lesser extent, with Japanese, South Asians, 
and Koreans” (Ngai 2004: 106).  Mexicans became a prime source of farm labor at the 
turn of the century and after 1910 constituted the bulk of farm workers in the California 
agricultural industry (Reisler 1976).  Filipino migrants had entered California in large 
numbers in the 1920s; many arrived from Hawaii (Coloma 1939).  But the majority had 
migrated directly from the Philippines (Ngai 2002).   
Between 1920 and 1930, the Filipino, Mexican, and Japanese populations would 
increase tremendously.  In 1930, California’s Filipino population numbered 30,470—a 
significant increase from the 1920 figure of 2,674.  The Mexican population in California 
stood at 368,013 in 1930—a threefold increase from the 1920 figure of 121,000.  As for 
the Japanese population, it stood at 97,456 in 1930, an upsurge from the 1920 count of 
71,952 (U.S. Census Bureau 1930).  Japanese and Mexicans constituted the two largest 
racial minority populations in 1930s California while Filipinos were the fourth largest 
minority group behind the Chinese.  However, Filipinos seemed to be perceived as a 
more notorious group as they originated from a US colony.  Further, Filipinos were the 
“new” Asian group in the state resultant of their conspicuous population increase rate of 
over 1000 percent between 1920 and 1930.   
 Decades later in 1966, Filipino and Mexican farm workers would merge their 
respective labor unions, the Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee and the 
National Farm Workers Association, into one mostly Mexican union led by Cesar Chavez 
as President.  But why were Filipino and Mexican workers, along with some Japanese 
workers, unable to succeed in the 1930s as they would in the 1960s?  To date few 
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analyses have been offered on the 1930s farm labor strikes and either ignore or 
deemphasize racial dynamics.  In this chapter, I argue that there was a racial hierarchy in 
1930s California agriculture ordered as follows: Whites, Japanese, Mexicans, and 
Filipinos.  The chapter demonstrates how a function of this hierarchy was to disable the 
assemblage of farm workers into a racially united farm labor union.   
 It was the ethos and practice of White supremacy that enacted a hierarchical 
arrangement of Asian and Mexican origin workers in which the groups were indexed and 
ranked from “capable” (Japanese) to “less capable” (Mexicans) and “detestable” 
(Filipinos).  Therefore, I define White supremacy as a racist force that distributes 
resources—political, economic, and social—to groups of color in such a manner that the 
lived experience and material outcomes of racial inequality is a differentiated existence 
for each group.  Further, while groups of color have these varied experiences, Whites 
remain at the top of a racial hierarchy.  The objective of the chapter is to not only 
historicize the racial politics of the farm workers movement but to provide a relevant 
theoretical treatment of racism that is applicable in contemporary settings. 
The chapter proceeds in the following manner: First, I offer a brief critical 
discussion of sociological and historical studies on farm labor mobilization.  I argue that 
these studies seldom position race as a key investigative point of analysis.  Thereafter, I 
examine historical sociological scholarship on multiracial agricultural workers.  These 
studies put forward models that enable a rigorous comparative analysis of race and 
ethnicity.  Next I begin presentation of my empirical case by detailing the social and 
historical construction of a superior White “American race” in the United States.  The 
ensuing sections locate and discus the disabling force of White supremacy in 1930s 
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California agriculture as it emanated from four key sources: landowners, the state, 
organized labor, and the White public. 
RACE AND THE FARM WORKERS MOVEMENT 
In studies of California’s agricultural labor history, historians and social scientists tend 
toward one of two directions.  Either the analyses offers a straightforward interpretation 
of how farm workers are economically exploited by landowners.  Or the workers are 
placed under the microscope of social movement theorists who strive to understand how 
exactly the farm workers movement of the 1960s was a success.  Moreover, much of the 
scholarship elides how Mexican and Asian origin people were oppressed in different 
ways.      
 Carey McWilliams (1942 and 1969 [1935]), the great documenter of the farm 
working class in California, writes on how landowners throughout the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries exploited farm workers of color.  McWilliams (1969: 103) 
argues that “the history of farm labor in California has revolved around the cleverly 
manipulated exploitation, by the large growers, of a number of suppressed racial minority 
groups which were imported to work in the fields.”  Later, McWilliams ponders the 
1930s strike waves and wonders why the strikes failed to coalesce into a united labor 
front.  While illuminative, McWilliams’ work poses the ensuing waves of Chinese, 
Japanese, Mexican, and Filipino workers as exploited groups that sequentially replaced 
each other.  He does not offer a comprehensive breakdown of these groups’ racial 
identities and how employers acted upon groups of people that they deemed not only 
inferior as a class group, but as racial groups as well.  Thus, McWilliams concludes that 
 26 
 
class relationships are the prime causal factor of the lowly position of farm workers, not 
the racism enacted upon them. 
 Sociologists J. Craig Jenkins and Marshall Ganz analyze farm worker efforts to 
unionize.  Jenkins notes the “ethnic cleavages” (1985: 73) that existed between Filipino 
and Mexican workers.  Further, Jenkins (1985: 73) argues that such divisions were 
historical creations resulting from “immigration waves, the prominence of self-
recruitment, and grower hiring policies.”   White racism is not cited as one of the causal 
factors of intra-worker divisions.  However, Jenkins does offer that White workers in the 
1930s, many of them Dust Bowl refugees pejoratively tagged as “Okies” and “Arkies,” 
were favored over workers of color.  However, since workers of color had become 
entrenched as the main source of farm labor in the 1920s (Ngai 2004: 106) and as the 
analytical section will demonstrate, employers preferred Asian and Mexican labor, I 
propose that the reason that considerable strife surrounded the strike waves of the 1930s 
was because racial and ethnic minority workers engaged in labor agitation.  
 In his study, Ganz (2000) contends that the United Farm Workers of America 
(UFW) was the embodiment of an “ethnic labor organization.” After doing so, the 
analysis imparts precious little light on the forces and parameters of racial or ethnic 
identity within the movement.  Further, Ganz explicates the 1960s and does not mention 
or analyze the predicament of farm workers in the 1930s as a precursor to what would 
occur three decades later.  Considering the short shrift that racial dynamics experience in 
farm worker scholarship, I turn to historical sociological work to access theoretical tools 
that allow interpretation of agricultural workers and race in 1930s California. 
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 RACIAL HIERARCHY MODELS AND AGRICULTURAL LABORERS  
In his study on late nineteenthc century California, Tomás Almaguer (1994) argues that 
racial groups, many who were agricultural workers, were stratified on a racial hierarchy 
that descended in the following order: Whites, Mexicans, Blacks, Asians, and Native 
Americans.  However, moving into the twentieth century, this hierarchy would transform 
as the Japanese curried greater favor with the White majority.      
 Writing on 1903 in the California community of Oxnard, Almaguer charts the 
unionization attempts of Japanese and Mexican beet toppers in the founding of the 
Japanese Mexican Labor Association (JMLA).  The workers would garner some 
concessions, but organized labor, along with widespread racist sentiment were wary of 
the nation’s first all non-white, interracial labor union (Jamieson 1945).  Almaguer’s 
central claim is that the specter of White supremacist practices and attitudes proved to be 
causal factors in the creation of a racial hierarchy.  The JMLA would procure a 
membership of what the Oxnard Courier described as over 1000 “dusty skinned Japanese 
and Mexicans…most of them young and belonging to the lower class (cited in Almaguer 
1994: 194).”   
The Oxnard beet strike displayed the first genuine example of large-scale 
interracial farm labor unionism in California.  However, Japanese and Mexican workers 
were perceived differently.  The Los Angeles Times reported after a violent shooting 
incident surrounding the labor unrest that Mexicans were responsible “for most of the 
firing” and that Japanese workers were “inclined to be peaceable” (cited in Almaguer 
1994: 194).  Japanese and Mexican efforts were stifled and further, it was clear that 
though they labored in the same kind of jobs, they occupied different racial positions 
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within California society.  Pursuant to their differentiated racial position, the class 
position of the Japanese would shift subsequent to the Oxnard strikes.  Richard Steven 
Street (1998) reports that many Japanese beet toppers formed the Japanese Cooperative 
Contracting Company (JCCC) in February 1906—no evidence is provided that Mexican 
workers did or could have ascended to the position of labor contractor.  Street (Ibid.:198) 
writes that the JCCC “did advertise itself as representing long-time Japanese sugar beet 
workers, but not Mexicans.”   
 Sociologist Moon-Kie Jung provides additional evidence of vertically aligned and 
fused racial and class inequality.  He examines racism’s effect on the class position of 
haoles (White landowners) and Portuguese, Japanese, and Filipino workers in interwar 
Hawaii (between World Wars one and two).  Jung (1999) maps a racial hierarchy that 
produces a corresponding class position for each group of workers with Portuguese 
workers at the top, Japanese in an intermediary location, and Filipinos at the lowest 
position.  Divided along mutually reinforced lines of race and class, the multiracial set of 
workers in Hawaii encountered a daunting task in striving to build interracial labor 
unionism, which eventually occurred. 
   We witness a situation in 1930s California that is not altogether different from 
interwar Hawaii.  As in Hawaii, workers of color were unable to build a successful 
movement in interwar California.  Japanese, Filipino, and Mexican laborers were 
relegated to similar, but not identical, positions on a race and class hierarchy.  And as in 
late nineteenth century California, the chapter exhibits how all three groups were 
perceived in unique ways and thus subjected to group-specific forms of racism.  
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BUILDING THE SUPREME WHITE RACE  
Thomas F. Gossett postulates that in the early twentieth century, an “American race” 
(1997 [1963]: 319), embodying a racial and nationalist ideology, emerged.  This 
conception of the “American race” would be grounded in Anglo Saxon identity and 
domination (Horsman 1981).  By pulling apart this racial and national identity, it is 
apparent that the ideology of White supremacy rests upon a tautological rationale: Whites 
are superior in every way—physically, cognitively, culturally—and thus should have 
more privilege and resources; furthermore, Whites have more privilege and resources 
because of their innate superiority.   
Historian David Roediger writes on how the construction of this “American race” 
would perpetuate inequality as “racial formation and class formation were thus bound to 
penetrate each other at every turn” (Roediger 1999 [1991]: 20) in US history.  Roediger 
proffers a thesis (Ibid.) that White supremacist oppression, in the cloak of Whiteness, 
creates the domain of working class identity for Whites only and ensures that Blacks 
simultaneously form the “anchor” (Twine and Warren 1997) of that identity.  Blacks are 
thus the core and the foil of White workers’ superior racial identity.  Workers of color are 
an uninvited guest, an intruder, and also perceived competition for working class identity 
and jobs.  Most significantly, they represent a perversion of the conflated racial, national, 
and class identities of White working class Americans.   
 As for California in the 1930s, the insidious nature of White racial and class 
domination is evidenced in a 1934 Los Angeles Times editorial.  Bemoaning the 
candidacy of socialist Upton Sinclair for governor, the editorial speaks of the difficulties 
confronting this “supreme” racial group in the Depression era.  The paper wrote: 
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Until now, it might be said that the Americans were a nomadic race— 
at least in a spiritual sense.  They lived in a land of milk and honey 
with great forests, free lands and untouched resources for the grasping.  
The pioneer period has come to an end…..This involves a readjustment  
of physical needs, but not of patriotic ideals.4   
 
In an earlier portion of the piece, the paper speaks disparagingly of striking farm workers 
in the Imperial Valley, east of San Diego on the US-Mexico border.  The editorial speaks 
to Whites of their own superiority while invoking the lowly Mexican strikers in the 
cotton fields of the Imperial Valley as potential imposters upon this identity. 
 In the face of such brash racism, farm workers of color would not form a racially 
united labor front.  The force of White supremacy precluded such an event and the 
ensuing sections will explain how as the workers walked off the job.  Indeed, White 
supremacy from varying sources would act oppressively against struggling workers of 
color in the California fields. 
THE FARM LABOR STRIKES OF 1930S CALIFORNIA  
 
The 1930s was a tumultuous period in California history.  In economic turmoil because 
of the Great Depression, few groups were more deprived than farm workers of color.  In 
the years from 1933 to 1939, the state’s burgeoning agribusiness industry would witness 
unprecedented strike waves.  Filipino and Mexican workers would comprise a large 
number of these striking workers (Garcia 1980; Gregory 1989).  Japanese farmers would 
be caught in the middle as a group who possessed more capital, privilege and status than 
Filipinos and Mexicans, but still maintained an unequal position with respect to Whites in 
the racial hierarchy of the time period.  Moreover, there were some Japanese farm 
workers involved in the mobilization efforts. 
                                                 
4 “Is This Still America?” Los Angeles Times August 30, 1934, pg. A4. 
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 In 1933, thirty “major” strikes (Wollenberg 1972: 163) involving upwards of 
50,000 workers took place (Jamieson 1945; Wollenberg 1972).  By 1939, there would be 
a total of 180 agricultural strikes (McWilliams 1942; Jamieson 1945).  The strikes often 
became physically violent episodes as landowner-controlled law enforcement and angry 
White mobs reacted to the agitation (McWilliams 1935; McWilliams 1942; Fisher 1953; 
DeWitt 1980).  One worker, in the northern city of Hollister, recalled that in response to a 
1936 strike, the notorious grower organization, the Associated Farmers, “tried to run the 
workers out of the area.  But [sic] they refused to leave.  Most of this was up in the 
southside of Hollister…Of course there was [sic] fights.  They used ax handles and 
baseball bats.”5 Furthermore, the strikes were deemed criminal and frightening activity 
by landowners as the strike leaders were portrayed as Communists: 
[The Associated Farmers] would claim that those people [CIO organizers] were around 
here in the area.  They would hand out pictures of them to be aware of.  Because they 
said they were probably Reds or Communists...and they told us a lot of stories how they 
were bad people and would cause a lot of trouble.6 
 
 Three years previous in a 1933 issue, the Los Angeles Times quoted Los Angeles 
Police Department Chief James E. Davis as he heaped praise on his own for keeping the 
city safe and strike-free.  Chief Davis, seemingly relieved, portrays Los Angeles as an 
urban oasis that escaped the labor uproar which had occurred in the exterior regions of 
the state, “The amount of effort and tact extended by this department in the prevention 
and control of labor strikes and Communistically tended riots cannot be measured in 
mere words or statistics.”7  Further, the police boss had instituted a “Red Squad” that 
                                                 
5 Labor Collection Papers, Leonard Library, Charlie Blacklock, Interview with Joan L. Zoloth, 1976.  
6 Ibid. 
7 “Chief Reports Drop in Crime” Los  Angeles Times Dec 23, 1933, pg. A2. 
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restricted any activities deemed subversive and operated with the blessing of government 
and business leaders.8    
  In the face of strike unrest, employers could rely on law enforcement, but still 
deemed it necessary to organize their interests and did so in amalgamating various 
landowners into the Associated Farmers (Chambers 1953; Jenkins 1985).  Conversely, 
but not surprisingly, farm workers were an unstable group that would find it difficult to 
match the deft manner in which landowners organized.  Farm workers moved from work 
site to work site, were marginalized people, and did not possess the commensurate 
resources necessary to effectively respond to powerful landowners and growers.   
DIFFERENT RACES FOR DIFFERENT JOBS 
Concomitant with their desire for lower wages, California landowners expressed “racial 
preferences” for certain kinds of workers.  Indeed landowners constructed farm workers 
of color as unique groups, which they subjected to “qualitatively different racisms” (Jung 
2002: 392).  Lloyd Fisher (1953: 7) writes: 
To be sure, the farmer has preferences, but these are racial preferences.  
The Filipino is preferred because Filipinos are presumed to be skilled agricultural 
workers.  The Mexican is preferred to the White because of a presumption that he is less 
‘independent.’  The Negro is least favorably regarded.  
  
As it were, Filipinos were regarded as appropriate for certain kinds of crops such as 
lettuce and asparagus (Fisher 1953; Jenkins 1985), but posed a threat as labor agitators.  
As for Mexicans, they were perceived as a malleable group of dimwits who could be 
exploited with ease and sent back home over the border to Mexico where they remained 
an accessible, cheap labor force (Hoffman 1974).   
                                                 
8 The LAPD openly admits this on their website: www.lapdonline.org/history (1926-1950). 
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Moreover, Whites were not excluded from this racial schema.  In fact, they 
formed the justification as to why landowners would desire cheap workers of color.  
White workers were perceived as a group who would stake their claim to the status of 
workers who deserved a higher wage.  Additionally, White workers did not visualize 
themselves as mere farm workers; the performance of farm labor by Whites made the 
occupation a loftier calling.  One White worker recalled that previous to “thinking of 
agricultural labor as Mexican work….There were whites in the fields, whites in the 
packinghouses.  Before, it never used to be a disgrace to work in the fields.”9   
But even in the 1930s and with the influx of Okies and Arkies and thus a 
seemingly substantial and cheap labor reservoir, the powers that be contended that 
Whites were physiologically unequipped to carry out farm work anyway.  One official in 
the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, George P. Clements, argued that farm labor was 
a type of work “to which the oriental and Mexican due to their crouching and bending 
habits are fully adopted, while the white is physically unable to adapt himself” (cited in 
Hoffman 1974: 10).  Further, the historical record indicates that Whites were certainly in 
the packinghouses and sheds, but not out in the fields in large numbers (Ngai 2002).    
In the comparison of “oriental” and Mexican labor, landowners desired Mexican 
workers above everyone else.  Compared to Filipino and Japanese workers they were not 
perceived as people with the capacity to strike.  Further, Mexican workers were in large 
supply and easily disposable, but this is far too simple of an explanation as to why 
Mexicans were the most prized type of worker.  One California landowner and walnut 
farmer, George Teague (1944: 141), opined that Mexicans were the favorite worker of 
land barons because they are “naturally adapted to agricultural work, particularly in the 
                                                 
9 Labor Collection Papers, Leonard Library, Holman Day, interview with Joan L. Zoloth, 1976. 
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handling of fruits and vegetables.”  Again, we observe the racialization of workers of 
color that constructs them as apropos for agricultural work.  However, the key point here 
is that Mexican workers offered the ideal quality of being physically predisposed to do 
agricultural labor.     
In contrast to Mexican workers, Filipino and Japanese workers were racialized as 
labor agitators who threatened the racial and class order.  Historian Cletus Daniel (1981) 
argues that Japanese workers had developed their own niche in the California agricultural 
industry along with effective strategies to bargain for higher wages.  While this certainly 
was the case, I will add that subsequent to their ascension to the class level of tenant 
farmer, many Japanese farm operators—like White landowners—possessed an interest in 
snuffing out strike actions.  Indeed there were Japanese farm workers but it is essential to 
note Japanese farmers’ unique position as an employer group.  By 1910, the same year 
that Mexicans came to dominate the agricultural labor force, many Japanese had become 
either growers or sharecroppers in California (Iwata 1992) and oversaw more than 
170,000 acres of California farmland, which was rented from White landowners 
(Wollenberg 1972).  Further, legal mandates by the California Alien Land Laws of 1913 
and 1920 barred Japanese Californians from becoming property owners and blocked any 
ascension to the racial and class status of White landowners.   
THE “DESIRABLE” JAPANESE  
Thus, the racial hierarchy in 1930s California agriculture constructed and reified a 
racialized social system in which the Japanese were regarded by Whites more favorably 
as compared to Filipinos and Mexicans.  For example, near the northern cities of 
Vacaville and Winters, one local resident in 1935 stated that “The most desirable renter 
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that they [landowners] have is the Japanese.  They are not as bad at impoverishing the 
soil as the Spanish and the Italians.”10  In contrast, Filipinos built a “reputation for 
militancy and radicalism,” (Daniel 1981: 109) which made them the least desirable group 
of people. 
Still, in accordance with their unique position as worker and employer, Japanese 
workers took interest in labor mobilization.  One flyer distributed to Japanese residents in 
San Francisco denounced oppression of racial minorities and called for racial and 
working class unity:  
The condition of the Japanese, along with Chinese, Filipino and Negro masses 
is getting worse under the Merriam administration and the ‘New Deal.’  The 
Japanese is hired for cheap wages and is discriminated against in daily life…. 
Workers and poor farmers have no reason to struggle among themselves on  
national or color lines;-- all are exploited by the bankers and landlords.11  
Indeed, Japanese workers’ and tenant farmers’ racial and class identities negotiated a 
tight intermediary space between Whites and those beneath the Japanese on the ladder of 
racial preferences: Japanese growers in Imperial Valley replaced their Mexican workers 
with Whites as will be shown, but Japanese workers in San Francisco called out for 
interracial cooperation. 
 Yet, Japanese tenant farmers cooperated with Whites in maintaining the stratified 
social order of the day.  For example, in dealing with Mexican strikers in 1935, a 
message in English and Japanese, was sent out to growers/employers in the Imperial 
Valley: the “NOTICE” was composed by a committee of three White growers (Jack, 
Harrigan, and Beleal) and three Japanese growers (Uchida, Sasaki, and Matsumoto) in 
conjunction with General P.D. Glassford, who had been called in by the government to 
                                                 
10 Paul S. Taylor Papers, Bancroft Library, Term Paper Interview by Ruth Merrick with unnamed 
respondent, April 1935, (Box  43, Folder 12). 
11 Young Library, Yoneda Papers, “Why the Japanese Should Vote Communist,” August 1934, (Box 152, 
Folder 2). 
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settle unrest in the area.  The memorandum dictated that only American workers (read: 
White) could be employed in shed work.  Ngai (2004) indicates that indeed shed work 
had been the exclusive right of White workers and workers of color were contained to 
work in the fields.  Significantly, the command ordered “that the alien Mexican packers 
be replaced by Americans returning them [Mexicans] to the field work.”12  Thus, 
Japanese growers worked in conjunction with their White counterparts to head off 
potential strike action. 
1933 in El Monte, ten miles east of Los Angeles, further exemplifies the 
hierarchy.  Japanese growers faced demands for higher wages from Mexican workers, 
who they employed as berry pickers.  As strikes ensued, White institutions in the 
community, represented most prominently by the El Monte Chamber of Commerce, 
ensured that Japanese growers made concessions (Wollenberg 1972).  This action on the 
part of the Chamber of Commerce is not to be mistaken for magnanimity toward 
Mexicans.  Local public aid programs were breaking under the strain of providing 
support to striking workers.  Expressing deep concern for the public coffers and taking 
into account that Japanese growers could not pay rent to local White landowners if 
berries were not picked, the pressure to concede was insurmountable. 
Further, Wollenberg (1972) describes how Mexican workers believed that racial 
tensions were at play with their Japanese employers in El Monte—a situation not 
contained to the southern portion of the state.  Filipino workers also maintained that their 
Japanese overseers looked down on them.  Up north in Salinas, one Filipino worker 
expressed deep animosity for Japanese bosses, “Most of the farms then [in the 1930s] 
                                                 
12 Paul S. Taylor Papers, Bancroft Library, Flyer, (Box 46, Folder 11). 
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were run by Japanese.  You had to really earn your wages.  They were slave drivers.  
They said if you weren’t working fast enough, you were out of work.”13  
Another worker uprising occurred in Venice in April 1935, beginning with strikes 
in celery fields, 4,500 Filipino, Mexican and Japanese workers walked off the job and 
spurred on a series of mini-strike waves throughout the community.  No love was 
apparently lost between the workers and their Japanese employers as “during the labor 
troubles, kidnapping [sic], rioting, raids, pitched battles, and the use of airplanes from 
which to drop rocks on field workers were resorted to.”  Nobura Tsuchida (1984) narrates 
how the dispute was resolved with a labor deal agreed upon between the workers’ 
representatives—the California Farm Laborers Association and the Federation of Farm 
Workers of America—and the growers’ organization—the Southern California Farm 
Federation of Los Angeles County (SCFFLAC), which held within its membership 800 
Japanese farmers.14   Though the SCFFLAC was a Japanese organization, Tsuchida 
(Ibid.) reports, based on his reading of a Los Angeles Japanese newspaper [Rafu 
Shimpo], that throughout the strikes growers drew the backing of local law enforcement 
agencies, Japanese civic organizations, the US Immigration Service, and the Japanese 
Consulate.  The workers appealed to the broader public with a meeting at Union Church 
in Little Tokyo where spokespeople for Filipino and Mexican laborers were provided an 
opportunity to plead the workers’ case.  However, by early June the strikes were ended 
when “Mexican workers unilaterally accepted hourly rates ten cents lower than the 
strikers request (Ibid.: 459).” 
                                                 
13 Labor Collection Papers, Leonard Library, Manuel Luz, interview with Joan L. Zoloth, 1976. 
14 “Field Strike Called Off” Los Angeles Times July 10, 1936, pg. A9. 
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Japanese tenant farmers and White landowners set clearly defined goals: to 
maintain a status quo of low wages and a tight grip on their labor force.  In carrying out 
this agenda, landowners and farm operators had several factors operating in their favor.  
As for workers, they had little to rely upon except for their own ability to walk off the job 
and eventually the Communist Party.  Communist ideals represented an ideological 
construct that operated to draw Filipinos, Japanese, and Mexicans together under the 
banner of exploited workers.  Throughout the early portion of the 1930s, the Communist 
Party supported Trade Union Unity League (TUUL) was a key player in most of the labor 
agitation.  Most prominently, the TUUL was the driving force behind the formation of the 
Cannery and Agricultural Industrial Workers’ Union (CAIWU), which had organized 
Mexican berry pickers in El Monte.   
Daniel (1981) contends that Mexican participation in TUUL sanctioned activity 
should not be equated to acquiescence with Communist philosophy.  Yet, Jamieson 
(1945) points out that prominent labor organizers, which he specifically names—
Japanese, Filipino, and Mexican—indeed subscribed to Communist ideals.  However, for 
Mexicans in El Monte, Communist ideals were not adequate to address their conflict with 
Japanese bosses as it required them to assert themselves purely as workers—the struggle 
could only be understood as class struggle.  According to Wollenberg (1972), Mexican 
strikers felt that there was racial as well as class tension between themselves and their 
Japanese employers and may have disagreed with the way in which the CAIWU 
attempted to deracialize the labor strife.   
 Further, historian Eiichiro Azuma (1998: 164) demonstrates that indeed tense race 
relations were at play between Japanese farm operators and their workers.  Azuma reports 
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on a tendency for Japanese tenant farmers to identiy Mexicans “as more ‘docile’ and 
‘better’ than Filipinos, who had already struck against farmers elsewhere in California.”  
However, this racialized differentiation of workers, in which Mexicans were considered 
more favorable, occurred when Japanese employers could exclude Filipinos.  Azuma 
(1998: Footnote 90) asserts, based on his readings of Japanese newspapers, that when 
Mexicans did carry out strike activity, such as in El Monte, “Filipinos often became a 
‘good’ race—that is, a friend of the Issei farming class—while Mexicans were considered 
the main menace.”  Thus, the ordering of the racial hierarchy was open to the 
manipulation of those groups who sat atop of it.     
THE STATE AND INTERRACIAL LABOR UNIONISM 
With few resources available and few advocates to defend them, working with known 
Communists was perhaps the only alternative for Filipino, Japanese, and Mexican 
workers but it was a perilous relationship upon which to embark.  In 1919, the California 
legislature had enacted the State Syndicalism Law.  Thereafter, state law deemed a 
criminal anyone who subscribed to “any doctrine or precept” which advocated or 
employed actions that would serve to create “a change in industrial ownership or control, 
effecting any political change” (text of the statute cited from Solow 1935: 14).  
Subsequently, the presence of Communist led activity and convenient anti-Communist 
legislation would provide landowners in California with good reason to coalesce into 
their own anti-labor organization: The Associated Farmers. 
 The Associated Farmers as a name for the landowners’ organization was a 
misnomer.  The group was a complex of powerful land barons, big industry—such as 
businesses, which shipped and processed agricultural products—and the banking sector—
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in particular, the Bank of America.  The organization would utilize the State Criminal 
Syndicalism Law to deal, in effect, a deathblow to CAIWU-led strikes, bringing them to 
an end by 1934, and thereby dissolving the only organization, which advocated for 
interracial labor unionism.  In a 1934 report by the Associated Farmers, which can be 
characterized as big capital’s White paper on the strike waves of the period, the 
organization stated that the program of the CAIWU and “the Communist 
Party…embodies the overthrow of the American form of government by force, 
suppression of religion, and the establishment of a central control, or dictatorship, by the 
workers themselves.”  Furthermore, though the report spoke most specifically about 
southern California, it identified Communist led agricultural strikes as a 
statewide/industry-wide problem: “It is a program [labor strikes] primarily directed 
toward the perishable crops of California agriculture.  It is a situation which must be met 
by agriculture as a whole.”15   
In 1935, “agriculture as a whole” along with the aid of the state apparatus would 
finish off the CAIWU in a Sacramento courthouse where union leaders were convicted of 
violating the Syndicalism statute.  However, the trial in 1935 constituted far more than a 
crackdown on Communist activity.  I contend that the legal verdict was a state-sanctioned 
renouncement of interracial labor unionism.  The prosecuting lawyer in the case, 
Sacramento district attorney Neil McAllister, informed the jury that “the defendants do 
not believe in religion or the superiority of the white to the negro and yellow races” 
(Solow 1935: 20).  Moreover, McAllister argued that convicting the defendants would be 
tantamount to carrying out the tenets of patriotic duty (Solow 1935: 20).   Indeed, the 
                                                 
15Paul S. Taylor Papers, Bancroft Library, Report by the Associated Farmers: “The Imperial Valley Farm 
Labor Situation,” April 16, 1934, (Box 46, Folder 11). 
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strike leaders had engaged in not only Communist action, but had done so with the other.  
Consequently, farm workers of color in 1930s California faced not only a battle for 
higher wages, but more significantly, they encountered the devastating force of White 
supremacist ideology which worked to disassemble any effort to create interracial 
working class consciousness.  These workers constituted an inferior group of people in 
which race and class were “mutually constitutive” (Jung 2006) and acted to relegate 
workers of color to the lowest levels of the labor market.   
However, Filipino and Mexican farm labor activism did not fade into decline.  
Stuart Jamieson (1945: 129) reports that “farm labor unions grew rapidly among 
Filipinos, as among Mexicans” subsequent to the CAIWU’s state-engineered demise.  
However, growers reasoned that Filipinos were the party responsible for priming the 
labor movement pump.  A newspaper account from Brawley in the Imperial Valley 
offered that Filipinos (Ibid.: 131, cited from the Brawley News) “brought labor 
disturbances in the valley” and that “growers are not pleased.”  Though growers may 
have focused upon Filipinos as the central labor agitation threat, Jamieson (Ibid.: 132) 
reasons that Filipino “won their greatest gains when they had cooperated closely with 
organized Mexicans and whites.”     
UNDESIRABLES: FILIPINOS AND MEXICANS IN THE NATIONAL SPACE 
Though Filipinos and Mexicans underwent the threat of repatriation, both groups were 
filtered out differently in the national imagination.  They were colonized subjects who 
were neither American citizen nor outright foreigner (Ngai 1999; Ngai 2002; Ngai 2004).  
Coming from a colonial outpost, workers from the Philippines were not subject to the 
1924 Immigration Act.  Though the Filipino population in California in 1930 of 30,500 
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did not compare with that of the Mexican population of 368,000, H. Brett Melendy 
(1967) asserts that Filipinos were significant to the White majority as they represented 
the dreaded “third Oriental wave” to invade California (subsequent to the Chinese and 
Japanese).  This “Oriental” wave was not merely a physically different colonial subject.  
They were a hygienically unfit group who were predisposed to engage in labor agitation 
and sexual relationships with White women.   
 Consequently, between 1933 and 1935, the Congress would consider a series of 
bills that would move legislative efforts toward the institution of a Filipino repatriation 
program.  On July 10, 1935, President Roosevelt signed House Resolution 6464 into law.  
Two provisions in the law stand out.  First, the law’s text is clear that Filipinos would not 
be forcefully deported from the country.  However, another provision mandated that any 
Filipino person who took the offer of free passage back to the Philippines would not be 
allowed re-entry into the country.  As a result, there were few takers of the “offer;” only 
2,036 individuals would end up choosing to return the Philippines when the program 
terminated in July 1940 (Ngai 2002).  Historian Mae Ngai (1999) argues that though only 
a few accepted the offer of free passage (most from the middle-class), the goal of 
repatriation efforts are more nuanced than being simple removal programs.  They are a 
message to the targeted group—regardless of whether they vacate or not—that they are 
undesirables.  
In contrast, Mexicans were not current colonial subjects in the 1930s, but had 
been the objects of conquest by the US subsequent to the Mexican American War of 
1848 (Acuña 1972; Barrera 1979; Montejano 1986).  Throughout the 1930s, Mexicans 
would be repatriated by an illegal program that would force Mexican descent people, 
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some of them US citizens, “back” to Mexico.  Mexicans, not unlike Filipinos, served well 
as an economic scapegoat in tight economic times (Hoffman 1974; Balderrama and 
Rodriguez 1995).  Consequently, from the years 1930 to 1937, over 500,000 Mexicans 
would be deported from the United States.  Many of these people would be children who 
held US citizenship (Hoffman 1974).  
The repatriation of Mexicans from the US was a forcible removal of people from 
many parts of the country.  Efforts were carried out in Chicago, Detroit, and Gary, 
Indiana.  However, the main stage for the repatriation program of Mexicans was in 
California, particularly Los Angeles (Hoffman 1974; Gutiérrez 1995).  McWilliams 
(1968) argues that the impetus for directing repatriation efforts toward California’s 
Mexican population was, in part, at the directive of landowners.  The propertied elite was 
deeply concerned, as already illustrated by the formation of the Associated Farmers, in 
regards to any labor organization farm workers would endeavor to create.  Removing 
Mexicans from California would, hopefully for powerful landowners, extract some 
portion of the labor agitation threat.  
The number of repatriated Mexicans far outnumbered Filipinos who returned to 
the Philippines.  Yet, Filipinos appeared to be the group, which drew considerable ire as 
compared to Mexicans as seen in the previous section.  Mexicans were assessed as 
reliable, necessary labor.  Balderrama and Rodríguez (2006: 101) write that in the 1930s, 
the powers that be “were repeatedly implored to desist from repatriating indigent 
Mexicans until after the crops had been harvested.”  Further, Los Angeles Chamber of 
Commerce official, George P. Clements, contrasted Mexicans as more desirable than 
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Filipinos who were deemed (Ibid.: 101) “the most worthless, unscrupulous, shiftless, 
semi-barbarian that has ever come to our shores.”   
A possible reason that Mexican labor remained more desirable—even in the midst 
of deportations—is that Mexicans often worked as a family unit (Ibid.: 45-48).  
Conversely, Filipino men were single and lacked a sizable number of potential Filipina 
marriage partners.  The lack of family meant that Filipinos were solo workers, bringing 
no additional laborers in the form of immediate relatives, and were conceived as a threat 
to Whites and, in particular, White women.  A White Salinas resident, in 1930, expressed 
abhorrence of Filipinos since “they will not leave our white girls alone and frequently 
intermarry” (cited in Melendy 1977: 67).   A San Joaquin County labor official remarked 
that a Filipino contractor “brings women (white women) into the camp as well as booze” 
(Ibid.).   
Indeed, as racially stigmatized groups, both Filipino and Mexican workers found 
few allies in their organization efforts and little protective cover from state-operated 
repatriation.  However, Mexicans were not envisaged as the sexual threat that Whites 
projected onto Filipino men.  Further, Filipino workers would find themselves 
differentiated from Mexicans as unpalatable to the White organized labor power 
structure. 
“ONE BIG UNION”?: (WHITE) ORGANIZED LABOR SAYS “NO” 
Organized labor was not receptive of Filipino and Mexican organization efforts either.  
Specifically, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) was unwilling to be racially 
inclusive of all agricultural laborers.  In the development of an official policy toward both 
Filipinos and Mexicans, the California Federation of Labor (CFL) would officially 
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support the exclusion of Filipinos, in slight favor of Mexicans, from the agricultural labor 
force.  This policy was reiterated from 1927 to 1931 at annual CFL conventions (Fuller 
1991: 53).  Though on a small scale, this racism-laden, nativist sentiment was reflected at 
a more macro and state-level when the US Congress instituted anti-Filipino legislation in 
the 1930s (Baldoz 2004).   
Moreover, agricultural workers, no matter their racial and ethnic identity, had 
been disallowed the right to collective bargaining when they were excluded from the 
provisions of the Wagner Act of 1935 (more formally known as the National Labor 
Relations Act) (Mariano 1940).   This distinction of being an industrial worker was 
necessary to engage in the labor negotiation process.  Both landowners and organized 
labor subscribed to this view of workers as inhabiting categories of either industrial or 
non-industrial worker.  However, the designation moved beyond job classification and 
disproportionately harmed workers of color, especially those in California’s agricultural 
industry.  Workers of color could not be categorized as industrial workers since they did 
not labor in the sheds and packinghouses.  In defining laborers as industrial workers, the 
implication for farm workers of color was that to be defined as an industrial worker 
meant being White. 
In February 1937, 97 delegates representing more than 100,000 farm workers met 
in San Francisco in an AFL sponsored gathering and called to dissolve this class, racial, 
and labor line drawn between industrial and non-industrial workers.  Representatives 
called for “one big union” which would unite both “cannery and field workers” 
(Chambers 1952: 35).  However, the AFL was in favor of no such action.  Oddly, the 
organization leadership desired to organize farm workers, such as Filipino lettuce 
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workers in Salinas, but was unwilling to impart upon these workers actual membership in 
the labor union (Dewitt 1980).  Unsurprisingly, as they faced marginalization from labor 
union organizations, Stuart Jamieson (1945: 179) asserts that several among “the more 
articulate elements in Filipino communities favored a separate racial labor movement.”  
Subsequent to the strike waves of the 1930s, Filipino workers formed the Filipinos 
Agricultural Laborers Association (FALA) which Jamieson (Ibid.: 187) termed “the 
largest field workers’ union in California” in 1940. 
Unsatisfied delegates at the San Francisco meeting founded the United Cannery, 
Agricultural, Packing, and Allied Workers of America (UCAPAWA), which was 
affiliated with the recently formed CIO (Committee for Industrial Organization—later to 
be known as the Congress for Industrial Organizations).  Within the AFL and the newly 
minted CIO, workers were supposed to be industrial workingmen.  Citing this 
shortcoming, UCAPWA focused on unionizing workers within the agricultural industry 
who worked in the processing plants and in the fields (Chambers 1952).  Therefore, a key 
UCAPAWA initiative was to blur the line between the industrial and agricultural worker 
in order to assemble workers across these lines.  Thus by implication, this was a 
movement toward interracial unionism. 
As it were, the CIO was a newly formed umbrella organization made up of a few 
unions who held some contempt for the AFL.  That is to say that the UCAPAWA had 
allies, but they would not be powerful enough to overcome the AFL and its resistance to 
farm workers of color.  Nevertheless, by the time of UCAPAWA’s first national meeting 
in Denver in July 1937, many Filipino, Mexican, and Japanese labor unions would 
become incorporated into the structure of UCAPAWA (Jamieson 1945).  However, 
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historian Howard DeWitt (1980) asserts that even within the confines of the UCAPAWA, 
Filipino demands were not being met.         
   While Filipinos and Mexicans had cooperated with Japanese and even White 
workers in agricultural strikes, especially in CAIWU-led activity in 1933, many workers 
were stationed within group specific labor organizations.  Mexican workers had 
organized unions such as El Confederacion de Uniones de Campesinos y Obreros 
Mexicanos del Estado de California (CUCOM), the Mexican Agricultural Workers 
Union, and the American Mexican Union.  Filipino workers organized a litany of unions, 
among them were the Filipino Labor Association, the Filipino Labor Supply Association, 
and the Filipino Labor Union Incorporated of Guadalupe (Jamieson 1945).  Though they 
maintained their own labor organizations, there are examples of cooperation between 
Filipino and Mexican workers much to the chagrin of landowners and Japanese tenant 
farmers.  This is evidenced by the previously noted Venice strikes in 1935.   
As previously noted, Stuart Jamieson (1945) asserts that when there was 
cooperation between Filipinos, Mexicans, and Whites, there were significant labor 
victories.  However, these successes did not deter some in the Filipino community from 
an insistence on Filipino-only agricultural labor unions.  Individuals, such as the secretary 
of the Filipino Labor Union Incorporated (FLU), C.D. Mensalves, “favored a policy of 
racial exclusiveness and opposed affiliation with other labor organizations” (Jamieson 
1945: 132).  This may be attributable to the ways landowners and the labor union power 
structure (as embodied by the AFL) racialized workers of color and viewed industrial, 
White workers as superior and labor union eligible.  But clearly, Filipinos underwent a 
differentiated experience with racism as compared to Mexicans.  Labor unions did not 
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want them.  As deportable subjects, they were characterized as “semi-barbarian.”  
Furthermore, Filipino workers’ position at the bottom of a racial hierarchy is evidenced 
further by the racist violence to which they were subjected in 1930s California.  
THE RACIST TERRORISM OF THE WHITE PUBLIC  
Historian Eric T.L. Love (2004: 164) writes that US colonization of the Philippines 
constitutes the “culminating event…on race and American imperialism in the late 
nineteenth century.”  Love shows that US imperialists, ever cognizant of connections 
between race and colonization and hoping to obfuscate those links, operated to “remove 
race from the debates” [Love’s emphasis] (Ibid.: 164) over a potential takeover of the 
archipelago.  Advocates for empire building aimed to defuse concerns in regards to how 
the U.S. state could govern a racially mixed empire.  One such concern articulated by a 
former government official warned the reading public that governing the Philippines 
would mean “running the risk incident to the admission of distant and alien peoples to 
full citizenship” (cited from North American Review in Ibid.: 181).  The Nation voiced 
concern that annexation of the Philippines opened the door for “incorporation into our 
system of an immense group of islands” and “eight millions of people of various races, 
that are for the most part either savage or but half-civilized” (Ibid.: 181).         
 Indeed the effects of racism rooted within imperial endeavors persisted into 
twentieth century as Filipinos were subjected to White terrorism in 1930s California.  
While anti-Filipino terrorism that occurred in the year 1930 obviously predates the strike 
waves between 1933 and 1939, I assert that anti-Filipino riots in that year provide a 
reliable barometric measurement of the social atmosphere, which Filipinos experienced 
throughout the decade.  
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Beginning in Watsonville, racist anger toward Filipinos would crystallize in 
violent scenes.  On January 19, upwards of 500 “blue collar” Whites marched through the 
town proclaiming that Filipinos posed a threat to society as a “social and sexual problem” 
(DeWitt 1976: 46-47).  The fear that Filipino men would engage in sexual relationships 
with White women caused a great stir in the local community.  Filipinos would respond 
to the onslaught of White gangs by fighting back, but would be unable to gain an upper 
hand in how the local media would depict them.  Historian Howard DeWitt cites one 
newspaper whose coverage of the riots was summed up in a headline, which read 
“FILIPINOS RIOT ON WATSONVILLE STREETS” (cited from the Santa Cruz News 
in DeWitt 1980: 47).  The newspaper thus posed Filipinos as the rioters though much 
evidence points to the fact that “Filipino riots” were a justified reaction to the White 
mobs.   
Moreover, the state of California issued a post-riot report on Filipino migration 
into the state that did not allow a favorable depiction of the group among the White 
public.  The bulletin (State of California, Department of Industrial Relations 1930: 72) 
opined that “Filipinos are taking the places of white workers in many of the occupations 
in which they find employment upon arrival into California.”  Taking under consideration 
several instances of rioting against Filipinos in Watsonville, Exeter, Tulare county, and 
Monterey county, the state report concludes (Ibid: 76) that Whites were understandably 
upset since “the appearances and customs of the Islanders…aroused the acrimony and 
hostility of the white residents.” 
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One Filipino farm worker in a community nearby Watsonville described a trying 
daily life in the 1930s: 
  Even if you had the money we weren’t allowed in hotels or in some restaurants 
  they refused to serve you.  Right in Salinas, that was so.  If you walked the street  
even with friends of another race, the people would say ‘hey gugu, monkey.’   
That’s the way people treated us.16   
Paul A. Kramer (2006: 127) offers that the racist epithet, “gugu,” was part and parcel of a 
“distinctive Philippine American colonial vocabulary that focused hatreds around a novel 
enemy.”  Though the racial slur originated in the Philippines from US military personnel 
as Kramer argues, in California it was only a portion of derogatory practices and 
language that the White public would use to oppress Filipino workers.   
A bit north of San Francisco in Vacaville, about 90 miles from Salinas, the local 
police chief cited Filipinos as a threat to the wellbeing of the local community.  The 
chief, in 1935, attested that “the Filipinos are the least desirable additions to any 
community” and showed an interviewer a “large exhibit of arms [guns and various 
weapons]” that had allegedly had been taken from local Filipinos.  Further, the chief 
contrasted Filipinos and other groups such as the Chinese with a positive assessment of 
Japanese people who took “care of each other and do not cause any trouble in the 
community.”17  A local judge in San Francisco, in 1936, deemed Filipinos as “scarcely 
more than savages” (cited in Kramer 2006: 407).    
As for the riots in Watsonville, they would subside within a few days, but would 
culminate in the death of one Filipino farm worker who was gunned down in his living 
quarters located on the ranch where he worked.  Back in the Philippines, the Manila 
                                                 
16 Labor Collection Papers, Leonard Library, Manuel Luz, interview with Joan L. Zoloth, 1976. 
17 Paul S. Taylor Papers, Bancroft Library, letter to Paul S. Taylor from Ruth Merrick, April 30, 1935, (Box 
43, Folder 12).  
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Times termed the riots an interracial conflict calling the chaos in Watsonville “racial 
warfare” (Ibid.: 411).  One White worker confirms that anti-Filipino violence was not a 
once-occurring affair and pointed out that such incidents were commonplace: “They 
[Filipinos in the 1930s] took a pretty bad beating themselves.  The shipper would burn 
them out of their camps or go out at nights and shoot into their houses.”18  Congressmen 
Arthur M. Free, who represented Watsonville (seemingly only the White portion of the 
population), argued that the White gangs had been all but baited into the violence because 
Filipino men were “luring young white girls into degradation” (cited from the Manila 
Times in Kramer 2006: 412).  The tension would spread to nearby San Jose where local 
Filipino leaders would advise Filipinos in the local community to “stay off the streets” for 
their own safety (DeWitt 1976).  The threat of racist riots notwithstanding, landowners 
wanted to maintain access to cheap labor.  Eventually, law enforcement would see to the 
protection of Filipino farm workers, but the voice of the White public, in the form of 
violent racism—like landowners, the government, and labor unions—had been sounded.     
CONCLUSION 
Filipino, Mexican, and Japanese farm workers sought social and economic transformation 
in 1930s California.  However, the number of obstacles they would encounter would 
make successful collective mobilization impossible during the decade.  This chapter has 
argued that White supremacy, in various guises, prevented the formation of a successful 
farm workers’ movement by constructing a racial hierarchy that descended in the 
following order: Japanese, Mexican, and Filipino.   
 The most prominent part of White supremacist practice was located within 
California’s powerful set of landowners who held substantial numbers of Filipino and 
                                                 
18 Labor Collection Papers, Leonard Library, Holman Day, interview with Joan L. Zoloth, 1976. 
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Mexican workers in their employ.  Employers would assess Mexicans as hardy, 
subservient workers and Filipinos as wily, labor agitators.  As for the Japanese, they 
would occupy a middle ground position as they constituted both an employer and worker 
group.   
Further, landowners gave voice and organization to their interests in the form of 
the Associated Farmers.  Striking workers had an effect on the California agricultural 
industry though they would win few concessions for themselves.  Strikes drew the ire of 
landowners and they responded to worker organization efforts in kind with the 
destruction of the CAIWU in 1935.  This action was symbolic of the sort of sway that the 
Associated Farmers held in the California political, economic, and social structure.  
Additionally, the tension between workers and growers was not a simplistic White/non-
White confrontation.  As has been demonstrated, Filipino and Mexican workers often 
struck against their Japanese employers. 
 Additionally, the federal government acted to physically remove Filipinos and 
Mexicans from California as both groups were deemed unfit for American society.  The 
government would have little success in repatriating Filipinos.  However, it should be 
noted that the Tydings-McDuffie Act in 1934 would solve much of the so-called 
“Filipino Problem” in California.  The end of official US rule of the Philippines would 
also ensure that Filipino people could no longer enter the country in large numbers.  
Rather than seeking to remove Filipinos, the US government would simply bar them from 
further entry.  As for Mexicans, they were subject to particularly more violent removal 
efforts.  Mexicans, especially in Los Angeles, were removed from the US in substantial 
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numbers—many of them children and citizens.  However, in the face of White 
supremacy, their claim to citizenship would be meaningless.   
 Also, labor unions would be unwilling to incorporate Filipino and Mexican 
workers into their organizations.  While making some efforts to unionize farm workers, 
the AFL—the most prominent labor organization—ultimately would not relent to racial 
minority agricultural laborers.  Like the government and its repatriation efforts, labor 
unions deemed Filipinos as particularly unfit for membership within the identity of free, 
White industrial workers.  
 Last, the broader White public acted violently against of workers of color.  Anti-
Filipino riots in California are evidence of this.  While no examples are provided of 
massive anti-Mexican riots in California, indeed these riots may be another example of 
how Filipinos and Mexicans were differentiated from each other.  Mexicans were the 
“acceptable unacceptable” group.  Indeed, this may have had some effect on the racial 
and ethnic divisions within the multiracial farm working class.  Three decades later in 
1966, they would overcome a history of acrimony in the merger of their two unions and 
move towards landmark farm labor concessions.   
However, the condition of race and labor relations within California agribusiness 
would undergo sudden change in the 1940s.  The inception of the Bracero Program along 
with the internment of Japanese origin people would extract Japanese tenant farmers and 
workers from the industry.  However, this was no haphazard shift within California 
agriculture.  The next chapter addresses this shift and the role of the state in bringing 
workers from Mexico into California and removing Japanese origin people from their 
economic niche as tenant farmers.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
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CHAPTER 3: THE STATE GIVETH AND TAKETH: BRACEROS, JAPANESE 
INTERNMENT, AND ANTI-CITIZEN FARM WORKERS  
  
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
 
In 1942, the onset of World War Two altered California agriculture.  The previous 
chapter detailed the structural power of racism that disabled the coherence of a 
multiracial labor force into a racially united labor movement.  While it would be 
inaccurate to argue that the state had no interest in the strike waves of the 1930s—indeed 
the state had interests, the decade of the 1940s signals the entrance of the state as a key 
player in race and labor relations within California agriculture.  How did the state affect 
the condition of race and labor relations during this period?   
Most apparently, though insufficiently analyzed in California agricultural labor 
history, the state subtracted Japanese tenant farmers and laborers from the agriculture 
industry via internment.  Further, the state added, over the course of twenty plus years, 
Mexican workers to the labor force with “approximately 4.5 million work contracts 
[which] were signed” and sent “the vast majority of workers…to three states (California, 
Arizona, and Texas)” (Mize 2006: 86).  The institution of a guest worker program drew 
the ire of farm workers organizers and farm workers as they argued that it lowered wages 
and prevented the formation of a viable farm workers union.  As for White farm 
operators, Mexican labor supplied at the cheap and the extraction of Japanese tenant 
farmers indicated good fortune.  Still, the state’s control of the guest workers program 
was a point of contention for these owners and farmers who wished to exact sole control 
of the labor procurement process.  Indeed, the state not only managed the Bracero 
program but possessed distinct interests in controlling the flow of Mexican labor into the 
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US Southwest while protecting the nation from the supposed threat of Japanese people in 
the country.   
I use the chapter to exhibit how the state initially played an external role in the 
farm workers movement but in the war era became a key, internal player in the racial and 
economic politics of farm labor.  As the Bracero Program took flight in April 1942, the 
US acted on orders from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to relocate Japanese Americans 
to internment camps set up throughout the US West and in Arkansas.  The imprisonment 
of Japanese Americans immediately created a vacuum in the agricultural labor market.  
However, the entrance of Mexican workers to fill the labor void while robbing Japanese 
tenant farmers of their economic position would leave farm labor activists dissatisfied.  
As they persisted in protest of the Bracero program, an anti-immigrant discourse 
infrastructure took root with farm labor leaders as they voiced opposition to non-citizen 
workers who had immigrated legally and illegally into the US.  As part of the 
dissertation’s larger argument, I contend that the enactment and practice of the Bracero 
Program and Japanese internment are illustrative of the type of exploitation that a White 
racial state exacts upon Asian and Mexican origin people. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2006 the Congressional Research Service (CRS) issued a report citing the pros and 
cons of reimplementing an agricultural guest worker program in the United States.  
Mexicans would provide the bulk of this guest labor force if such a bill were to be 
pressed into law.  The objective of the CRS study is to assess the effect of guest workers’ 
salaries on domestic, citizen workers’ wage levels.  The report concludes that a 
contemporary Bracero initiative would in all likelihood produce an “adverse effect” on 
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citizen workers’ wages.  However, it adds that “these adverse effects might differ today 
depending on the extent to which US farm labor and product markets have changed over 
time.”19  While the report delivers its message with a deliberately objective tone and 
clinical analysis, it seems to argue that if guest workers were disallowed entry into the 
country, undocumented workers would have an adverse effect on wages anyway.  
Therefore, the solution may lie in simply allowing legalized foreign workers into the 
agribusiness labor market. 
Eighteen years previous to the CRS study, President Ronald Reagan signed into 
law the Civil Liberties Act (CLA) of 1988.  The law’s purpose was to provide redress to 
those Japanese people who had been interned by the US state during World War Two. 
The statute represents an acknowledgement by the US government that the imprisonment 
of Japanese people during the war was produced “largely by racial prejudice, wartime 
hysteria, and a failure of political leadership.”  In consideration of the state mandated 
programs of the 1940s that contracted Mexican workers and interned Japanese people, it 
is compelling that in the contemporary era, the government takes investigatory measures 
to assess the possibility of renewing a guest worker program directed at Mexicans—the 
program is not even critiqued as being potentially exploitive.  On the other hand, the 
government—led by a reactionary at the executive level—decides to admit its error.  I do 
not infer or suggest that by virtue of the CLA Japanese origin internees received a fair 
shake.  In fact, if anything the practice of internment has laid down the groundwork for 
the imprisonment of people at Guantanamo Bay after September 11, 2001.20  Production 
                                                 
19 Congressional Research Service Report 95-712, The Effects on U.S. Farm Workers of an Agricultural 
Guest Worker Program, by Linda Levine. 
20 Disgustingly, some so-called critics such as Michelle Malkin (2004) argue that Japanese internment is a 
useful model for the “war on terror.” 
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of the CRS report indicates that the state wishes to learn lessons from the past in order to 
procure labor efficiently but apprehends no lesson—or more disconcertingly, simply 
ignores it—on the dangers of racializing a group of people as enemies of the state.  
In detailing the role of the state and its effect on Asian and Mexican origin 
workers, the case of labor conflict and race relations within 1940s California agriculture 
provides an ample opportunity to understand state interests.  The previous chapter 
narrated and analyzed how, in the 1930s, farm worker mobilization and struggle was 
fraught with the tension of labor and racial conflict.  We observed four central racial 
groups: Japanese, Filipinos, Mexicans, and Whites with varying agendas as they emerge 
into conflict with each other.  However, the preceding narrative has mostly focused upon 
conflictive interactions between owners and workers.  Beginning in the 1940s, the state 
entered the fray as a regulator and contractor of farm labor. 
With codification of the Bracero Program by the Congress in 1942—the same 
year that Executive Order 9066 would be issued and legalize Japanese internment—
debate ensued over the rights of citizen farm workers to have exclusive access to the farm 
labor market and thus to the right to organize and bargain with employers.21  While 
legally a program for the entire country, until its cessation in 1964 the Bracero Program 
was central to the maintenance and expansion of the agribusiness industry in the US 
Southwest (Mize 2006).  Additionally, the importation of non-citizen, Mexican workers, 
in the estimation of farm worker activists, served as the perfect blockade to successful 
farm worker mobilization.  Indeed from the 1940s to the 1960s, farm worker activists 
were wholly consumed with the existence of and quest to terminate the Bracero Program.  
                                                 
21 The Spanish word for arm is brazo thus forming the root of the term Bracero.  Therefore, Bracero can be 
translated as “working arm” or more appropriately into English as “working hand.” 
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They would decry the practice of importing guest workers for its abuse of Mexican 
workers and the program’s primary role in constricting the possibilities of creating a farm 
worker union.  However, can the program be held responsible for the lack of a legitimate 
farm workers union? 
 A brief comparison of farm labor agitation in the time periods before and after the 
era of the Bracero Program provides some answers.  In the 1930s, intense strike activity 
occurred in California agriculture illustrated in the preceding chapter.  As for the post-
Bracero era, there was a momentous lift in farm worker mobilization efforts that would 
conclude with the formation of the United Farm Workers of America in 1966.  However, 
from 1942 to 1959, the trend of farm worker activism, which had taken flight in the 
1930s came to a halt and seemingly lied dormant until the peak era of the 1960s.  Majka 
and Majka (1982:146) detail the period’s only significant farm worker strike when the 
National Farm Labor Union (NFLU) organized action against the DiGiorgio Corporation 
in 1947, a company that “with its extensive financial empire and corporate ties, was a 
prime example of agribusiness”—and again in the 1960s would be the target of striking 
farm workers.  Obviously, landowners were central actors within the agricultural industry 
and thus key to any labor strife and appeal for labor unionism.  However, in the 1940s the 
state transitioned into a key, internal player. 
 The state altered the manner in which farm labor and capital would interact by 
acting as the “mediator” to which both groups would need to appeal: the former to ask for 
termination of the Bracero program and the latter to ensure that the program continue and 
that Japanese tenant farmers be imprisoned.  However, the state was no neutral set of 
institutions as it drew in Mexican workers and interned Japanese families.  In fact, the 
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state’s treatment of and actions towards both groups is in accordance with the previous 
chapter’s assertion of a racial hierarchy in California.  The very fact that Japanese tenant 
farmers held a higher position on a racial hierarchy of the 1930s would not provide them 
with protective cover in the 1940s.  The opposite was true.  In accordance with their 
position nearer to Whites as Jung has described in his analysis of Hawaii’s agricultural 
labor force (2006), the Japanese in California were deemed a greater threat as compared 
to other groups of color; all talk or perceptions of the Japanese being “good” or “reliable” 
were swept away by the distinct form of anti-Japanese racism.  Meanwhile, Mexicans 
continued to be racialized as the accessible and appropriately equipped farm labor force. 
THE STATE, RACE, AND FARM WORKERS 
 
There has been debate over whether state theories should be built around “state-centered” 
[the autonomous entity] (Skocpol 1979, 1985) or “society-centered” [the state created 
from the social context] understandings of the state.  George Steinmetz (1998: 17) writes 
that “state-centered” thinking “was successful partly because” it explained scenarios “in 
which state structures and policies failed to correspond to dominant class interests.”  That 
is, these theories propose that the state often possesses its own agenda.  
As for analyses of the state and farm workers, they cannot afford to be exclusively 
adhered to either one of these two approaches to state theory.  On one hand farm workers 
contend with what I argue is an oppressive, at times seemingly all-powerful state.  While 
I take care to not overreach and characterize the state as all-powerful, in 1940s California 
the US state maintains ample power to contract and import cheap, Mexican labor while 
simultaneously relocating and imprisoning over 100,000 Japanese origin people from the 
West Coast into camps.  It is no overreach to understand these state sanctioned and 
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managed programs as stunningly efficient and emblematic of oppressive and I would 
argue racist power.    
Even then, Zatz (1993: 854) demonstrates how the working class—and I would 
add oppressed people of color—must bring their challenges to the state; they do so 
because the state is perceived as a “neutral ground on which interest groups fight it out.”  
And indeed, though often unsuccessful as their pleas fall on deaf ears, farm workers and 
organizers tried and continued to try in the 1940s and 1950s.  
For example, historian Erasmo Gamboa shows that while Braceros and the farm 
working class as a whole may have been unable to alter their status as subjugated 
workers, they attempted to exert some amount of power—citizen and non-citizen alike.  
Gamboa’s (1990) social history indicates that Braceros protested their inferior status, 
mistreatment, and engaged in strike activity.  Simply because the efforts were not 
“successful” in the conventional sense and did not spur on large-scale mobilization is not 
ample reason to term the farm working class a powerless lot.  Indeed, as a Foucaldian 
analysis would contend (Foucault, 1990 [1978], even the oppressed have some reservoir 
of power from which they can draw.  
Whatever modest level of power they held among their ranks, the state would 
eventually, though not in the 1940s, have to listen to workers of color.  Even though the 
state would hear out farm workers in the 1960s and 1970s and their interaction with the 
state offers a compelling case for sociological analysis, state theorists have not taken 
much interest in the farm workers movement.  Two books represent what appear to be the 
only complete monographs on state theory and farm workers: Farm Workers, 
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Agribusiness, and the State by Linda C. Majka and Theo J. Majka and Inside the State by 
Kitty Calavita.   
Majka and Majka (1982) offer a well-developed study of California agriculture 
and the state, but offer little analysis of how the state became an internal player within the 
movement.  The authors address how landowners “employed a succession of nonwhite 
minorities excluded from the predominantly white, urban-based labor union movement” 
(Ibid.: 5).  However, they cursorily reason that the absence of a racially united farm 
workers movement was resultant of  “rivalries and distrust among ethnic factions.”  For 
Majka and Majka, the state seems to occupy three different historical roles in its dealings 
with farm labor and capital conflict: capitalist ally, mediator, and potential reformer.   
However, they sidestep the state’s role as a racist exploiter in and of itself.   
In her study, Calavita (1992) focuses on the Bracero Program to draw out 
theoretical ideas on the internal workings of the state.  Arguing that the program was 
(Calavita 1992: 1) “born and raised on administrative powers”—and not simply resultant 
of capitalists’ demands—Calavita demonstrates that the importation of Mexican 
agricultural workers cannot be entirely explained by a Marxist take on state theory such 
as that advanced by Majka and Majka.  She urges an interpretation that accounts for the 
intra-state tension existent in the state’s managerial conduct of the Bracero Program.  
Thus, two interrelated points emerge from the Calavita analysis: the state is no monolith 
and thus contains competing agendas within it.  While helpful to our understanding of the 
state and the Bracero era, Calavita’s monograph like Majka and Majka does not concern 
itself much, if at all, with race and its own causal relationship to the inequality that farm 
workers of color experienced.  Again, as most scholarship on farm workers, they remain 
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concerned mostly with the economic realm or social movement dynamics that enabled 
success.  Further, they do not envision the state with any racial connotations or exerting 
racist power over groups of color.  
The dearth of literature on race, the state, and farm workers is no surprise.  As 
expressed in the dissertation introduction, farm labor scholarship seldom addresses the 
racial politics of the farm workers movement.  Further, Calavita and Majka & Majka 
briefly note Japanese internment as a state-managed project coterminous with the Bracero 
Program.  Thus, for the purposes of this chapter, broader sociological theories on race 
and the state should be examined as they offer necessary insight. 
Recently, David Theo Goldberg’s (2002) work conceptually fuses both terms 
(race and the state) and sketches a comprehensive theoretical overview of the racial state.  
Goldberg (Ibid: 6) submits that the state is an entity produced out of the 
interconnectedness of state projects and state powers.  Like Calavita, Goldberg alleges 
that the state cannot be reduced to a mere pawn of big capital.  Further, he argues (Ibid: 
110) that “racial states govern populations in explicitly racial terms.”  That governance 
over racial groups connotes a certain hierarchical position for each group.  This is not 
accidental, but is a purposeful creation of inequality within society.    
Goldberg illustrates (Ibid.: 102) how the racial state deals explicitly in the 
management of migration/immigration with an eye to labor supply and expense.  Within 
this process of immigrant/worker management, the racial state operates in such a way that 
an interpretation of this process as being (Ibid: 101) “an ephiphenomenon” of capitalists’ 
bidding or “conduit of capital” is shortsighted.  For example, the Bracero Program is 
consignable to that category of state-managed procurement of labor that was indeed 
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beneficial to capitalists.  But I will show that White farm operators, while pleased to 
attain cheap Mexican labor wished to manage labor attainment on their own—it is a 
misinterpretation to set capital and the state as co-conspirators.  Meanwhile, the 
withdrawal of the Japanese from the California agricultural labor force may have been 
beneficial to White capitalists, but the state’s overarching agenda was to remove a 
perceived threat to national security not to necessarily increase capital profit for White 
farm operators.  Against such a seemingly impassable and oppressive structure, how are 
groups of color to counteract? 
One short answer to the question is that at some places and times, groups of color 
are simply unable to countervail the state’s racist agenda.  Even when possible, 
immigrant labor of color forms a “distinct category” (Sassen-Koob 1981) of labor 
contracted by core states in the “consolidation of the world economic system.”  These 
workers’ powerlessness is rooted in their dependency on both their employers and the 
state.  Therefore, to attain justice would mean to protest the oppression flowing from 
owners and the government—certainly this was the predicament in which Braceros found 
themselves.  However, Braceros would also find that organized farm labor wanted 
nothing to do with them.  Farm labor organizers time and again ascertained that they 
advocated for US citizen farm workers—they appealed to the state to prevent capitalists 
from exploiting citizen workers and thus distinguished their plight as being separate from 
Braceros.  Thus, Braceros came to be recognized as a kind of anti-citizen. 
Moreover, I submit that not only Braceros, but the wide range of farm workers—
ranging from Filipinos to US born Mexicans to Braceros and undocumented Mexican 
workers—confronted what was an essentially White state though obviously not as a 
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united labor front.  Michael Omi and Howard Winant (1986: 81) advance this conception 
of the racial state in writing that “the state from its very inception has been concerned 
with the politics of race…” and that the state’s primary objective in regards to racial 
minorities “was repression and exclusion.”  Moreover, the state embarked upon a project 
of developing a “racial nomenclature”—much like Goldberg’s assertion that a racial 
governance of society ordered groups into a hierarchical scheme.  That is, groups within 
society had to be defined and stationed within a classificatory system, which maintained 
racial privilege for some and disadvantage for others (also see Banton 1987).  
 Anthony W. Marx (1998) details the destructive outcomes for racial minorities 
when a state implements racist practices as an essentially White state.  This informs the 
scholarship as it details how difficult it is for racial minorities to mobilize against racist 
systems rooted in state apparatuses.  Marx contends that in South Africa, for example, 
Afrikaners and the English colonizers were drawn together under a White racial identity 
via a state (Ibid.: 95) “strategy of prioritizing the racial difference from blacks in order to 
submerge white ethnic difference.”  Thus, White racial identity was constructed within 
South Africa for the express purpose of nation-building, which in turn would foment a 
nation founded not only on the explicit emphasis on Whiteness but on the exclusion of 
Blacks from what was essentially a national and racial identity.  
THE STATE SUBTRACTS THE “ENEMY RACE” OUT OF THE FIELDS 
As the US entered the war, Japanese farmers in California found themselves in great peril 
within the very country and industry, which they had been central to building.  In January 
1942 Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt took charge of the US Western Defense 
Command and “claimed authority over the ‘Japanese problem’” since “Californians did 
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expect bombing and a Japanese invasion” (Masumoto 1987:42) after the attack on Pearl 
Harbor.   
In the Fresno county community of Sanger, the continuance of Japanese farm 
labor output was deemed the litmus test of their allegiance to the United States of 
America.  It was as if Japanese farmers were required to literally work their way not to 
the full rights of equality and citizenship but to merely stave off being tagged enemies of 
the state.  The local newspaper in Sanger informed the public that Japanese American 
farmers “should continue to till their land and demonstrate their loyalty.  Defense 
command and the fourth army official have heard of reports of some Japanese (who) have 
plowed under crops” (cited from the Sanger Herald (n.d.) in Masumoto 1987:45).   
Unscrupulous, predatory individuals in the town of Selma, a few miles south of 
Sanger, reportedly pressured Japanese residents to “pay at once all the unpaid balance of 
loans” (cited from the Selma Enterprise (n.d.) in Masumoto 1987:47).  In her community 
study of Cortez in Merced County, historian Valerie J. Matsumoto (1993:89) explains 
that the mayhem of impending internment provided only a “brief time…for 
preparations.”  Coupled along with the “uncertainty of their return,” many Japanese 
farmers “lost the leases for rented farmlands and were forced to dispose of homes and 
business.” 
A post-war government study of the camps displays the central role that Japanese 
farmers and laborers occupied in the California agriculture industry.  I will point out that 
these numbers are not California specific as Japanese origin people were relocated from 
other states.  However, of the grand total of 111,170 internees in the various camps 
profiled in the study, 92,757 were taken from California.  Table 3.1 displays the 
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prominent position that Japanese workers played in the West Coast agribusiness industry.    
The study (US Department of the Interior 1946) classifies the employment backgrounds 
of internees over the age of 14, which I will define as “adult internees,” who were 
imprisoned in 1942.  Of these 88,731 “adult internees,” 25,674 individuals’ work 
backgrounds were catalogued under the term “Agricultural, Fishery, Forestry, & Kindred 
Occupations [AFFKO].”   
Table 3.1 Japanese Internment and Its Impact on Pacific Coast Agriculture 
 
Total Japanese Internees 111,170 
Japanese Internees from California 92,757 
Adult Internees (age 14 and over) 88,731 
Adult Internees in Agricultural 
Occupations 
22,722 
 Source: U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority.  “Primary Occupational Classification 
as of 1942 by Sex and Nativity: Evacuees 14 Years Old and Over to WRA in 1942,” in The Evacuated 
People: A Quantitative Description. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), Table 22. 
 
However, most of these individuals were most decidedly not in the fishery or 
forestry industries—the overwhelming amount of these workers labored in raising grain, 
animals, fruits, and vegetables or in managing farms.  My own calculations indicate that 
2,952 internees of the AFFKO classification indeed worked in areas outside of 
agriculture and most of this group—numbering 2,376—worked as “Gardeners and 
grounds keepers”—a particular occupational niche that many Japanese Americans held in 
Los Angeles (Tsuchida 1984).  After excluding this number (2952) from the total number 
of workers in the AFFKO category, my final tally indicates that 20.4% of adult internees 
worked in agriculture and is illustrative of the disproportionate way in which California 
agriculture was affected by the WRA initiative to imprison Japanese origin people.   
As for White growers, they were pleased as they could undertake efforts to block 
out the Japanese threat to White control over California agriculture.   This desire to 
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exclude the Japanese was expressed from a lobbyist sent to Washington by the Shipper-
Grower Association of Salinas (SGAS).  The SGAS representative, Austin E. Anson, was 
blunt: “We might as well be honest.  We do [want to relocate the Japanese].  It’s a 
question of whether the white man lives on the Pacific Coast or the brown men.  They 
came into this valley to work, and they stayed to take over” (emphasis added, cited from 
the Saturday Evening Post in McWilliams 1945:127).  As to California-wide agricultural 
associations, Majka and Majka (1982: 50) quickly note that “all of the white grower 
organizations supported [Japanese] evacuation, and the Western Growers Protective 
Association, the Associated Farmers, and California Farm Bureau.” 
However, the US government also was concerned with agricultural production 
and keenly aware that production levels would be affected by removal of Japanese 
farmers.  Historian Roger Daniels (1971: 48) writes that Agriculture Secretary Claude 
Wickard may have planned “a sort of large agricultural reservation in the central valleys 
of California on which the Japanese could ‘carry on their normal farming operations’ 
after being removed from all ‘strategic areas.’”  Further, Wickard posed the idea that 
Mexicans could potentially serve as a substitute labor force for the Japanese in the 
agricultural industry.22 
 If the Japanese were unofficially the enemies of White farm operators, they had 
no doubt been officially identified and racialized as enemies of the US state.  As stated in 
the introductory remarks for the chapter, positioning at a higher level of the racial 
hierarchy is not to be mistaken for acceptance but rather wariness of the Japanese.  Just as 
Mexicans were racialized as suitable for agricultural work, the Japanese were racialized 
                                                 
22 The single-quotation mark phrases are cited by Daniel (1971: 48) from a letter written by Wickard to 
Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, January 16, 1942 [See footnote 9 for full archival information].   
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as a group whose allegiance fell with Imperial Japan.  A White resident near the first 
camp to be set up in Manzanar, California ironically offered that the camps provided 
protection to Japanese people since subsequent to Pearl Harbor they were viewed as the 
enemy and there existed a “feeling, after what the Japs had done, that the Japs would 
probably have been beaten up if they hadn’t been in a place where they could be 
protected” (Garrett and Larson 1977: 101).  Indeed, any semblance of partnership that 
had previously existed between Japanese tenant farmers and White landowners during the 
1930s in holding back labor strikes dissolved in the wake of war.  The state rendered its 
assessment of the Japanese as a group ultimately and innately steered by their racial 
disposition.  General DeWitt held forth in a government report that while many Japanese 
in the US were “possessed of United States citizenship…the racial strains are 
undiluted…It, therefore, follows that along the vital Pacific Coast over 112,000 potential 
enemies of Japanese extraction, are at large today” (cited in Matsumoto 1993: 97).  
FARM CAPITAL’S CHEAP MEXICAN LABOR 
From 1942 to 1964, the practice of Bracero importation would stand in marked 
contradistinction to the manner in which Japanese workers were immediately removed 
from the California agribusiness industry.  US Southwestern agribusiness would have its 
way in regards to having their Mexican labor supply at wage levels that enabled 
substantial farm capital profit.  As the program began in April 1942, there would only be 
a trickle of workers with 4,203 Braceros entering the US.  The ensuing war years yielded 
a stream of Bracero workers with 52,098 in 1943, 62,170 in 1944, and in the war’s final 
year, 49,454.  From 1946 to 1948, the number of workers would substantially decrease 
with the average number of Bracero entrants in that range of years sitting at 
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approximately 29,000.  However, in 1949, 107,000 contracted Mexican workers would 
enter the agricultural labor workforce but dip down to 67,500 in 1950. Thereafter, from 
1951 to 1964 the number of admitted Braceros would average a whopping 301,196 per 
year (Calavita 1992: 218, Appendix B).  These figures are laid out in Table 3.2 below. 
Table 3.2 Bracero Entrants 1942-1945, 1949 & 1950 and  
Yearly Averages 1946-1948 & 1951-1964 
 
1942 4,203 
1943 52,098 
1944 62,170 
1945 49,454 
1946-1948 29,000  
(yearly average) 
1949 107,000 
1950 67,500 
1951-1964 301,196 
(yearly average) 
Source: Calavita 1992: 218, Appendix B 
 
Though able to take advantage of such voluminous cheap, imported labor, 
growers expressed their concern that the guest worker program was state managed.  In 
their organization publication in 1943, the Associated Farmers—an enemy of organized 
farm labor as made clear in the previous chapter—maintained that growers should not 
become beholden to “any labor supply that must be received through any government 
agency” and further argued that big capital should implement a labor retrieval system 
“which we can institute and administer (emphasis added)” (cited from the Associated 
Farmer in Gutiérrez 1995).  A few years later in 1948, the Bureau of Employment 
Security took the reins of the program and “in turn utilized the services of the California 
Farm Placement Bureau, an agency with a history of close cooperation with growers” and 
seen as neglectful of farm laborers (Majka and Majka 1982: 143). 
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“BEST SUITED TO THIS WORK:” THE STATE ADDS MEXICAN WORKERS 
There had been a historically rooted perception that domestic workers—seemingly even 
Mexican origin citizen workers—were of little use and less value as compared to 
Braceros within California agriculture.  In regards to domestic workers in general, 
President Theodore Roosevelt’s Country Life Commission, in 1909, offered that “the 
general testimony” about American workers ascribed them as “less efficient and less 
reliable than much of the foreign labor” (cited in President Truman’s Commission on 
Migratory Labor 1951:19).  In 1950, President Truman’s Commission on Migratory 
Labor would find this sort of statement echoed by interviewed employers; however, this 
“reliable foreign labor” was now found among Mexicans.  Indeed, Mexican labor, as 
demonstrated during the 1930s, fit the bill.  One farmer in California, arguing for usage 
of the Bracero labor force, contended that “the Mexican national is by all standards the 
best suited to this work.  By temperament and aptitude, he seems especially adapted to 
farm employment” (Ibid.:20).  Indeed, since 1910, Mexicans had become cemented as the 
premier type of worker that employers desired to carry out farm labor.  Thus, the 
importation of Mexican labor beginning in the 1940s was not the introduction of Mexican 
workers into California agriculture as the most desirable labor.  However, it did signal the 
emergence of a state-managed labor procurement process of workers from Mexico. 
Even then, employers attempted to exert as much control as possible over this 
procurement process and carried out detailed examinations of Mexican workers who they 
viewed as laborstock rather than actual human beings.  Ernesto Galarza, in a 1956 
account for the Joint United States-Mexico Trade Union Committee, reported that 
Mexican workers would initially appear at recruiter stations in Mexico in their efforts to 
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find work north of the border.  Pito Perez, one worker who was called up for a job, was 
“led into a large room” at the station “where he is given his first cursory examination.  A 
man shakes his hand to test his grip and check his callouses.  He is patted on the back.  
The gesture is friendly and just firm enough to judge his shoulder muscles” (cited in 
Galarza 1956:3).  
These “especially adapted” workers eked out a miserable existence cordoned off 
in labor camps where Braceros were subjected to food poisoning, denied medical care, 
and lacked an ample supply of toilets.23  It would be insult to argue that the level of 
humiliation and bigotry, which Braceros experienced in being forced to live in camps, is 
approximate to what Japanese families underwent subsequent to removal by the WRA.  
However, I wish to point out the unique yet similar ways in which both groups were 
cordoned off: one group—the Japanese—extracted from the agricultural labor market that 
20.4% of the adults built up and labored within while the other group—Mexicans—were 
contracted, transported into the US Southwest, and placed in labor camps to do work at a 
cheap rate.   
Besides their substandard living environs, both groups held in common a reified 
status as anti-citizens (Roediger 1991: 57): the Braceros as anti-citizens ineligible for 
labor unionism and Japanese origin people as anti-citizens ineligible to literally walk 
freely within the nation.  Indeed to be an anti-citizen does not infer absence from the 
nation-state space.  Rather, it points to how the subjugated group is indeed present within 
the nation and essential for labor or as an object of degradation.  Though David 
Roediger’s Wages of Whiteness draws up the concept of anti-citizenry to depict the plight 
                                                 
23 Ernesto Galarza Papers, Green Library, AWOC Organizer Newsletter, September 21, 1961, (Box 4, 
Folder 4). 
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of African Americans in confrontation with White racism, the term is useful in 
comprehension of Asian and Mexican subjugation in California as well.  Moreover, the 
lack of citizenship status or the second-class variety (in the case of the Japanese) reflected 
a specific racial and class position in California agribusiness.  The consignment to anti-
citizen status was granted legitimacy by other institutions within the California 
agricultural sector—most significant was the reception of Braceros by farm labor 
organizers. 
ORGANIZED FARM LABOR AND BRACEROS 
Chapter two demonstrated how Filipino workers suffered exclusion from mainstream 
organized labor in slight favor of Mexican workers.  However, in the 1940s and onward, 
Braceros, though they were Mexicans, would not receive much in the way of acceptance 
by farm labor organizing efforts.  They were often deemed within the farm workers 
movement as a group unworthy of labor union membership.  Braceros labored under the 
control exerted upon them from three sources: the state in its management of the 
program, the exploitative conditions to which landowners subjected them, and in the 
orchestration of their migration from Mexico to a US Southwest worksite by 
intermediaries.  For example, Stephen H. Sosnick (1978: 389) relays how middlemen 
organizations such as labor bureaus and farm labor associations—many formed as the 
Bracero program took flight after World War Two—“functioned as full-service labor 
contractors.”  Put simply, no one seemed to allow the Braceros out of their sight.   As a 
consequence of being both a foreign workforce and an overtly managed labor force at 
that, Braceros would need to tread carefully if they were to engage in farm labor strikes.  
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Even so, Braceros engaged in labor agitation and, at times, garnered concessions 
from employers.  In fact, when Braceros did so, the fledgling AWOC lauded the striking 
workers from Mexico:  
Mexican nationals are beginning to demand their rights, by means 
of wild-cat strikes, appeals to Mexican government representatives 
in Sacramento and Washington, and demands that growers and  
contractors recognize AWOC as their representative.24   
 
The same newsletter issue also noted that some Braceros garnered a wage raise as a result 
of strike activity: an increase from 14 cents to 18 cents per box for picking tomatoes.  
However, simply because they were applauded by AWOC did not infer acceptance by 
organized farm labor.  Far from it, in fact, as farm labor organizers categorized Braceros 
as representative of things antithetical to American citizenship, culture, and identity.   
As for farm labor organizers, opposition to the Bracero program required appeals 
for the program’s termination to three audiences: the US state, farm capital, and 
sometimes the Mexican state.  For example, farm labor activist Ernesto Galarza not only 
posted his grievances to the US government but also journeyed to Mexico City to plead 
his case to Mexican governmental leaders.25  One audience, which was not of concern to 
Galarza and other farm labor organizers, were Braceros themselves.   
While farm worker activists acknowledged the dehumanizing and downright 
racist treatment that Mexican guest workers underwent, organizers made it clear that 
these new workers should not be granted access to neither the agricultural labor market 
nor to farm labor unionism.  Organizers expressed feelings of ambivalence, sympathy, 
and contradiction about the presence of imported Mexican labor.  In some moments, they 
                                                 
24 Ernesto Galarza Papers, Green Library, AWOC Organizer Newsletter, September 21, 1961, (Box 4, 
Folder 4). 
25 Los Angeles Times, “Imperial Labor Appeal Carried to Mexico City,” June 1, 1951, p. 23. 
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maligned workers from Mexico and in other moments, they expressed a desire, though 
made no overt efforts, to unionize these laborers.   
Galarza argued vehemently on behalf of farm worker activists that the Bracero 
Program be terminated and reasoned that Braceros were the absolute impediment to farm 
labor progress.  He authored one report written in “the nature of a brief on behalf of the 
present system of farm [sic] labor market control” and maintained that all Agricultural 
Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC) efforts even as late as 1959 “should be to 
break the control of the [sic] corporation farm interests on the bracero program, which is 
now the keystone [sic] of the California farm labor market.” 26  Galarza alleged that in 
1951 Braceros were the primary reason that an NFLU-sanctioned strike could not take 
hold in the Imperial Valley.27  Thus, Galarza asserted that the Bracero Program should be 
of great concern to farm worker organizers.  Braceros not only usurped the rightful place 
of citizen workers in the labor market, they served to exclude citizen workers from full 
legitimacy as unionized laborers. 
FARM LABOR UNIONS FOR CITIZEN WORKERS ONLY 
Braceros were informed that they would and could not ever be associated with farm labor 
organizations and that message emanated not only from farm labor organizers.  One 
worker, Alvino, said that “they [growers and/or the state] are trying to force us to accept 
contracts here in this valley where the pay is low…It looks like we will be forced to 
accept the Imperial Valley or Yuma.”28  Another Bracero, Odeoclato, provided his own 
                                                 
26 Ernesto Galarza Papers, Green Library, Memorandum for Franz Daniel from Ernesto Galarza, November 
3, 1959, (Box 4, Folder 6). 
27 Los Angeles Times, “Imperial Labor Appeal Carried to Mexico City,” June 1, 1951, p. 23. 
28 Reuther Library, UFW Papers—Central Files, Statement by Henry P. Anderson for the Subcommittee on 
General Legislation and Agricultural Research (p. 12), AWOC Research Paper #2, Paper Date: June 15, 
1961, Interview Date: May 19, 1958, (Box 12, Folder 16). 
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account of maltreatment and subjection to anti-labor tirades: “Our foreman was very 
mean, always swearing at us and bawling us out…Anybody that complained was called a 
striker and shipped back to Mexico.”29   
Though acknowledging their severe mistreatment, Galarza reiterated the 
designation of Braceros as ineligible for labor unionism.  Galarza (1956:76) maintained 
that Braceros were “a group apart from the organized labor movement of the United 
States.”  While Mexican guest workers and their labor remained essential to US 
Southwestern agribusiness, Galarza contended, “from an organizational point of view, the 
thousands of Mexican farm workers do not exist.  This fact only adds to the bracero’s real 
isolation” [emphasis added].  Indeed, Galarza furthered along that isolation by placing 
labor unionism out of reach for a group of workers that had formulated their own strike 
actions.  This was a precarious position which Braceros occupied as they faced the anti-
labor disposition of their employers and the lack of a “labor home” from which they 
could mobilize. 
Therefore, in line with strategy that advocated only for citizen farm workers 
against big capital via appeals to the state, AWOC exhorted its membership to let 
President Kennedy “know that we domestic farm workers do still exist, in spite of the 
tremendous harm done by the bracero system. [emphasis added]”30  While the notion of 
citizenship and “belonging” factored into the racist exclusion of workers as demonstrated 
in the previous chapter, the strike waves of the 1930s emphasized more so race and class 
rather than citizenship.   However, in the age of the Bracero, AWOC’s statement that is 
                                                 
29 Ibid.: Interview Date: May 27, 1958. 
30 Ernesto Galarza Papers, Green Library, AWOC Organizer Newsletter, September 21, 1961, (Box 4, 
Folder 4). 
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cited above indicates a shift within the movement and that in confrontation with the 
Bracero Program, farm workers organizers asserted their right to farm jobs since their 
constituency was of the citizenry, legally at the very least.   
While the tactic and argument strategy seems sturdy, the movement’s problem 
was that Braceros—“foreign labor”—had come to be defined as the most desirable type 
of labor. The cruelly ironic reality dictated that even if Mexican American workers were 
to be perceived and allowed bona fide US citizen identity, they were not constructed as 
the most ideal workers anyway.  Organizers asserted that US citizenship entitled workers 
to labor unionism.  However, citizen farm workers operated within a labor market that 
prized foreign, imported labor over domestic laborers and thus seemed to make the 
assertion of citizenship a moot point—to employers at least.  
FILIPINO WORKERS AND THE BRACERO PROGRAM 
While the Japanese were interned and state-contracted Mexican workers flooded the 
California agricultural labor market, Filipinos persisted in their own organizational 
efforts.  In Stockton, they organized the Filipino Agricultural Laborer’s Association 
(FALA) in March 1939.  The very next month, FALA declared a strike in the asparagus 
crops and “within thirty six hours the million dollar asparagus industry capitulated.  
There was a caucus among the farmers.  They gave up.  And the asparagus cutters won 
the strike” (from Inosanto 1974, cited in Voices 1984:9).31  A few years later, as war 
broke out in the Pacific, Filipino workers were granted citizenship and engaged in 
military combat.  According to Schwartz (1945: 100), FALA actively engaged in 
interracial collective efforts with “independent unions of Mexican and Japanese 
                                                 
31 A note on the source labeled “Voices” in the text: This oral history collection does not have numbered 
pages.  Thus, I did my own page count and reckon that the quote I am using from Inosanto is located on 
what would be page 9 in “Voices.”   
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workers.”  Further, like Inosanto cited above, Schwartz contends that the onset of the war 
removed several Filipino from the agricultural labor market. 
However, primary sources indicate that indeed some Filipinos remained employed 
as agricultural laborers after the war.  Filipino workers voiced their disapproval of the 
program’s ramifications and recognized Braceros as invaders upon their turf, literally in 
the fields, and figuratively as domestic workers.  One Filipino worker from Stockton 
reported the unfair labor market system, which they encountered: “Baltini [a grower 
outside of Stockton] got in a crew of Mexican Nationals.  Our pay started going down.  
He [Baltini] said ‘If you don’t like it, I got somebody who will be happy to do it.’  So we 
left.”  Braceros were also held responsible for working a crop that was often regarded as 
the domain of Filipino farm workers: asparagus.  Lloyd H. Fisher (1953: 7) observed that 
a “Filipino agricultural worker is very likely to be a professional harvest hand” as 
opposed to Mexican workers who were more likely to “regard agricultural employment 
as a temporary expedient.”  The same Filipino worker, perhaps noting the intrusion on his 
expert status and labor market niche as an asparagus worker, complained that “We used 
to be able to make $1,200 or $1,300 during the asparagus season…Since the braceros 
came in, we haven’t been able to make more than about $800 a season.”32 
IMPEDIMENTS TO ASSIMILATION   
 
Farm worker advocates walked a tightrope in their stern opposition to the Bracero 
Program between that of siding with citizen workers and simultaneously ascertaining that 
they did not appear to be Bracero bashers.  AWOC spoke to all the sensitive points of the 
Bracero Program by citing the exploitation of Braceros, the harm the program does to 
                                                 
32 Reuther Library, UFW—Central File Papers, U.S. Department of Labor Hearings, Sacramento, February 
21, 1962, (Box 12, Folder 11). 
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domestic workers, and the particularly difficult position in which it places Mexican 
American workers.33  In congressional testimony, AWOC reported the feelings of a 
“Mexican American leader in Los Angeles,” who stated that “Naturally, we feel sorry for 
the braceros…After all, our own parents were in the pretty much in the same 
position…But look at what the program is doing to us.”34  Therefore, there was a strict 
partition, which the farm worker organizers deployed, along lines of nationality: the flow 
of Mexican workers was a trespass on Mexican American identity, image, and 
opportunity.   
Further, AWOC would construct an argument that posed Bracero workers as a 
threat to the assimilation process for Mexican descent workers referring to the imported 
workers as “the continual infusion of the unassimilable…by an act of Congress.”35  
Significantly, AWOC made a concerted effort to portray Mexican American workers as 
workers headed toward assimilation—an odd portrayal that refused to take into account 
histories of racism and discrimination that Mexican workers had been subjected to in the 
US Southwest (Barrera 1979, Camarillo 1979).  AWOC’s logic dictated that Braceros not 
only “took” jobs from Mexican American workers, but also were impediments to what 
would seemingly be a naturally occurring assimilation process.  For example, they 
maintained that Braceros posed “an almost overwhelming burden upon the resident 
Spanish-speaking in their efforts to become full Americans rather than hyphenated 
Americans.”36  They put forth this type of argument within a larger framework of what 
                                                 
33 Reuther Library, UFW Papers—Central Files, Statement for the Subcommittee on General Legislation 
and Agricultural Research, AWOC Research Paper #2, June 15, 1961, p.5, (Box 12, Folder 16). 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Reuther Library, UFW Papers—Central Files, Statement for the Subcommittee on General Legislation 
and Agricultural Research, AWOC Research Paper #2, June 15, 1961, p. 11, (Box 12, Folder 16). 
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the U.S. and “America” should represent in the world.  They argued that most Americans 
would “agree that  foreign contract labor systems…are destructive of our best national 
ideas and aspirations” and “antithetical to immigration policies which have characterized 
the [U.S.A.] since the revolutionary epoch.”37 
ALTERNATE LABOR RESERVOIRS: JAPANESE GUEST WORKERS 
However, Mexican workers were not the only foreign workers who were deemed a threat 
to the ability of citizen farm workers to attain farm labor jobs.  Since organized farm 
labor protested the guest workers program, farm operators with the help of the state were 
active in making certain they could gather reliably cheap labor from other nations.  
Indeed, Mexico simply offered the most prominent source of foreign agricultural labor to 
the US but did not constitute the sole source. 
Ernesto Galarza and the NFLU also expressed concern to the possible importation 
of additional workers into California via a Japanese guest worker program.  AWOC 
Director Smith responded to other perceived threats by Asian guest worker programs 
when he “fired off letters” of protest to the Secretary of Labor in response to suggestions 
that “45,000 Filipino Nationals” would be brought in to carry out agricultural work.  The 
Secretary’s response indicates the suggestion of importing Filipino workers was an 
absurd idea.38 
However, growers had indeed managed to attain Japanese guest workers.  In 
1957, proposals to increase the number of Japanese guest workers from a miniscule 
number of 786 to an astonishing 1,000,000 had been submitted.39  Ernesto Galarza was 
                                                 
37 Reuther Library, UFW Papers—Central Files, Statement for the Subcommittee on General Legislation 
and Agricultural Research, p. 10, AWOC Research Paper #2, June 15, 1961, (Box 12, Folder 16). 
38 Green Library, Ernesto Galarza Papers, The AWOC Organizer, January 6, 1960, (Box 4, Folder 3). 
39 Los Angeles Times, “Conflicting Views Given on Imported Farm Labor,” May 1, 1957, p. 23. 
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dispatched and stepped into the fray.  Galarza, along with John F. Henning of the 
California State Federation of Labor, contended that Japanese guest workers program 
formed part of a “scheme under which both American and Japanese workers are abused 
for employer profit.”—the identical anti-guest worker tactic utilized in opposition to the 
Bracero Program.40   
Interestingly, one leader of the conservative Japanese American Citizens League 
argued that Japanese farm workers’ experiences in the US were crucial.  This same 
individual, Frank Masaoka—who had also actively spoken out against Japanese 
Americans who protested their imprisonment in the internment camps—insisted that by 
writing “letters” back home to Japan, Japanese guest workers had put a stop to electoral 
victories by the Communist Party in the southern prefecture of Kagoshima.41  Seemingly, 
the perception of the Japanese mutated from enemy race to vanquished enemy that could 
be “Americanized.”  
Galarza (1964: 247) further contended that on account of the protests over the 
Bracero Program and grower distrust of the state, growers were “wise to keep within 
reach alternative sources from which the labor pool could be replenished.”  In setting up 
the Japanese guest worker program, the Japanese Consul in San Francisco stated that 
workers from Japan had “an opportunity to participate in the American way of life and to 
learn the latest technical methods in American agriculture” (cited  in Galarza 1964: 248 
from Interim report from the Consul General of Japan [San Francisco]).   
Growers had thus found an alternative labor source other than citizen workers or 
Braceros that also fulfilled the mission of the US state: to form a productive relationship 
                                                 
40 Los Angeles Times, “Recruiting of Japanese Farm Workers Assailed,” April 24, 1957, p. 7. 
41 Los Angeles Times, “Conflicting Views Given on Imported Farm Labor, “ May 1, 1957, p. 23. 
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with Japan.  An Associated Farmer official informed the San Francisco Chronicle that 
the labor deal with Japan was “more or less an educational deal” (cited in Galarza 1964: 
249) for Japanese workers.  Another observer proclaimed to the same newspaper that the 
Japanese workers are “fundamentally clean and not as apt to get drunk” when compared 
to Braceros (cited in Galarza 1964: 248).   
CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE EXPANSION AND THE BRACEROS 
While farm worker organizers bemoaned the existence of the Bracero system and the 
state exerted its power in management of the program, growers had also made certain to 
implement contingency plans for their labor supply.  However, by the time of the 
Japanese guest workers program’s creation, the war had long been over.  Indeed, AWOC 
argued that Bracero labor had allowed growers “from California and the Southwest” to 
expand the agribusiness industry—it was no longer a case of simply keeping head above 
water during a war.  AWOC asserted that in the 1950s as the Bracero Program underwent 
phenomenal growth that “production of strawberries” in Monterey County, California 
“increased…from 541 to 5,124 acres” and “tomatoes in San Joaquin County, Calif., more 
than doubled; from 337,000 to 796,500 tons.”42  Further, sociologist Ronlad L. Mize 
(2006) has asserted that Bracero labor was integral to the massive growth of US 
Southwestern agribusiness. 
Indeed, growers were accustomed to an expected delivery of workers on some 
type of schedule for California growers—both large and small—so that tremendous 
production numbers could be sustained.  In the process of labor procurement, the state 
could act as friend or foe.  Member farmers of the San Joaquin Farm Production 
                                                 
42  Reuther Library, UFW Papers—Central Files, Statement for the Subcommittee on General Legislation 
and Agricultural Research, AWOC Research Paper #2, June 15, 1961 p. 10, (Box 12, Folder 16). 
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Association received a plea from the association, because AWOC had started to picket at 
the Podesto Ranch in nearby Bellota.  Consequently, cherries were not being picked at 
the ranch as the California Department of Employment determined that the picket action 
constituted a bona fide labor dispute.  Thus, “no local or domestic workers can be 
referred by the Farm Labor Offices and it also means that Podesto Farms cannot use 
Mexican Nationals [Braceros]” (my insertion).43  The letter states that cherry growers 
were in dire straits and would pay scab workers $1.10 per bucket and $1.75 per day for 
food and shelter for picking the cherries “immediately (today) or our member will have a 
complete crop loss.”44   
 These associations of farmers, such as the San Joaquin group, acted to maintain 
some kind of farm capital-managed procurement of labor.  Farmer associations provided 
for their members “centralized pools of braceros, from which anyone, large or small, 
might draw his captive workers by picking them up in the morning and returning them at 
night.”  AWOC advanced an economic theory of capital and the labor supply, which 
posited that increased production led to a need for more labor (thus more Braceros or any 
other kind of guest worker), cheaper products (perhaps good for the consumer but offered 
lower profit margins), and in turn, necessitated more production to maintain high levels 
of income.45  Further, organized labor continually asserted that there was a grooved-in 
“adverse effect” that carved out a position in the farm labor market exclusively for 
                                                 
43 Reuther Library, AWOC Papers, letter from San Joaquin Farm Production Association to association 
members, May 25, 1960, (Box 5, Folder 14). 
44 Ibid. 
45 Reuther Library, UFW Papers—Central Files, Statement for the Subcommittee on General Legislation 
and Agricultural Research, AWOC Research Paper #2, June 15, 1961, p. 10, (Box 12, Folder 16). 
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Braceros and caused wages to drop to an unacceptable level for domestic workers.46  
AWOC asserted that “after meeting his personal expenses and the living expenses of his 
family, [a Bracero] has only $5.48” per week in net income which leaves a Bracero 
workers “$4.50 short of requirement to meet his debts.”47  Indeed, both farm labor and 
the growers turned to the state to hopefully, for the former, terminate the program, and 
for the latter, import Mexican labor. 
APPEALS TO THE STATE  
The resentment against Braceros emanated not only from Filipino and Mexican farm 
labor but also from White workers who also desired to be unionized.  One white worker 
lamented “that peach thinning wages were better before the Nationals arrived.”48  In 
response to this quip, Louis Krainock, AWOC’s Director of Public Information, 
responded by telling the worker that the Braceros “are having their usual depressing 
effect on wages.”49  Another White worker in the southern city of Blythe complained to 
AWOC Director Norman Smith that “the Nationals have [the jobs] all sewed up and very 
few [white and/or American workers] get in there.”50  The worker went on to decry the 
low wages and spare work available to him.   
J.H. Scott, a white worker in Petaluma informed Director Smith of the ways in 
which certain crops were assigned to certain racial groups: 
                                                 
46 AWOC conducted two in-depth studies in 1959 and 1960 on the “adverse effect” of the Bracero 
Program. Green Library, Ernesto Galarza Papers, A Case Study in “Adverse Effect,” October 5, 1959, (Box 
4, Folder 9) and Another Case Study in Adverse Effect, January 5, 1960, (Box 4, Folder 10). 
47 Reuther Library, UFW Papers—Central Files, Statement for the Subcommittee on General Legislation 
and Agricultural Research, p. 3, (Box 12, Folder 16). 
48 Reuther Library, AWOC Papers, letter to Louis Krainock from Ella Satterfield, May 19, 1960, (Box 5, 
Folder 14). 
49 Reuther Library, AWOC Papers, letter to Ella Satterfield from Louis Krainock, May 23, 1960, (Box 5, 
Folder 14). 
50 Reuther Library, AWOC Papers, letter to Norman Smith from S. Brown, February 3, 1960, (Box 5, 
Folder 4). 
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Today, my family and I went out to a bean field where they had been 
picking for three days.  At least, the Mexican Nationals had been picking. 
I asked to go to work and I was turned down, flat.  I was told if I wanted  
to work I could go to another field where the white workers were being hired.51    
Consequently, Mr. Scott posted a complaint with the Farm Labor Office, which had to 
send down two individuals to secure work for the family.  However, Mr. Scott stated that 
not only were farm operators withholding employment from him, but was so was the 
state-mandated guest worker program, which put Mexican workers in what he deemed 
was his rightful place.   
Eventually, the Bracero Program would come to its termination point in 1964.  
Indeed, farm capital in California had profited handsomely.  However, the imprint on 
farm labor would be such that through the 1960s and later, the farm labor movement, 
particularly in its appeals to the state, would not advocate for non-citizen workers—
particularly the udocumented—which were overwhelmingly from Mexico.   
CONCLUSION: THE FORMATION OF FARM LABOR’S ANTI-IMMIGRANT 
DISCOURSE 
 
Even after the program was terminated, opposition to the Bracero Program had set into 
place an anti-immigrant discourse within the farm workers movement.  In creating and 
managing the program, hearing protestations to the program, and listening to the desires 
of farm capital for cheap labor, the state moved into a central and internal role within the 
capital, labor, and racial conflicts of California agriculture.  In developing a strategic 
appeal to the state, farm labor organizers would utilize this anti-immigrant discourse to 
delineate Mexican workers as problematic for assimilation, national worker unity, and 
union success.  Cesar Chavez argued that the program persisted with the influx of 
undocumented workers from Mexico: 
                                                 
51 Reuther Library, AWOC Papers, letter to Norman Smith from J.H. Scott, September 7, 1960, (Box 5, 
Folder 9). 
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   Congress has but scotched the snake, not killed it.  The [Bracero] Program 
lives on in the annual parade of thousands of illegals and green  
carders across the United States-Mexico [sic] border to work in  
our fields…and probably never have had, any bona fide intention 
of making the United States of America their permanent home.52   
Therefore, Chavez judged that undocumented workers had inherited the position 
of Braceros as trespassers upon the national identification of Mexican descent workers in 
the US.  One study offers (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002: 36) that the “number of 
braceros remained insufficient to meet the demand emanating from the fields” and thus 
growers “increasingly took matters into their own hands by recruiting undocumented 
workers.”  Thus, subsequent to the war, labor organizers contended with a mixed set of 
laborers who were deemed unfit for labor union membership: documented Braceros and 
unauthorized workers.  However, the precarious position of Braceros demonstrates that 
authorized status did not confer enough legitimacy on legal workers so that they could be 
recognized as organizable.   With mention of “green carders,” Chavez assails the 
liberalization of immigration laws in 1965 as counterproductive to labor organization 
efforts.  Part and parcel of the anti-Bracero discourse was to separate out Mexican 
American workers as assimilable people into the US nation while Braceros simply could 
not be.  Louis Krainock also positioned Braceros into this position as anti-citizens when 
he asked one farm labor ally rhetorically, “Do Nationals—or can Nationals—support 
local schools, clubs, churches, civic groups, the whole community?  Of course not.  He 
can’t because he is not a real member of the community.”53  
As the Bracero Program drew to a close, the Los Angeles Times editorialized the 
pros and cons of the program’s demise.  In alignment with organized farm labor logic and 
                                                 
52 Reuther Library, UFW Papers—Information and Research, Statement by Cesar Chavez Before the 
Subcommittee on Labor, April 16, 1969, (Box 17, Folder 7). 
53Reuther Library, AWOC Papers, letter from Louis Krainock to Lillian Ransome, February 22, 1960, (Box 
5, Folder 4). 
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discourse, the paper argued that more jobs for domestic workers were available as a result 
of banishing workers from Mexico.  As a result, this meant an infusion of revenue for the 
country (as opposed to Braceros remitting money to their families in Mexico) and 
especially the state of California.54  However, the battle to end the program went to the 
bitter end.  In December 1964, only weeks before the program’s conclusion, C. Al Green, 
appointed Director of AWOC in January 1962, testified in San Francisco against the 
possible usage of Public Law 414, a potential successor to the guest worker statute, by 
the Department of Labor to continue the importation of workers into the country.  Green 
contended “growers have used the excuse that an adequate number of US workers is not 
available to do work.”  Further, Green cited seven cases in which he alleged that growers 
not only had “cheap, captive” labor in Braceros but a reservoir of strikebreakers as well.  
Green concluded by stating that “domestic farm workers will do stoop labor when the 
price is right.”55  
 It is not surprising that, even in its final days in 1964, organized labor would be 
aggressive in its denouncement of the Bracero Program.  An AWOC report in 1959 held 
that since 1951, the guest worker program had always been renewed in the dying hours of 
a Congressional legislative session.  Thus, AWOC was wary of what it referred to as 
“Congressional intent.”56  By 1959, with the formation of AWOC, farm worker activists 
seized an opportunity to challenge the existence of the Bracero Program.  Previous to the 
1950s, there had been little opportunity or an able farm labor organization that could 
                                                 
54 “The Year the Braceros Departed” Los Angeles Times December 3, 1965, pg. A4. 
55 Reuther Library, AWOC Papers, Testimony by C. Al Green Before a Hearing of the U.S. Department of 
Labor, December 7, 1964, (Box 7, Folder 17). 
56 Green Library, Ernesto Galarza Papers, AWOC Paper: A Case Study in “Adverse Effect,” October 5, 
1959, (Box 4, Folder 9). 
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challenge, not only growers, but also the state’s efforts to continue the program.  Perhaps 
their conclusion was that the anti-immigrant discourse had worked effectively. 
 For farm worker organizers, another bit of their logic informed them that the 
Bracero Program represented evidence that the state simply carried out farm operators’ 
bidding.  For example, the previously cited testimony of C. Al Green in 1964 cites the 
power of landowners and the Bracero program as an initiative that created big profits for 
landowners.  Three years earlier in 1961, there had been strikes in the Imperial Valley, a 
vast area on the border where sizable lettuce crops were grown.  AWOC hoped to use the 
strikes not to create a labor deal but to force growers to desist from utilizing Bracero 
labor.57  The movement against Braceros was so absolutely central to farm labor 
initiatives that they did little actual mobilization of farm workers.   
While locating the problem as being represented by landowners only, farm worker 
organizations never estimated that the state possessed its own agenda as a labor importer.  
The state had been quite influential in its continual renewal of the program and in some 
instances by expressing a disinterest and maintaining a distance from activists.  Dolores 
Huerta, working around the same time period for the NFWA, construed the continuance 
of the Bracero Program as an indicator that no organizational body or activists were 
moving against the program.  She asserted that “On PL [Public Law] 78, the situation 
was that exactly which I found in May—no one is working for its defeat that’s [sic] why 
it passed the Senate.  I don’t know what the Union is doing, nothing as usual, I guess.”58  
Additionally, Huerta noted that efforts needed to be taken from within the state.  Huerta 
                                                 
57 “Lettuce Farm Strike Part of Deliberate Union Plan” Los Angeles Times January 23, 1961, pg. B1. 
58 Reuther Library, NFWA Papers, letter from Dolores Huerta to Cesar Chavez, n.d., (Box 2, Folder 12) 
While this letter has no date, Huerta makes reference to her need for new car license plates for 1963, so the 
letter is written sometime after the inception of the NFWA in September 1962 and before the new year 
began.    
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lists several Congressmen from throughout California, who needed to be contacted and 
cajoled into voting out the program. 
In actuality, much labor organization activity had been focused on ending the 
importation of Mexican workers if not most farm labor organizing energy since the 
1940s.  Perhaps Huerta was referring to the NFWA specifically, but the AWOC had 
made the program its reason for being.  The lettuce strikes in the Imperial Valley, which 
Jenkins (1985) refers to as a “fiasco” did achieve some success in that it set into motion a 
ruling by the Department of Labor to disallow Bracero labor from growers if domestic 
workers were available.  However, the central point here is that indeed labor unions were 
involved in dislodging the foreign labor program and that those appeals were couched 
within an argument that big capital utilized the cheap labor to their own advantage.  
However, tremendous power over the program resided in the state.  In fact, in the 
Imperial Valley, while AWOC picketers rallied against Braceros in the fields, the 
Department of Labor saw to it that the lettuce crops were harvested.  The state, and not 
the growers, made certain that the produce made it to market.   
Therefore, farm worker activists were consumed with appeals to the state in order 
to end the oppression, which they argued emanated from agribusiness and the dominant 
forces of hungry capitalism.  However, the state resided in its position as a power 
monger—it had interests in having the crops harvested, in having profits maintained or 
increased, and having an available labor supply.  Thus, capital and the state may have had 
intertwined agendas, similar interests, but a conclusion that they operated in tandem, 
always and purposefully, is flawed. 
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It was on the point of wages that labor unions, growers, and the state battled it 
out.  The federal government saw to it that there was some minimum wage for Braceros.  
The wage varied from state to state and in California the floor rate of pay for Braceros 
was standardized at $1 as late as 1962.59  However, the argument from US citizen 
workers was that these wages could not sustain their families as compared to single male 
Braceros from Mexico, who were provided room and board, and sent their wages back 
home.  Thus, US farm workers and farm worker organizations repeatedly concluded that 
workers from Mexico, even after the Bracero Program’s conclusion, incurred serious 
harm on the creation of a union as they simultaneously exerted a downward pull on wage 
rates.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
59 Reuther Library, AWOC Papers, U.S. Department of Labor—Bureau of Employment Security Letter No. 
1281, March 29, 1962, (Box 8, Folder 14).  The lowest rates of pay for Braceros were in Arkansas at 60 
cents per hour and Texas at 70 cents per hour. 
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CHAPTER 4: AN INEVITABLE COALITION? THE MERGER OF TWO 
PEOPLES AND TWO UNIONS IN THE FARMWORKERS MOVEMENT 
 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Since the 1930s and subsequent to World War Two, Filipino and Mexican farm workers 
had struggled to create viable labor unions that would allow them to negotiate with 
powerful landowners who employed them.  For most of this history, they met with little 
success.  In the 1930s, farm workers of color were positioned on specific points of a 
racial hierarchy as discussed and analyzed in Chapter 2.  Chapter 3 detailed how during 
and after World War Two, energies were directed at dismantling the newly created 
Bracero Program while Japanese Americans were whisked away to internment camps in 
1942.  Thereafter, farm worker organizers confronted the state and powerful growers in 
their efforts to assemble a farm workers labor union.   
In the Bracero era of the farm labor struggle, the AFL-CIO (American Federation 
of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations) funded Agricultural Workers Organizing 
Committee (AWOC) was formed in 1959.  In 1962, Cesar Chavez founded a parallel 
farm workers organization, the National Farm Workers Association (NFWA).  AWOC’s 
Filipino contingent was crucial to farm worker mobilization in the 1960s and Cesar 
Chavez’s Mexican dominated NFWA would emerge as a competitor with AWOC in 
efforts to forge farm labor unionism. 
In 1966, Filipinos and Mexicans would merge their respective labor unions, 
AWOC and the NFWA, into one interracial union and social movement organization.  
This chapter demonstrates how and why Filipino and Mexican workers were drawn 
together against the historical backdrop of racial division within the California agriculture 
labor force. 
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I utilize primary source material drawn from the UFW and farm worker organizer 
archival holdings to demonstrate how internal factors to the movement were essential to 
the merger, which would produce landmark concessions in 1970.   The chapter provides a 
fresh analysis that complements the numerous studies on farm workers that concentrate 
on external factors’ role in the production of social movement success. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In February 2005, the Seattle Times reported that 170 workers from Thailand had entered 
the US on H-2A visas and would work cherry and apple harvests in the Yakima Valley of 
Washington State.  A California-based farm labor contractor was responsible for 
obtaining the workers and expected to procure the labor of over 1,000 workers from 
Thailand throughout the rest of the year.  Though I have no far-reaching evidence that 
Thai workers are the largest and latest Asian addition to the agricultural labor market on 
the West Coast, a quick look at the UFW website allows viewers to read a portion of the 
website contents in the Thai language.  At the very least, the website content paired with 
the Seattle report indicates that Thai workers’ presence is acknowledged within the 
contemporary Pacific coast farm labor market.  The Seattle newspaper interviewed the 
UFW’s regional director for Washington who argued that the importation of Thai 
workers was intended to displace Latino farm laborers.  The director referred to this 
action as the playing of “a subtle race card…which is the legacy of agriculture.  We have 
a similar trajectory here.  As Mexican workers become more organized, one of the 
responses is to replace them with workers from Thailand.”60 
 But in fact, as I have argued throughout the dissertation, the racial politics for 
Asian and Mexican origin farm laborers within the history of California agriculture has 
                                                 
60 Seattle Times, New State Import: Thai Farmworkers, February 20, 2005. 
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hardly been a “subtle” affair.  The UFW official poses the importation of foreign, non-
White labor as groups sequentially replacing each other as objects of capitalist 
exploitation.  Further, by simply stating that Thai workers are to replace more 
“organizable” Mexican workers infers that Thai immigrant workers are somehow less 
desirous of farm labor unionism.  Are both groups, Asian origin and Mexican origin farm 
workers, destined to be a racially split labor force?  While this was the case for most of 
California history, this chapter demonstrates how at one point and time Filipino and 
Mexican workers overcame such divisions to form a racially united labor front in 
California.   
From the 1930s until 1959, California labor organizers were stifled in their efforts 
to create labor movement success for farm workers.  Unions such as the CAIWU 
(Cannery and Agricultural Industrial Workers Union) and the UCAPAWA (United 
Cannery, Agricultural, Packing, and Allied Workers of America) drew farm workers 
together in the 1930s.  Those efforts were squelched because of deeply entrenched White 
racism, which subjected various racial groups in California—Filipino, Japanese, and 
Mexican—to “qualitatively different racisms” (Jung 1999, 2002, & 2003). 
Throughout the era of Japanese internment and Braceros, there were no 
significant farm labor victories.  In 1942, California growers were provided cheap labor 
at a steady rate with the implementation of the Bracero Program.  As a result, through the 
1940s and 1950s, the National Farm Labor Union (NFLU) and then AWOC promoted the 
cause of field laborers by asserting their opposition to the Bracero Program, but with little 
to show for their work (Calavita 1992).  Indeed, the intense repression of the 1930s 
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coupled with the Bracero Program’s inception in the 1940s did much to place farm 
worker mobilization efforts in a state of “social movement abeyance” (Taylor 1989).   
“PEOPLE WHO KNOW A LITTLE SOMETHING ABOUT FARM LABOR” 
By 1959, the NFLU was out of the picture and farm worker activists were in a 
directionless state.  How could they succeed against a historical legacy of repressive 
racism, failed strikes and meager concessions?  In a letter to Ernesto Galarza in 1961, 
Henry Pope Anderson wrote of his desire  
 
to create an organization which actually represents some citizens  
of the state of California; which behaves responsibly with integrity, 
and organizational savvy; and which is run by people who know a 
little something about farm labor.61   
 
Anderson penned his letter two years after the formation of AWOC in 1959 and a year 
prior to the formation of the NFWA.  He worked for AWOC as chairperson of the 
union’s Northern California Area Council and was ever mindful that AWOC possessed 
hefty funding from the AFL-CIO—funds that would ring in at over $1 million from 1959 
to 1965 (Jenkins 1985).  Still, even after two years of financed organizing work, some 
semblance of labor mobilization had not taken root. 
As for the NFWA, Cesar Chavez founded the organization in 1962.  Chavez has 
been widely hailed as the architect of successful farm worker mobilization in 1960s 
California; no doubt, he is the enduring icon of the farm workers movement and Chicano 
struggle—two distinct yet intertwined social movements.  However, the victories of farm 
labor in the 1960s and into 1970s were the outcome of far more than the masterminding 
of Cesar Chavez.  I argue that union contracts and worker cohesion in the fields of 
                                                 
61 Ernesto Galarza Papers, Green Library, Letter to Ernesto Galarza from Henry Pope Anderson, October 8, 
1961, (Box 17, Folder 3). 
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California were produced, in part, out of the merger of the AWOC (henceforth referred to 
as the Committee) and the NFWA (henceforth referred to as the Association) in 1966.  
Further, the merger of both unions represented not only the integration of labor 
organizations but of racial groups as well: previously segregated Filipino and Mexican 
farm workers, who were often in competition with each other for agricultural jobs.  Thus, 
this portion of the dissertation traces the trajectory of this merger, focuses on intra-
movement dynamics, and details the process of integration as resultant from both internal 
and external factors.  To conclude, the chapter points out the challenges the union would 
face from various parties as it emerged on the labor union scene. 
IGNORING FILIPINOS AND INTERRACIAL LABOR UNIONISM 
J. Craig Jenkins and Charles Perrow (1977) theorize that shifts in the external political 
environment moved along the insurgency efforts of farm workers.  Marshall Ganz (2000) 
poses the Association as an organization, despite being in possession of fewer resources 
as compared to the Committee, better equipped in its strategy acumen to achieve success.  
Ganz terms this acumen the “strategic capacity” of the Association.  Jenkins (1985) uses 
one short chapter in his monograph to decry, like Ganz, the flawed approaches of the 
Committee.  An ensuing, much longer, chapter lays out the path to victory, which the 
Association built up and traveled along.  These studies merely mention Filipinos in 
passing, if at all, and Jenkins’ monograph, for example, pays short shrift to the 
Committee’s Filipino contingent.   
The end result of casting scant attention toward the Committee and Filipino 
workers is the assumed inevitability, which characterizes the merger of the Association 
and the Committee in the scholarship.  In fact, racial amalgamation of Filipino and 
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Mexican workers was central in producing a new labor front in the fields united along 
racial lines.  Filipino and Mexican workers required cooperation and previous to the 
grape strikes of 1965-1966 had not exhibited much desire to work with each other toward 
unionization.  How would that process occur?  In order to provide an adequate response 
to the chapter’s central research question, an overview of scholarship on social movement 
mergers, success, and external/internal dynamics is necessary. 
THE NEED TO SHIFT AWAY IN ORDER TO MERGE 
Some studies focus on social movement coalitions, which may be understood as mergers, 
such as bloc mobilization or cooptation (McCarthy and Wolfson 1992: 273).  These 
social movement mergers are enacted when social movements and/or social movement 
organizations (SMOs) come together and are “shaped by preexisting patterns of social 
relations among the adherents of social movements.”  While helpful in comprehension of 
social movement mergers that follow a linear trajectory toward success, a preexisting 
pattern postulation is less helpful in explanation of social movement mergers that are 
resultant of a shift away from preexisting patterns.  McCarthy and Wolfson presuppose 
that SMO mergers occur because some enabling conditions or set of factors is already in 
position to thrust the SMO toward success.  However, preexisting patterns, though 
significant, are not set in stone and fortunately so in the case of California farm workers.   
Indeed, Filipinos and Mexicans required that the patterns of racial interaction 
between their respective groups undergo an alteration.  Therefore, preexisting patterns 
were not enabling; they were problematic.  The workers had to pivot toward interracial 
cooperation in order to mobilize successfully.  There are elements of what Moon-Kie 
Jung (2003) refers to as an “ideological transformation” among Filipino and Mexican 
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workers in regards to race and racial identity as an intra-movement force.  Indeed, as 
Jung shows, both internal and external factors weighed heavily in producing labor 
victories for Japanese, Filipino and Portuguese workers in Hawaii.  Problematically, 
much of the sociological scholarship on collective action reveals little on how and SMO 
mergers occur along racial lines when the preexisting pattern of racial interaction did not 
foretell cooperation but rather pointed to continued division and competition for jobs.62   
Regardless of whether the preexisting patterns enabled or disabled social movement 
success, they indeed require attention both internally and externally.  Some analyses that 
focus upon internal social movement dynamics and people of color offer necessary 
conceptual tools. 
Douglas McAdam (1982) and Aldon Morris (1981) write up particularly 
insightful research that points the way toward internal analysis of social movement 
dynamics and their integral role in production of success.  While recognizing the varied 
strengths of resource mobilization (RM) theory (see McCarthy and Zald 1973), the 
authors critically note RM theory’s emphasis on external variables.  While external 
variables are of obvious importance, McAdam and Morris argue that a rationally 
conceived plan of action was key to building successful Black insurgency.  Both propose 
that internally formulated and historically constructed “conducive” and “facilitative” 
factors enabled social movement victories.  Thus, they provide a framework that 
explicates the formation and significance of internal structures for social movement 
success.  McAdam argues that “pre-existing” structures—again the reference to some 
                                                 
62 I maintain that the AWOC and the NFWA were SMOs though many may simply recognize them as 
aspiring labor unions.  They were not typical labor unions as they operated outside the confines of the 
manufacturing industry trade union tradition and worked with significant numbers of racial/ethnic 
minorities.   
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antecedent, success-enabling social condition—formed the base for the Black freedom 
struggle.  Morris reasons against any supposition that spontaneity spurred on Black 
activism and propelled sit-in waves that occurred in the Deep South.  His empirical 
analysis travels solid ground in detailing the long road of organizational efforts within the 
Black freedom struggle that led to sit-ins.   
INTERNAL DYANMICS OF THE FARM WORKERS MOVEMENT 
As for farm worker scholarship in sociology, the work has remained within RM theory’s 
emphasis on external dynamics.  Though exhibiting shortcomings, RM theory aids in the 
demonstration of how social movement organizations—even organization such as the 
Committee and the Associacion, which blur the lines between SMO and labor union (see 
Gordon 2005)—configure, organize, and use resources to advance the cause.  The most 
widely regarded studies of the farm workers movement therefore deem external factors as 
key to farm worker success thereby mutually excluding internal dynamics.  Jenkins 
(1985) and Jenkins and Perrow (1977) employ RM theory to explain the success farm 
workers achieved with focus upon external causality. 
These reviewed works surmise how change in the external political environment 
correlated with what is referred to as “the rise and dramatic success of farm worker 
insurgents” (Jenkins and Perrow 1977: 249).  For example, in comparing two eras of farm 
worker mobilization, 1946 to 1952 and 1965 to 1972, Jenkins (1985) concludes that the 
UFW was enabled by a ripe political climate.  Drawing upon external resources, the 
UFW secured path-breaking contracts in 1970.  Further, Jenkins and Perrow are assertive 
in (1977: 1249) maintaining that UFW victories are not explained “by the internal 
characteristics of the movement organization.”  On the contrary, I maintain that an 
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internal view of the farm workers movement, not to be exclusively identified with only 
one organization but with both the Association and the Committee, is beneficial in 
understanding farm worker success.   
However, even in studies of the farm worker movement’s decline and 
deterioration—to be addressed in the final substantive chapter, RM theory is employed 
interchangeably.  Theo Majka and Linda Majka (1993) elucidate some reasons that the 
United Farm Workers of America (UFW) encountered failure in the 1980s.  In a 
straightforward manner, they argue that permutations in the political environment and 
opportunities led to movement decline.  Further, they propose that social movement 
processes operate in a cyclical manner—if there is a peak then there must be an ensuing 
decline.  Consequently, the failure of the UFW is explained as an inverse function of the 
RM thesis.  Success and failure arise from variables, which are external.  To enable social 
movement success, helpful external stimuli must be present and if they are absent then 
social movement failure will ensue.  However, the Majka and Majka conclusion is 
contradictory.  Their postulation is that UFW success is rooted in the external but they 
also argue that UFW failure is due, in part, to extinguished external opportunities and 
intra-union tension.  Thus, intra-union tension is partially responsible for movement 
decline, but they attribute none of the success to intra-movement phenomena.  
SUCCESS THAT FLOWS FROM THE INTERNAL 
Definitions of social movement success and failure are slippery terms with which social 
movement theorists must reckon.  William Gamson (1975: 28) defines social movement 
success for “challenging groups” (farm workers would certainly fit into this category) as 
being signified by the “acceptance of a challenging group by its antagonists as a valid 
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spokesman for a legitimate set of interests.”  Indeed, the recognition of a farm workers 
union by growers was a marker of success.  However, there were other defining moments 
of success as well.  In the case of Filipino and Mexican farm workers, this occurred when 
the Association and the Committee accepted each other as genuine and equal partners in 
worker organizing efforts.  As it pertains to the merger and as already stated, scholarship 
on farm workers imposes a persistent inevitability upon the merger of the Association 
and the Committee; it is either taken for granted or ignored.  Consequently, the 
relationship between two sets: growers/workers and the unions/external factors are 
deemed most significant.  The merger, in and of itself, is taken as axiomatic in analysis of 
the movement and remains an unexplained axiom at that.    
 Even in explanations of failure, internal social movement dynamics are 
commonly ignored though the previously cited work by Majka and Majka (1993) touches 
upon them.  In their provocative study of poor people’s movements, Piven and Cloward 
(1977) speak to the plight of deprived groups and offer explanations of success and 
failure.  They put forward that social protest is enabled and constrained by social 
structure.  Therefore, from a Marxist perspective, elites remain in charge of social 
movement phenomena most of the time.  Moreover, those who engage in protest, 
unbeknownst to them, walk into the structured trap of an elite-controlled society.  
However, Piven and Cloward (1977: 34) hold that, almost always, repression takes effect 
and even when concessions are made, the elite are endowed with “a powerful image of a 
benevolent responsive” power structure.  Nearly without fail, the elite win out.   
Further, as SMOs secure victorious measures, they become institutionalized 
causes that are co-opted by outside organizations and interest groups.  Their reliance on 
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external resources disables the movement—too many interests and agendas, many of 
them flowing from more powerful bases, stir the pot.  My main concern with the tone and 
approach of Piven and Cloward and RM theory is the maintaining of focus on elites 
and/or external stimuli as the variable conditions that must change to create success and 
ultimately.  As the chapter considers the interaction and cooperation between the 
Association and the Committee, it is imperative to parse out some social movement 
literature that takes an inward gaze at social movement processes that allows analysis of 
the confluence of internal and external variables that enable success and cause failure. 
INTERNAL MOVEMENT DYANMICS AND IDENTITY 
Daniel Cress and David Snow showcase Jenkins and Perrow’s (1977) paper as 
impercipient in its argument that external factors hold primacy in the explanation of 
mobilization success.  Cress and Snow (1996: 1094) write that RM theory tends to 
“emphasize the generic categories of money, people, and legitimacy.”  However, 
concentration on these so-called “generic categories” makes sense within RM theory.  
Further, as we consider that RM theory formed a powerful theoretical response to relative 
deprivation theory—the idea that people mobilize because they have nothing—RM 
theory theorized that people, in fact, require resources to mobilize not only extreme 
dissatisfaction with the status quo.  Yet, Cress and Snow’s critique is a point well taken: 
comprehension of internal dynamics is essential in studies of collective mobilization.  But 
specifically, I offer that it is internal dynamics of racial identity that deserve attention in 
farm worker scholarship. 
Racial identity within the movement transformed from a tension producing force 
to one that united Filipino and Mexican farm workers.  Theorizing such a transformation, 
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from racially split yet spliced in the 1930s to a racially united labor front in the 1960s, is 
useful to comprehend social movement mergers along racial lines.  In his work on 
identity and the coherence of people into social movements, Alberto Melucci (1988) 
argues that identity matters a great deal—it provides positive feedback for social 
movement participants (Biggs 2003) and can propel the movement along.  Further, 
emphasis on identity formation and affirmation within SMOs allows for analysis of 
internal dynamics that is framed within “cultural and cognitive theories” (Caniglia and 
Carmin 2006: 205).  Melucci (1988: 332) assesses shortcomings in social movement 
theory and argues that:  
social movement participants define in cognitive terms the field of  
possibilities and limits which they perceive, while at the same time 
activating their relationships so as to give sense to their “being together” 
and the goals they pursue.  
 
The fuel of the movement is therefore not only mobilized capital or resources, but also 
the boost which identity can provide for movement members.63  As that identity becomes 
something that is shared, it resonates throughout the fold.  However, Melucci poses that a 
process of “perception” of the social movement possibilities is attendant with an 
“activating” of bonds between social movement participants; somehow, both occur in 
tandem to produce group cohesion.  For farm workers, it seems the activation of a 
cooperative relationship between the participants was necessary in order to perceive what 
level of success was possible.  Thereafter, internal group relationships and possible labor 
victories were mutually inclusive variables.   
 For example, Joshua Gamson (1996: 235) illustrates “ways in which identity 
boundaries are shaped by and shift through organizational activity” within the gay and 
                                                 
63 Additionally, emotions may be considered another essential component of the farm workers movement.  
While the sociology of emotions and social movements are not part of the analysis here, the edited book by 
Flam and King (2005) is a good starting point for the field. 
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lesbian movement.  Gamson (Ibid.) concludes that collective identities take shape and are 
reconstructed—what we can term identity formation—“through organizational bodies” 
(Taylor and Whittier 1992).  I argue that this framework can be extended to an 
understanding of not only the farm workers movement, but more explicitly to how it 
drew the Association and the Committee together. 
 Most notably, the “cultural and cognitive approach” is apt in how it moves social 
movement analysis beyond by drawing the literature within: to intra-organization and/or 
intra-movement relationships.  Gamson demonstrates that Cress and Daniel’s previously 
mentioned “generic categories” are helpful in the study of social movements.  But what is 
additionally required is a comprehension of how an SMO acquires its legitimacy, 
externally and internally, and simultaneously confers legitimacy on its membership.  In 
other words, Filipino and Mexican workers arrived at a point in which they regarded each 
other as comrades.  Moreover, it is a helpful theoretical and empirical venture to 
understand how internal variables such as race relations within the movement, as Table 
4.1 depicts below, form and grow to bind groups together in a social movement and/or 
SMOs.  
Table 4.1: Chapter’s Contribution to Farm Worker and SM Scholarship 
 Emphasis Theory Cause of Farm 
Worker Success 
Farm Worker  
Scholarship 
External Variables 
(Resources) 
Resource 
Mobilization 
Political 
Opportunities 
Controlled By Elites 
Chapter’s 
Contribution 
Internal Variables 
(Interracial Minority 
Relations) 
Social Movement 
Mergers 
Interracial 
Cooperation 
Fostered Within the 
Movement 
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SPLIT YET SPLICED IN THE FIELDS 
 
Prior to the merger of the Association and the Committee, Filipinos and Mexicans rarely 
worked together in the fields of California though they dominated the agricultural labor 
market.  Ferris and Sandoval (1997: 100) write that “Filipinos and Mexicans had often 
been segregated into different picking crews; this separation was often exploited by 
ranchers to pit one group against another in a labor dispute.”  As a consequence of these 
separate work groups, Filipinos and Mexicans were rooted in different labor 
organizations.  This situation was not solely attributable to landowner exploitation though 
that was certainly a major factor.  There were disparate historical experience and interests 
that played a role in the racially divided farm working class.  Larry Itliong, an 
indefatigable Filipino labor organizer and UFW Vice-President, wrote of how the merger 
was significant against the historical backdrop of segregated work crews.  Writing in 
January 1967, Itliong declared: 
  May I let you know that it was our people [Filipinos in the AWOC] 
  who started the strike.  Then our Mexican brothers followed suit. 
  Since then the cooperation between these [sic] two groups has been 
  good.  It looks to me that this is the real beginning of a [sic] closer 
  relationship between our people. (emphasis added) 64 
Itliong’s letter notes the “cooperation” as Mexicans in the Association constituted a 
clearly separate organizational body and racial/ethnic group from Filipinos in the 
Committee.  His appraisal of the new union recognizes the newness of the relationship.  
Up until 1959, Filipino and Mexican workers had not utilized a discourse of 
multiracialism, color-blindness, or racial unity to advance the farm worker cause. But 
they had commenced with the usage of such language in the 1960s.  Indeed, the 
employment of the term “Mexican brothers” is significant as it is a reverse of what 
                                                 
64 Larry Itliong Papers, Reuther Library, letter to Jose M. Leonidas from Larry Itliong, January 8, 1967, 
(Box 1,Folder 4). 
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Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2006) terms “semantic moves” that represent White racism in 
reference to people of color.  I propose that, in this case, the semantic move is anti-racist, 
unsubtle, and seeks to rectify divisions—the flip side of Bonilla-Silva’s racist semantic 
move.   
ECONOMIC PROFILE OF FILIPINO AND MEXICAN FARM WORKERS 
Yet, Filipinos and Mexicans were spliced groups in that their position as the racially 
subjugated core of the California agricultural labor force dating back to the 1930s 
continued on into the 1960s and 1970s.  Census data collected in 1960 illustrates this 
persistent condition of separation between Filipinos and Mexicans was rooted in not only 
cultural or historical differences but class position within the farm labor market as well.  I 
have cited other scholars in the dissertation that note Filipino-Mexican tension but 
ultimately regard both groups as workers who, though racially and ethnically split, 
ultimately constitute a one-in-the-same oppressed group.  For example, in detailing the 
impediments to farm labor unionism Stephen H. Sosnick (1978: 298) opines that “ethnic 
diversity and impermanent employment militated against a sense of solidarity among co-
workers.”  While certainly relevant, there was some gap existent between the workers as 
Filipino workers led a more destitute existence as compared to their Mexican 
counterparts.   
 A state of California study (1969: 23) on farm workers, based on data from 1965, 
displays “earning by ethnic group” in the state’s agricultural labor force.  The study 
analyzed wage levels for 218,200 Mexican farm workers and 16,400 Filipino farm 
workers.  The report offers that Filipinos earned the highest incomes in California 
agriculture across all racial groups—including White farm laborers.  Further, a key 
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conclusion is that Filipinos operated as “professional” agricultural laborers; they were 
less likely to migrate among crops as work became available and maintained more 
permanent forms of agricultural employment.  However, the findings apply to the 
statewide agricultural labor force and thus do not offer information specific to the 
geographic locales in which the labor strikes of the 1960s were rooted.  Further, no 
matter from which racial/ethnic group “professional” farm workers emanated, I suspect 
that they would have been some of the least likely workers to engage in strike actions.   
The grape strikes, which spurred the farm workers movement to its apex period, 
occurred in the San Joaquin Valley (SJV) of central, inland California.  The previously 
cited state study determined that (Ibid.: 6) the “San Joaquin Valley is the most significant 
area both as a pool of farm labor and a source of farm wages.”  Two of the largest 
standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs) in the SJV are listed in 1960 census 
reports as Bakersfield in Kern County and the city of Fresno in the same county.  We 
must turn to Filipino and Mexican income figures specific to this region in order to 
provide an adequate class profile of grape strike participants.   
My calculations drawn from the census data show that in 1960, 41% of employed 
Mexican origin workers (this includes both Mexican and US born individuals) over the 
age of 14 labored as “farm laborers and foremen” in Bakersfield.  In Fresno, the 
percentage stood at 46% for the identical demographic group in the same year (U.S. 
Census 1963).  In 1969 as the picket lines were in full swing, I ascertain that 35% of 
Bakersfield SMSA’s employed adults over age 16 “of Spanish surname”, which I suspect 
is inclusive of some Filipinos, held a job as “farm laborers and foremen.”65  As for the 
                                                 
65 Census data cited here is taken from 1970 census reports published in 1973.  However, the descriptive 
statistical tables are compiled from what workers reported for 1969. 
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Fresno SMSA, the percentage stood at 25% in 1970 (U.S. Census, 1973).66  These figures 
along with median income levels are shown in Table 4.2 below. 
Table 4.2: Mexican Incomes and Presence in the Farm Labor Force, 1970 
 Median Incomes % Employed in Farm Labor 
Bakersfield SMSA $6241 35% 
Fresno SMSA $5914 25% 
   
As for incomes, I do not provide figures specific to farm laborers in both SMSAs.  
However, in 1970, data for thirteen SMSAs in California (including Los Angeles and the 
Bay Area) were collected and the two lowest median income scores statewide for 
“Spanish surname” families were found in Bakersfield ($6241 per year) and Fresno 
($5914 per year) where substantial levels of Mexicans were employed in farm labor.  
While I do not have conclusive evidence yet to substantiate that these extremely low 
incomes are indicative of substandard farm wages, I suspect that the relationship is 
indeed prominent.  In fact, the only SMSAs nationwide with lower median incomes for 
“Spanish surname” families were in the Rio Grande Valley of South Texas.  Indeed, it is 
quite likely that the poorest Mexican origin people in the US, in 1970, labored and lived 
as farm workers in either one of the rich agribusiness industries of central California or 
South Texas (Ibid.).   
                                                 
66 I cannot offer complete explanation of why there is a drop in the agricultural labor force numbers from 
1960 to 1970.  One partial explanation is the change of age demographic from “14 and over” in 1960 data 
to “16 and over” in 1970 data.  Another explanation may be the Vietnam War.  For Mexican Americans, 
this is not an uncommon trajectory.  In my own family history, several men went directly from farm labor 
to military service.  Irrespective of the downward shift, the numbers in both years demonstrate the 
centrality of Mexicans to the agricultural labor force. 
 107 
 
 As for Filipinos, some census information speaks directly to their socioeconomic 
and generational position within California agriculture.  Data for the Bakersfield and 
Fresno SMSAs on Filipinos was seemingly not collected and therefore the following 
information is based on numbers collected statewide and displayed in Table 4.3.  In 1960, 
6,255 Filipinos over the age of 14 worked as “farm laborers and foremen” within the 
state.  Ten years later, this number for the same age group remained relatively stable but 
declined to 5,137.  However, in both years, a considerable number of Filipino farm 
workers were 45 to 64 years of age—4,853 in 1960 and 2,923 in 1970.  On the whole, 
Filipino median incomes are considerably lower than Mexican workers.  The total 
median income for Filipinos, 16 and over, in both “urban” and “rural” California 
residences was $4698 for men and $3469 for women.  Removing the effect of urban 
Filipino incomes details the difficult circumstances for Filipinos in rural California 
locales.  The rural income figures for Filipinos are the lowest of any cited in the chapter: 
$3,334 for men and $1,844 for women.  In fact, many Filipino farm workers were single 
men but the income data for women demonstrates how the inability to marry and thus 
have dual incomes may have hurt their economic status even further.  
Table 4.3: Filipino Median Incomes in California, 1970 
 Urban & Rural Rural 
Men $4698 $3334 
Women $3469 1844 
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A UNION OF THEIR OWN 
Indeed, Filipinos and Mexicans may have been divided by cultural and ethnic differences 
but as demonstrated, material inequality stratified Mexican workers above Filipino 
workers.  In 1972, Cesar Chavez informed a journalist that indeed there was a racial gap 
that the movement confronted among its constituency, but did not interpret it as a chasm 
reflected by income inequality between the groups.  Although Filipino farm workers were 
small in number as compared to Mexicans, Chavez deemed them necessary for successful 
mobilization.  Therefore, Chavez sought to bridge the gap in order to propel the 
movement along with every bit of human capital, which it could muster:  “The growers 
are totally antiunion and every step is a fight.  Our strike funds are limited.  We have to 
weld a lot of minority groups together.”67  Among some Filipino partisans, the racial 
division meant that Filipinos required their own farm labor union.  But a Mexican-led 
union provided an adequate substitute.  Certainly, no scholarship on the formation of the 
UFW characterizes the process as a temporary fix for Filipino workers. 
However, in 1971, Porfirio U. Sevilla, head of the Filipino American Citizens’ 
League, expressed his gratitude to Cesar Chavez for working with Filipino farm workers 
“in the absence of their own organization.”68  Sevilla reflects a similar tone to that which 
is observed in Itliong’s previously cited letter.  Sevilla expresses some expectation or 
desire for a Filipino body or labor union, which would advocate specifically for Filipino 
farm workers and offers to Chavez a kind of working partnership and a chance “to meet 
each for an exchange of views.”  Further, Sevilla expresses confidence that they can 
                                                 
67 Los Angeles Times, “Cesar Chavez---Out of Sight but Still in Fight,” February 14, 1972, p. A3. 
68 UFW—Office of the President, Reuther Library, Letter to Cesar Chavez from Porfirio U. Sevilla, April 
15, 1971, (Box 64, Folder 22). 
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“reach a mutual understanding for the better welfare of both our groups!”69  This notion 
was not a manifestation of some new Asian American or Filipino ethnic nationalism.  
Rather, I contend that this sentiment was deeply rooted in a history of Filipino efforts to 
form ethnic specific farm worker unions in California dating back to the 1930s (Jamieson 
1945).  Mexicans confronted a different historical experience as farm workers as they 
encountered large numbers of Bracero workers since 1942 that had altered the 
configuration of Mexican and American identity among Mexican origin workers. 
Indeed, in 1959, before the founding of the Association, the Committee and its 
Filipino contingent formed the keystone in the farm worker mobilization effort.  Ernesto 
Galarza, an ardent Mexican American farm labor organizer and anti-Bracero crusader, 
offered high praise of the Committee:  
The agricultural employer interests now fully recognize the 
AWOC as the expression of a full commitment [sic] by  
organized labor to assist and organize the farm workers 
in California.70   
 
Galarza’s appraisal should not be underestimated.  He partook in labor strikes and NFLU 
organizing activities throughout the 1940s and 1950s, though most of his energies were 
directed toward dismantling the Bracero Program.  Furthermore, in the late 1950s, 
Galarza attempted to broker cooperation between the NFLU and the Community Services 
Organization (CSO), headed by Cesar Chavez’s mentor, Fred Ross.71  
The CSO, funded by Saul Alinsky’s Industrial Areas Foundation, had done 
organization work with Mexican American communities in California urban areas.  
                                                 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ernesto Galarza Papers, Green Library, Memorandum to Franz Daniel from Ernesto Galarza, November, 
3, 1959, (Box 4, Folder 6). 
71 Fred Ross Papers, Green Library, Diary Entry, July 9, 1957, (Box 1, Folder 19) While most of the diary 
entries do not list a year, two of the typewritten pages have “1957” or ‘57’ scribbled near the top of the 
page.   
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Chavez was on the CSO payroll and based himself in San Jose until 1962 when he moved 
to Delano to found the Association.  After nearly four years of working within the 
Association in July 1966, only two months before the merger and in the midst of grape 
strikes orchestrated by both unions, the Mexican American Political Association (MAPA) 
singled out the Association, and not the Committee, as “THE BEST HOPE FOR THE 
FARM WORKERS THAT HAS EVER COME BY IN ALL THE YEARS OF AGONY, 
SACRIFICE AND HOPE.”72  A shift had occurred.  Seven years prior Galarza had 
anointed the Committee as the standard bearer in the farm workers movement and in fact 
had been hired to be “nominally assistant” (Galarza 1977: 32) to Director Norman Smith, 
but the Association soon after its inception experienced a rapid ascension in the 
movement.  Even as Chavez and the Association emerged into prominence, it was 
Filipinos who led the way not only in strike activity, but also in employment of an 
interracial discourse. 
WORKING OUT A HISTORY OF TENSION 
The Committee had labored to implement an infrastructure that would enable successful 
mobilization of farm workers.  In the early 1960s, the Committee had produced 
significant labor organizing activities and provided some respite for workers.  In 1961, 
Filipino workers displayed their organizing mettle in Santa Cruz.  Two hundred ten 
workers in Brussels sprouts, nearly all Filipinos, engaged in a strike referred to in a 
trilingual edition [English, Spanish, and Tagalog] of the AWOC newsletter as essential 
“to the survival of the whole farm labor movement.”73  The strike instantly garnered a 
                                                 
72 AWOC Papers, Reuther Library, MAPA: Special Newsletter and Urgent Request to All Chapters from 
Edward Quevedo, July 16, 1966, (Box 7, Folder 16). 
73 Ernesto Galarza Papers, Green Library, The Agricultural Worker/El Trabajador Agricola, Vol. 1, No. 3 
October 28, 1961, (Box 4, Folder 4). 
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wage increase from $1 per hour to $1.10, but the workers wanted $1.25 an hour and the 
right to collectively bargain.74   
Larry Itliong went before the newly formed Committee branch, which the workers 
had formed for the express interest of organizing a strike.  Though they momentarily 
represented the vanguard of the farm workers movement in the Committee, there was 
recognition that the Filipinos could not sustain long-term farm labor agitation on their 
own.  Itliong implored the workers: 
 I would like to plead to you for the sake of our own group...I know 
 and you know we have been abused a lot of times...But let us forget 
 those abuses we have had in the past.  Let us win the friendship of  
 all other groups by showing them our cooperation, by showing them 
 we know how to fight battles, by showing them we have the courage 
 to be together.75 
 
While not crying out for any sort of merger, one would not have been possible at this 
time anyway as the Association did not yet exist, Itliong identifies a need for Filipino 
farm workers to assemble under the protective cover of bigger numbers.  There is 
recognition of a shared but conflicted history with other farm workers, but that in the face 
of powerful landowners and the state, workers of color would require interminority 
cooperation.76  As they neared the merger, John Gregory Dunne (1971: 155), who 
conducted interviews with several prominent actors as events occurred in the farm worker 
movement, reported that a merger would be a challenge because of the tension between 
Filipinos and Mexicans, which was deemed “a potentially uncomfortable racial situation” 
as both groups possessed “little love for each other.”  
                                                 
74 Ernesto Galarza Papers, Green Library, Bulletin “TO ALL THE FRIENDS OF FARM WORKERS” 
from Rufino Nachor, October 24, 1961, (Box 4, Folder 7). 
75 Ernesto Galarza Papers, Green Library, The Agricultural Worker/El Trabajabdor Agricola  Newsletter, 
Vol. 1 No. 3, October 28, 1961, (Box 4, Folder 4). 
76 Interminority or what Claire Jean Kim and Taeku Lee term “Interracial Politics,” receives scant attention 
in historical studies.  It is often a phenomenon associated with the post-riot condition of Los Angeles in 
1992.   
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Speaking to those Filipino workers in Santa Cruz, it is clear therefore that Itliong 
recognized that Mexican workers were that group with which Filipino workers would 
need to unite.  Most certainly, Itliong was not referencing White workers.  In 1959 and 
two years thereafter, Norman Smith, the first Director of the Committee, had made efforts 
to recruit White workers into organizing initiatives.  But Smith had barked up the wrong 
tree and his overall performance drew the chagrin of Galarza who wrote that  
 the shock of Smith’s performance has shaken our friends severely. 
 As field workers they seriously question whether any top AFL-CIO 
 officials understand or care [sic] for the problem of field workers  
 as such.77 
Indeed, several letters that came across Smith’s desk reveal that many White workers had 
corresponded with the Director and that Smith was eager to advocate on their behalf.78  
Obviously, Galarza was disappointed.  His optimistic feelings on the Committee, which 
he had expressed a year earlier, were vanquished.79  J. Craig Jenkins (1999: 285) 
comments that the Committee focused on White workers and ignored Filipinos who 
“were organized, largely because of their strong ethnic ties and job pride as the most 
skilled field workers.”  However, it is key to note that indeed Filipinos constituted an 
organized set of workers.  Regardless of whether the Committee paid ample attention to 
Filipino labor interests, Philip L. Martin (1996: 85) suggests that the organization did 
“help to raise the wages of Filipino grape pickers.”  Consequently, Filipinos were able to 
maintain themselves as an enabling ingredient to successful farm worker mobilization 
that occurred later.   
                                                 
77 Ernesto Galarza Papers, Green Library, Supplementary report, May 23, 1960, (Box 4, Folder 10). 
78 Some of these letters can be located in the AWOC papers, Reuther Library, (Box 5, Folder 4).  These 
letters were signed by English-surnamed individuals who could have been Black workers.  But this is 
doubtful as Jenkins (1985) points out that Director Smith focused his organizing efforts on White workers 
and not workers of color.  Majka (1981) also confirm this point. 
79 In his 1977 book, Galarza admits that organizing farm workers was a tough business and that even he 
himself was ill-prepared with the knowledge of how to carry out the task. 
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 While the leadership of the Committee perhaps erred in its strategic approach—at 
least according to Galarza and Jenkins as well—the Filipino contingent produced a labor 
leader in Itliong who was undeniably the leader of Filipino farm laborers (Sosnick 1978) 
and argued for the necessity of interracial labor unionism.  Further, observers of the 
burgeoning farm workers movement noted that Director Smith, and it seems his 
misdirected efforts, had dissipated into the background, while individuals such as Louis 
Krainock took the reigns of the Committee.80  Krainock, the Committee’s Director of 
Public Information, responded to a union supporter, who called out for a multiracial farm 
workers’ union, by employing a race-neutral, rather than an interracial or multiracial, 
discourse.  Krainock insisted that: 
  ‘Color blindness’ is an essential for us.  If we do not learn from the  
  lessons of past history, we’re headed for trouble…I do not believe, 
  however, that AWOC is going to make these mistakes.81 
 
The next year, Filipino Brussels sprouts workers would listen to the same message from 
Itliong though his tone, I would assert, was most certainly not colorblind.  However, the 
history of farm labor organization history and its failed efforts to unionize workers is not 
one of simple mistakes and miscalculations.  The racial politics of the movement were 
such that a reconfiguration of class and racial divisions between Filipinos and Mexicans 
would be necessary.  That is, the groups would have to merge in order to create a 
successful farm workers movement. 
FORGING AN INTERRACIAL UNION 
Taken together, Itliong and Krainock speak out for “forgiveness” of the past when 
Filipinos and Mexicans formed labor unions, but as separate groups (Jamieson 1945).  
                                                 
80 “Lettuce Farm Strike Part of Deliberate Union Plan” Los Angeles Times January 23, 1961, p. B1. 
81 AWOC Papers, Reuther Library, letter from Louis Krainock to Lillian Ransome, February 22, 1960, 
(Box 5, Folder 4). 
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Indeed, this aim to build a multiracial union sprouted from the belief that agricultural 
labor was composed of exploited people of color—groups that hopefully would or should 
recognize their commonalities and intertwined history as working class racial groups.  It 
appeared logical to farm worker activists that class had to be emphasized, coupled along 
with the disremembering process, in order to unite the racially split workforce.  
Moreover, some radicals within the movement such as Filipino organizer, Philip Vera 
Cruz, envisioned a future in which a multiracial farm working class would confront big 
capital in the fields of California: “Filipinos and Mexicans are not the only farm workers.  
In the near future, Growers will be negotiating with Puerto Ricans, Arabs, whites, black 
and whomever will be.”  As the formation of a united farm working class took hold, these 
workers would evolve into “union negotiators” who were “tougher and more 
demanding.”82   
Krainock, in 1959, transmitted a “blueprint” to Director Smith of how the newly 
formed Committee should proceed with its initial efforts.  The document, quoted in the 
Los Angeles Times in 1961, stated “the financial, social, and ideological structure of 
agribusiness is built on cheap labor—upon some bracero concept whether it be Mexican, 
Japanese, Filipino, or Puerto Rican.”83  If in fact this was the case that farm labor was 
composed of oppressed racial minorities, then farm workers had a difficult barrier to 
surmount, because each group would not envision itself as a racial/ethnic monolith and as 
I have shown, Filipino and Mexican workers were no class monoliths either.  Historical 
sociological scholarship by Moon-Kie Jung (2003) on the multiracial working class in 
                                                 
82 Reuther Library, UFW Papers—Office of the President, Part II, Ideology Paper by Philip Vera Cruz: 
“Radical Perspectives in the Farm Workers Movement,” n.d., (Box 50, Folder 7).  Though no date is 
provided on this document, it is almost certain that the paper is written sometime between 1965 and 1973. 
83 “Lettuce Farm Strike Part of Deliberate Union Plan” Los Angeles Times January 23, 1961, p. B1 
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Hawaii illustrates how workers of color, previously divided by class and race, were able 
to mold “one big union” by a “disremembering” of a history of slights and injuries 
between Filipino and Japanese plantation workers.  In the California fields, some similar 
process of disconnection or forgiveness would have to occur in order for successful 
mobilization. As will be shown, this detachment or forgiveness of the past would occur, 
but it would prove to be only a fleeting moment of interracial labor unionism. 
As for the Association, the organization had its own modest philosophical 
argument for a multiracial farm workers’ union as well.  Dolores Huerta informed Saul 
Alinsky in 1962 that “we are also going to aim at the Negro and white farm worker 
community” in organization efforts.84  Huerta’s desire to reach out to a wide swath of 
workers demonstrates that both organizations conceded that interracial cooperation would 
be necessary for mobilization success.  I argue that this represented more than a 
politically correct presentation of the movement by farm worker activists.  It seems that, 
most certainly, the organizers had sized up the racial landscape among workers and 
discerned that interracial unity was a central variable that could disable or enable the 
movement.  Moreover, that plea for interracial unity was specifically a desire for Filipino 
and Mexican integration within the movement. 
Theo Majka (1980) propounds that dating back to the labor agitation of the 1930s, 
Filipino and Mexican workers were the groups that were most “organizable” and most 
likely to participate in labor unionism.  During this decade, Majka (Ibid: 302) argues that 
unions such as the UCAPAWA concentrated on “white Dust Bowl migrants rather than 
the more class conscious Mexican and Filipino workers.”  Thus, among farm workers, 
                                                 
84 Fred Ross Papers, Green library, letter from Dolores Huerta to Saul Alinsky, June 13, 1962 (Box 2, 
Folder 3). 
 116 
 
Filipino and Mexican workers are noted as labor agitators and three decades later they 
had still not fomented labor union success together or separately.  Moreover, Mae Ngai 
(2004) argues that white workers did not labor in the fields, but in the sheds and 
packinghouses.  That is, it was Filipinos and Mexicans dating back to the 1930s who 
dominated field labor.     
PICKETING TOWARD A MERGER 
In 1962, Cesar Chavez and his Association embarked on their agenda of organizing 
agricultural laborers.  The focus was upon Mexican field workers, though there was an 
employment of a multiracial discourse that alluded to the need for a racially integrated 
union.  Chavez began this work modestly by addressing the material shortcomings in 
farm workers’ lives.  His initial aim was to provide for basic needs of Mexican workers 
and he offered services such as burial insurance, an auto parts cooperative, and a credit 
union (Edid 1994).  While both organizations may have been on the same page in this 
regard and recognized the need for cross-racial cooperation, the Association distrusted 
the Committee and Louis Krainock, in particular.  Indeed, both groups saw the need for a 
merger and racial integration of workers, but that merger was also subject to the interests 
of each organization to assert its power within the movement.     
Dolores Huerta, one of Chavez’s main confidantes and perhaps the most 
important organizer, expressed deep animosity for the Committee.  She relayed to Chavez 
that “AWOC is having meetings in the camps.  It seems they copy everything I do.  But 
they are usually [sic] going in with their false promises, and the workers are already 
kicking.”85  In the letter’s overall text and discussion of several matters, it is nearly 
certain that the note is written sometime in 1962—on the heels of Itliong’s and 
                                                 
85 AWOC Papers, Reuther Library, letter from Dolores Huerta to Cesar Chavez, n.d., (Box 2, Folder 14). 
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Krainock’s calls for racial unity among workers.  In another letter, Huerta refers to 
Krainock as a “megalomaniac” [sic] who “has been successful in conning the 
Longshoremen and the Teamsters to put up some dough for his operation.”86   
 Huerta’s distrust of the Committee aside, it is true that the Committee was well 
connected to the most powerful levels of the US labor union hierarchy (Jenkins 1985).  
Keenly aware of this, it is logical that an organization such as the Association, standing 
outside of that power structure, would feel antagonistic toward the Committee.  
Nevertheless, the key point here is that these two organizations regarded each other as 
competitors—they possessed the same goals but perhaps had different tactical and 
political agendas.  Ever mindful of who backed the Committee, Chavez advised Huerta to 
“avoid fights with [the Committee] AWOC.”87   
Early in the spring of 1965, Filipino and Mexican grape pickers negotiated a wage 
of $1.40 per hour, the same wage Braceros were paid, in the Coachella Valley near the 
town of Delano in Kern County, which would serve as the center of farm worker 
mobilization operations from 1965 to 1970.  The wage rate of $1.40 was not an arbitrary 
number, which growers or workers conjured up.  US Secretary of Labor, Willard Wirtz, 
had set the wage rate for foreign agricultural labor, but oddly, this type of wage 
protection was in use for foreign agricultural labor only.88  As grape workers followed the 
harvest and labor route north of Delano, they found that the $1.40 hourly rate would not 
be paid to them.  Subsequent to some fits and starts, Itliong organized Filipino workers to 
commence strike activity on September 8, 1965 in order to demand the $1.40 wage.  
After a few days of unpicked grape fields, landowners secured replacement Mexican 
                                                 
86 AWOC Papers, letter to Cesar Chavez from Dolores Huerta, n.d., (Box 2, Folder 14). 
87 AWOC Papers, quoted in letter to Cesar Chavez from Dolores Huerta, n.d., (Box 2, Folder 12). 
88 “Tension Grows While Grape Strike Spreads” Los Angeles Times September 30, 1965, pg. 36. 
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workers (Dunne 1971).  Itliong reported “Our people wanted to beat up the scabs.  That’s 
when I went to see Cesar and asked him to help me” (Ibid: 78-79).  On September 16, 
Mexican Independence Day, the Association made the decision to join Filipino workers 
on the picket lines.  Some analysts (Edid 1994: 40, also see Jenkins 1999 )  
Itliong would encounter dissension because of the merger with Chavez and the 
Association.  Significantly, there was criticism from fellow Filipinos as well.  One group, 
identifying themselves as the Filipino Americanism Society (FAS), asked Filipino 
strikers:  
CAN’T YOU SEE THAT THESE PEOPLE ARE USING YOU TO FORM  
AN ORGANIZATION THAT WILL GIVE THEM POWER AND GREAT 
  WEALTH?  THEY ARE NOT SO CONCERNED WITH YOUR WELFARE  
AS THEY ARE WITH THEIR OWN SELFISH REASONS…AS LONG AS 
YOU DO NOT JOIN A UNION: NO UNION WILL BE FORMED HERE.89 
With its closing exhortation, the FAS claimed that Filipino workers were the linchpin of 
the strike activity; they held the key to whether contracts would be signed or not, whether 
or not the union would be taken seriously.  In actuality, this is a sentiment that would be 
echoed by other Filipino-affiliated participants in the movement—the Filipinos were the 
heart and soul of the farm worker collective action.    
Further, the FAS did not size up the emergent union agenda as helpful for Filipino 
workers.  They deemed it necessary to speak directly to Filipino workers as a group with 
a varying agenda from that of Mexican workers.  The Filipino consul in Los Angeles, 
Alexjandro F. Holigores, also voiced his concern in regards to Filipino involvement in 
the strikes.  The consul had personally paid for radio ads encouraging Filipino strikers 
that “it is my deep conviction that that the interests of the Filipino workers would be best 
                                                 
89 NFWA Papers, Reuther Library, bulletin to striking Filipino workers from the Filipino Americanism 
Society, n.d., Box 6, Folder number omitted.  No date is apparent on this document, but it is almost 
certainly written sometime in late 1965 or in 1966 as the bulletin notes that “OVER ONE HUNDRED 
(100) DAYS HAVE PASSED” since the strikes had commenced in September 1965. 
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served if they returned to their respective camps.”  The consul noted that he had asked 
growers to meet the $1.40 per hour demand.  The Committee responded with a swift 
rebuke to the consul and labeled him a “tool of the growers.”90 
 Nevertheless, the merger became official in August 1966.91  But this merger was 
not a unidirectional relationship in which Filipinos needed Mexican support but 
Mexicans could have gone it alone.  Indeed, as argued in the introduction, the bringing 
together of multiracial workers into a merged union is portrayed as an inevitable 
occurrence in much of the literature of the farm workers movement.  We see that it, in 
fact, was not inevitable: both groups had competing agendas and interests within the 
movement.  Though smaller in number, as compared to Mexican workers, the 
Association understood that the resource of the Filipino membership was a key ingredient 
in the new union’s labor efforts.   
In fact, the Association did little to instigate the strikes; they had been caught 
unaware.  Chavez revealed that he was apparently so focused on the concerns of his own 
organization that “The first I heard of it [the strikes] was when people came to me and 
said the Filipinos had gone out.  They [Filipino workers] were mad that the Filipinos 
weren’t working and the Mexicans were” (Dunne: 79).  Thus, it was the Committee’s 
Filipino contingent that had crossed a threshold of social movement activity and tipped 
farm workers over into a state of mobilized labor agitation.  Chavez was pushed into the 
strikes by an organization, which the scholarship has depicted as unimportant and even 
inconsequential.  Further, Filipinos and Mexicans in the Committee and the Association 
                                                 
90 “Filipino Consul Hit for Plea to Grape Strikers” Los Angeles Times October 6, 1965, pg. A8. 
91 UFW Papers—Office of the President Files, Reuther Library, AFL-CIO Official Charter, August 23, 
1966, (Box 71, Folder 6).  
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noted each other as adversaries in the competition for agricultural jobs.  Both 
organizations had to move toward a negotiation and agreement that was acceptable before 
embarking on massive labor mobilization efforts. 
 As the workers embarked upon strike activity from 1965 to 1970, Filipino and 
Mexican workers struggled to maintain movement viability.  There had been but a handful 
of significant strikes throughout the previous twenty years.  Thus, as the Filipino and 
Mexican workers required each other for strike action, the workers were presented to the 
media, growers, and workers that had not yet decided to join in the strikes as a racially 
united workers’ front.  Chavez wrote a letter to an unspecified newspaper editor to shed 
light on the cause and “to describe a little about the conditions surrounding the strike here 
Delano, involving 4000 Mexican Americans and Filipinos.”92  As he details the struggle, 
Chavez sketches a portrait of this unity by lumping all the workers together into his count 
of 4000 strikers.   
This count of racially mixed workers became a point of contention during the 
strikes and even in the historical assessment of what occurred.  Growers asserted that 
only 500 workers were on strike, while the union insisted that between 2,000 and 4,000 
workers had walked off the job.93  In his memoirs, Philip Vera Cruz (Scharlin and 
Villanueva 2000: 107), a highly ranked union officer and prominent Filipino American 
activist, asserted that “at the time of the merger, there were probably more Filipinos 
involved with the union than Mexicans.”  Another union supporter and participant in 
                                                 
92 UFWOC Papers, Letter addressed “Dear Editor from Cesar Chavez, October 1965, (Box 2, Folder 6). 
93 Ibid.: Los Angeles Times. 
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boycott activities noted that “the Filipino farm worker…was [sic] the backbone of the 
strike…without the Filipino, there would not have been a strike in the first place.”94 
A SHIFTY BASE   
John Gregory Dunne (1971) details how the lead-up to the merger was littered with 
anxiety because of tensions between Filipinos and Mexicans.  Therefore, the language 
that we see from Chavez’s note to the Editor is a quick turnaround from the relationship 
that existed before strikes ensued.  C. Al Green, successor to Norman Smith at the helm 
of the Committee, desired no cooperation with Chavez’s Association.  However, Itliong 
and Chavez had opened a line of communication with each other and AFL-CIO Director 
of Organizing, William Kircher, was in favor of the merger.  Itliong stated that: 
Kircher told me not to worry about Al Green…  He said he’d take care  
of him.   I began bypassing Green and working directly with Kircher. 
Finally, in August, Cesar and Kircher and I decided, “Let’s do it.” (Ibid: 155) 
 
But when the merger occurred, it was a relationship that some doubted and it 
tested the organizational loyalties and visions of movement participants.  Bill Berg, a 
boycott leader in New York, wrote of his feelings during the merger process, “Well, I 
have never been one little bit sorry for doing what I could for the striking AWOC’s and 
can remember that you and I had more than one argument about ‘the other side’.”  Berg’s 
allusion to the Association as an opposing organization frames Chavez’s group as a 
competing organizational body.  Further, it demonstrates distrust emanating from 
movement participants whose roots were in the Committee as Huerta had expressed from 
her position within the Association.  As a result of the merger of the Association and the 
                                                 
94 Reuther Library, Larry Itliong Papers, letter from Bill Berg to Larry Itliong, December 15, 1972, (Box 1, 
Folder 12). 
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Committee, it created a feeling of alienation for some.  Berg relayed that “After the 
merger, there never was a place for me so I left.”95  
Itliong also communicates this sense of varying roots to Chavez in a 1968 letter.  
Though the communiqué is long after the merger, it reveals how the Filipino and 
Mexican rank and file located their own identity as farm workers: in racial/ethnic identity 
and organizational body.  In the letter, Itliong continued a discussion with Chavez in 
regards to a car purchased by the union for Itliong’s use: 
  I know your concern with the Mexican brothers about their seeing me drive a 
  new car, and the Union making the payment for it.  As for me on the Filipino 
side they knew I have been driving new cars before I worked for AWOC  
[Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee] and its [sic] not new to them.96    
 
Apparently, Chavez was having a difficult time explaining the purchase of the vehicle to 
the Mexican workers in the union.  Ultimately, Itliong would not budge on the purchase 
and use of the vehicle and would leave it to Chavez to explain the necessity of the car to 
the “Mexican brothers.”  However, the car represented more than a mere vehicle.  To the 
“Mexican brothers,” the car connoted the different history and roots that Itliong had in 
the Filipino dominated Committee before he became a union officer with access to an 
official union car. 
Furthermore, there were external pressures being applied to the Association and 
the Committee before and after the merger.  The surfacing of such problems would 
produce enormous tension within the organization and prove quite damaging for the 
newly minted union as they proceeded to sign contracts and extend them past termination 
dates.  Still, at the point of signing contracts, the union seemed ready to take on such 
challenges.  
                                                 
95 Larry Itliong Papers, Reuther Library, letter to Larry Itliong from Bill Berg, December 16, 1971, (Box 1, 
Folder 12). 
96 Reuther Library, letter from Larry Itliong to Cesar Chavez, August 10, 1968, (Box 2, Folder 5). 
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EXTERNAL PRESSURES ON INTERNAL SUCCESS 
The AFL-CIO agreed to grant a charter to the newly merged union, temporarily named 
the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee (UFWOC).  This action raised the ire of 
what would become another UFWOC nemesis: The Teamsters.  In late August 1966, 
Governor Edmund G. Brown wired a congratulatory telegram to the UFWOC upon 
hearing that the AFL-CIO charter had come through.  The Teamsters termed the 
celebratory note as “prejudicial” to their interests and “is inconsistent with the prospects 
of fair play, demonstrates bias, and is in extremely poor taste.”  Ironically, or perhaps the 
situation was not so add after all, the Teamsters’ and then gubernatorial candidate and 
soon to be Governor Ronald Reagan garnered representation from the same public 
relations outfit.  Reagan and the growers sided with the Teamsters in their desire to block 
out the UFWOC.  Growers continually favored the Teamsters as the union representative 
of farm workers and their inclination to nix strike activity during peak seasons.97 
In consolidating, perhaps Filipino and Mexican workers encountered a point in 
which they understood their common needs and histories.  But within a relationship 
fraught with tense interactions and racial divisions, why would Filipino and Mexican 
workers merge their labor organizations?  In his work, Jenkins (1985) poses the 
Committee as a moribund labor organization and contends that its Filipino membership 
was its only active element thus assessing the merger as a moment, which held little 
significance for sociological investigation.  However, it is clear from the primary data 
presented here that there was a road upon which the Association and Committee 
negotiated in order to foster an interracial cooperation that was deemed necessary to 
succeed in strike and contract bargaining processes.  
                                                 
97 Los Angeles Times, “Handshakes Seal Pact Ending Grape Boycott,” July 30, 1970, p. 3 
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However, farm labor organizers recognized the moment as significant.  Time and 
again, organizers note that the merger of Filipino and Mexican workers under one 
umbrella organization is a momentous event—indeed they were aware that this was the 
greatest uprising of farm workers since the strikes of the 1930s and made this as part of 
the movement discourse.98  As Itliong told a Filipino American booster in a letter, the 
Filipino and Mexican coalition was long overdue since “we [Filipinos and Mexicans] 
have the same problem facing us.”99 
However, the merger was not a simplistic point of realization in which both 
groups simply had an awakening of sorts.  Filipinos and Mexicans expressed a pragmatic 
understanding that they required each other’s help to mobilize.  However, this does not 
mean that the amalgamation of Filipino and Mexican workers under the guise of the 
newly formed UFWOC would be an easy task.  
In July 1970 as the strikes, along with secondary boycotts administered 
throughout the country, concluded with signed contracts, the union clearly recognized 
more organization was necessary.  Still, the new contract provisions were landmark 
concessions from growers.  Grape workers, nearly 8000 of them, fell under the protective 
cover of a collective bargaining agreement that provided an hourly wage of $1.80, which 
would increase fifteen cents for the ensuing years of 1971 and 1972, plus a twenty cent 
bonus for every box of grapes.  Yet, during the same period, the Teamsters made inroads 
with thirty growers up north in the Salinas Valley.  On the day contracts were signed, the 
Teamsters called Chavez a “Johnny come-lately into this thing” and Bill Kircher of the 
                                                 
98 Reuther Library, UFWOC Papers, NFWA Bulletin, n.d., (Box 2, Folder 2) The bulletin has no date but 
the text states that the strike has been ongoing for “nearly three months.”  We can surmise that the bulletin 
was posted around the first week of December 1965. 
99 Reuther Library, Larry Itliong Papers, letter from Larry Itliong to Jose M. Leonidas, January 31, 1967, 
(Box 1, Folder 4). 
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AFL-CIO asserted that the UFWOC had the “right to be THE union that builds a 
collective bargaining base.”100  And, in actuality, the Association and the Committee had 
only accomplished just that: established a base.  What occurred afterwards would be a 
monumental test for an organizational body that had only set its path to secure equality 
for farm workers of color.  
CONCLUSION 
 
Filipino and Mexican farm workers, throughout the twentieth century, had endeavored to 
create successful worker mobilization.  However, it is in the 1960s that we witness 
interracial farm labor mobilization in California.  The social movement literature has 
previously paid little attention to merger processes in the analysis on social movement 
organization—a logical outcome of the failure to peer into the racial politics of farm 
workers movement.  Further, the integration of Filipino and Mexican workers in 1966 
into their new labor organization has not been analyzed for the remarkable interminority 
integration of workers of color that occurred.  This chapter has sought to fill this void by 
focusing on this momentous event and to demonstrate why the merger was such a 
significant event. 
 Further, this “union of unions” was not an inevitable, “natural” occurrence.  There 
was, perhaps, what Jung (2003) would term an “ideological transformation” among 
California’s multiracial farm working class.  That is, Filipinos and Mexicans did more 
than simplistically recognize that they required each other’s aid.  Certainly, the thesis and 
theory of resource mobilization does shed some light on what occurred in the grape 
fields.  The timing was opportune and elites aided the striking farm workers, but 
theorization of successful mobilization of farm workers in the 1960s provides only an 
                                                 
100 Los Angeles Times, “Handshakes Seal Pact Ending Grape Boycott,” July 30, 1970, p. 3. 
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explanation of external factors that created interracial unionization.  By assessing the 
inner workings of the movement, we witness how Filipinos and Mexican workers indeed, 
had to come together.  Thus, we can comprehend how variables external and internal to 
the movement operated in tandem to mold a social movement organization which farm 
workers had battled for, with little success, throughout the twentieth century. 
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CHAPTER 5: NO PODEMOS/NO, WE CAN’T: THE DECLINE AND 
DETERIORATION OF THE FARM WORKERS MOVEMENT 
 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The amalgamation of Filipinos and Mexican workers into the UFW was momentous.  
The laborious process of fomenting interracial labor unionism had traveled an arduous 
path and in so doing the consolidation of the AWOC and the NFWA required that farm 
workers rely on a host of resources.  These repositories of sustenance existed both 
without and within the organization that became the UFW.  Protestant and Catholic 
Church figures and activists pitched in.  Labor unions such as the United Auto Workers 
(UAW) and their powerful chief, Walter Reuther, made hefty pledges of cash and made 
public displays of solidarity with striking farm workers.  To some extent, the farm 
workers movement transformed into a cause célèbre—it became a “darling” movement of 
some on the left.  Additionally, and most essential for the overarching argument of this 
dissertation, the previous chapter maintained that the subscription to an ideological 
construct of working class cross-racial cooperation was essential for mobilization 
success—something that is hardly, if ever, noted or analyzed in scholarly accounts of the 
farm workers movement.  However, the act of fostering mobilization success for one 
moment or period of time is a different type of collective action than the continuous 
process of mobilization maintenance.  Indeed, the UFW would encounter some obstacles, 
which they were unable to overcome. 
 What follows is a narrative about and analysis on the decline and deterioration of 
the UFW.  The causes were several.  The union began to confront a depletion of funds, 
the loss of loyal supporters, repressive measures from the gubernatorial administration of 
Ronald Reagan, competition with their labor union nemesis: the Teamsters, and not least 
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of all, in-fighting among members around issues of racial politics among Filipinos and 
Mexicans.   
INTRODUCTION 
On his path to the presidency, Barack Obama invoked the rallying cry of “Yes, we can”/ 
“Sí, se puede” at many of his campaign gatherings—often he ensured to make the call to 
his huge crowds in both English and Spanish.  Oddly, I never observed any note by then 
Senator Obama or campaign surrogates of the phrase’s prominence—and to my own 
knowledge its origins—in the farm workers movement.  Still, the proclamation of “Sí, se 
puede” is perhaps, for much of the US population, the only possible connection to or 
recognition of the fact that there was a farm workers movement.101 What did happen to 
the farm workers movement after its success? 
Alas, a recent and downright scathing assessment of the UFW by the Los Angeles 
Times revealed an oligarchic, moribund organization—moribund at least in terms of 
doing the work of farm labor organization.102  The Times journalist found that the UFW 
maintained a mostly symbolic connection to its rich history of organizing farm workers.  
This chapter presents an analysis of social movement decline with the use of theories of 
social movements and networks; that is, we must answer the question of how movements 
come apart?  But to consign what follows to the mere category of an enticing historical 
sociological puzzle to solve in a dissertation or any other scholarly effort is to pay short 
                                                 
101 Even among Mexican origin people, recognition of the UFW can be contentious.  My own family 
members criticize Cesar Chavez because he “was in it for himself.”  My father is appalled that Chavez, 
who operated in California, is recognized with a regional highway named after him in our native South 
Texas.  The anecdotal evidence reveals what I interpret to be an intra-group critique: Chavez did not 
address the struggles of Mexican origin people throughout all of the US Southwest. 
102 See the article series in issues from the week of January 8, 2006: “Farmworkers Reap Little as Union 
Strays From Its Roots,” “The UFW Betrays Its Legacy as Farmworkers Struggle,” “The Family Business: 
Insiders Benefit Amid a Complex of Charities,” and “The Roots of Today’s Problems Go Back Three 
Decades.” 
 129 
 
shrift to the consequences of poor people’s movements’ decline.  Indeed, the fall of the 
house of farm labor is nothing less than tragic as it represents the atrophic process that the 
groundbreaking organization has undergone since the creation of stunning labor victories 
in the California fields.    
 Times’ reports offer that the UFW is alive and well as a thriving organization; it 
simply does not focus on its original mission.  For example, a series of articles shows that 
Paul Chavez, son of Cesar Chavez, heads the union’s National Farm Workers Service 
Center at a salary of over $124,000 per year but few efforts are directed at collective 
bargaining.  Instead Chavez’ son explains that his energies are directed at providing 
“service” to Latinos in general.  However, the UFW did not sit idly by as the Times’ 
pieces were published; they issued a 103-page rebuttal to the series (categorized as a 
white paper at the UFW website) and insisted that recent significant contracts had been 
signed in roses, strawberries, and mushrooms.103  
 While the UFW posts assertions of recent collective bargaining agreements, it 
seems very soon after landmark successes that the union encountered a deterioration of 
the organization.  The most prominent current sociological analysis on the UFW by 
Marshall Ganz (2000) is essential but it does not attempt to offer explanation of social 
movement decline—nor is that Ganz’ purpose.  In this chapter, I propose why it matters 
to do so and describe the myriad causes of the decline.   
DISABLED MOBILIZATION 
Explanation of social movement dissolution and unraveled internal ties is seldom in the 
foreground of collective action studies.  This is apparent in examination of collective 
                                                 
103 See the UFW website (www.ufw.org) and thereafter the “White Papers” section linked under 
“Research” to locate the report titled “The Los Angeles Times Series on the United Farm Workers: A 
Disservice to Reades and the Farm Worker Movement.” 
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action centered on the liberation of racial groups.  That is, often the research problem is 
one of locating how and why the mobilization of racial and ethnic minorities has attained 
success but ignores the ensuing decline and thus avoids an unhappy ending.  
Additionally, race and ethnicity as independent variables, are disregarded in favor of 
analytical concepts devoid of identity formation and dynamics.  Indeed much of the 
social movement literature in the last two decades concentrates on a manifold 
conceptualization of framing (see Snow et al. 1986 for where much of this began).  This 
process has been helpful but displays shortcoming in regards to race analysis and to 
social movements as well. 
In an argument for the inclusion of gender in framing analysis, Ferree and Merrill 
(2000) critique the scholarship for its detachment from sociologically pertinent 
experiences and identities linked to and defined by gender.  They (Ibid.: 456) offer that 
the inclination to focus upon frames “has developed from social psychological traditions 
that model cognition as ‘cold,’ using the detached and dispassionate observer as the 
standard actor.”  In doing so, variable individual and group identities such as those rooted 
in gender consciousness are not extracted but simply ignored.   Taking a cue from Ferree 
and Merrill, I assert that race and ethnicity require incorporation, if not specifically into 
framing theories, as a necessary component to our understanding of success—as the 
previous chapter offered—and failure of collective action, which is this chapter’s 
contribution.   
For instance, Michael Omi and Howard Winant (1994: 56) conceptualize a racial 
project as, in part, “an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources along particular 
racial lines.”  To move their very well known idea along, I surmise that the farm workers 
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of California enacted what I term an antiracist interracial class project.  This simple 
expansion of Omi and Winant’s ideation of racial inequality’s source and solution (racist 
and anti-racist racial projects) enables theorization of how and why two or more racial 
groups engage in cooperative work toward a common set of goals.  But what causes 
successful antiracist efforts “to reorganize and redistribute resources” to fall on hard 
times?  Why does interracialism become unsustainable?  In part, I assert that complex 
identities clash within the racial project—such as the farm workers movement—so that 
sustainability of the movement is improbable. 
I have cited several farm workers studies throughout the dissertation.  However, 
none that I can observe expends much time and effort to characterize the history and 
system of race relations within the farm labor force and the farm workers movement.  
More specifically for my purposes, interracial and interminority cooperation is never 
posed as a central independent variable that created success.  Therefore, the coming apart 
of a racial group merger, since one is hardly ever recognized in the first place, is never 
postulated to be the cause of farm worker movement decline.  While a focus on the 
fissures in a racial coalition is key to the chapter, I turn to more general social movement 
literature for analytical tools on social movement decline.  A general approach is the only 
option in a literature that pays little attention to racial coalitions specifically and to social 
movement dissolution in broader terms.  While I maintain that the breakdown of the 
coalition was crucial, it only provides partial causal explanation of farm worker 
movement decline.   Indeed there were other causes such as a state apparatus operated by 
a reactionary, abuse by the Teamsters, and internal ideological disagreements about the 
inclusion of undocumented immigrants as farm labor union members.  But provision of 
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some explanation of the farm worker movement’s outcome after its successful period is 
necessary even if it is analysis of decline.  This is true of social movement analysis in 
general as Marco Guigni (1998: 373) points out that “the study of the effects of social 
movements has largely been neglected.”  I propose that decline is one of those effects 
requiring analysis. 
FRAMES AND NETWORK TIES 
Florence Passy and Marco Giugni (2000) argue that the symbolic meaning of activism is 
interlocked with a social movement participant’s level of engagement.  They investigate 
why individuals engage with and at some point may withdraw from collective activity.  
They conclude that withdrawn social activists possess a life-sphere and networks that 
place less emphasis on social movement engagement and disconnect from co-
participants.  Like much of the framing literature, Passy and Guigni supply insight on 
how the singular social actor contributes to collective action; subsequently, they 
demonstrate why certain individuals pull away.  But their insight is delimited to the 
micro-level.  Snow and Benford (2005: 209) explain that frames are necessary to detail 
how “collective action frames are rooted…in extant ideologies, but are neither 
determined by nor isomorphic with them.”   Indeed individuals act but not haphazardly.  
Further, social movement theorists are increasingly concerned with those individuals’ 
connectedness to social networks.  
Florence Passy (2003: 24) illustrates how networks translate “latent or unrealized” 
energy into social movement “action.”   Further (Ibid: 24), these networks represent more 
than mere contacts but are “channels” through which social movement participants move 
toward engagement with activism.  As social actors become embedded in networks, 
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participants take possession of a reliable conduit through which to act, contact others, and 
maintain “trust” (Ibid: 41) with other movement members.  Pamela Oliver and Daniel J. 
Myers (2003) are helpful in their attempt to model the relationship between networks and 
the diffusion of protest activity among individuals.  However, omitted from such work by 
Passy and Oliver & Myers are explanations of negative case scenarios.  The sociology of 
social movements is strengthened with explanations of what occurs in moments of 
channel blockage, omission of some group’s identity within the movement, or the 
dislocation of movement participants’ embedded condition within networks.  What are 
some possible causes of the weakening of a social movement organization (SMO)? 
In his study on the Black freedom struggle, sociologist Kenneth T. Andrews 
(2004) provides case study analysis of three Mississippi counties and their differing 
levels of long-term movement activity.  Andrews (Ibid: 64) finds that the construction 
and maintenance of “movement infrastructures turn out to be consequential for the long-
term impacts of social movements.”  In terms of the UFW’s movement infrastructure, 
Filipinos proved to be central to the organization’s strength.  As they expressed alienation 
from what was interpreted as a Chicano-centric organization, the infrastructure 
weakened.   
Earlier work from Andrews (2002) investigates countermovement formation, 
which can defuse activism that threatens the status quo.  As for counter movements to 
which farm laborers were subjected, organizations such as the Teamsters and the state 
offered proactive countermovement responses to farm worker mobilization.  Ironically 
but I think accurately, the Teamsters, though a labor union, must be regarded as a 
countervailing force to farm labor unionism.  Further, the state, which began to actively 
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engage in management of farm labor as detailed in Chapter 3, has been shown to 
demonstrate its own countermovement tendencies (see Gale 1986).   
INELIGIBLE “ILLEGALS” 
Nearly a decade after the farm workers movement peaked, a “Declaration” was sent out 
as a proclamation that hoped to reassemble the momentum and spirit of an earlier time.  
The declaration’s first point read:  
  We know that the poverty of the Mexican and Filipino workers in California is the  
  same as that of all farmworkers across the country, the Blacks, poor Whites, Native 
  Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Arabs.  We will continue our social movement in  
  fact and not in prounouncements by uniting under the banner [of] our union all farm- 
  workers reardless of race, creed, sex or nationality.104 
Written in 1979, the statement is a scripted repeat of the exhortations disseminated in the 
1960s to jumpstart the movement.  This type of discourse was often invoked during that 
time in order to put forth a “multiracial/multicultural” image of the farm workers 
movement and later the UFW.  During an era of heightened levels of activism among 
groups of color, this multiracial discourse resonated across various movements and 
movement organizations.  That is, the plight of one group of color was inextricably 
connected to other groups of color or so went the argument.  The farm workers 
movement institutionalized, or at least tried to make it seem so in official discourse, this 
notion of a united racial and working class front.  The declaration noted the “martyrs” 
who had given their lives for La Causa.  As this chapter and the recent experiences of the 
UFW demonstrate, there would be no massive rejuvenation for the movement.  
 The first point’s express desire to encompass and represent the racial gamut 
reflective of the agricultural labor force did not extend to the existent gaps in citizenship 
                                                 
104 Marshall Ganz Papers, Reuther Library, “Declaration for the Liberation of the Farm Workers,” August 
11, 1979, (Box 7, Folder 18). 
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status among farm workers.  Certainly, the UFW campaigned against Mexican national 
labor who they argued encroached on their labor market position, no matter whether 
those workers were in the US legally (such as Braceros) or illegally.  Cesar Chavez 
testified to Congress of what he recognized as the ameliorative effect Braceros and 
“illegals” had on farm workers’ wages.  Yet, this approach from the union leadership did 
not jibe with union organizers literally working in the fields on union recruitment efforts.  
One “group of UFW field and boycott organizers in Florida” voiced their displeasure 
with official policy which not only disallowed undocumented workers’ participation in 
the union but aggressively sought to remove them from their respective jobs.  The Florida 
organizers refused to engage in the surveillance of undocumented workers.  A letter 
addressed to the “Friends of the UFW,” expressed the Florida contingent’s adversity to a 
union directive which ordered them to make “reports on the illegals in their areas…We 
were to note how many and where, who they worked for and who brought them in.”  The 
letter characterizes this sort of effort as tantamount to playing the part of “an arm of the 
Immigration Service.”105 
 The communiqué from Florida further indicates that the UFW had started to do 
the work of the state: deciding who belonged and who did not.  Unfortunately, rather than 
confront big capital and the state, the union expended precious time and resources on 
shifting “the blame on to whole communities of people.”106  Undocumented workers 
were therefore identified as movement inhibitors not a right wing California government 
or powerful growers.  Significantly, the trend of farm worker activism in the late 1970s 
reveals less and not more confrontation with growers and agribusiness in California.  In 
                                                 
105 Marhsall Ganz Papers, Reuther Library, letter to “Friends of the UFW,” n.d., (Box 7, Folder 31). 
106 Ibid. 
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Chapter 2, the labor strikes of the 1930s were an outright denouncement of powerful 
landowners.  By the 1960s, after landmark achievements with the grape strikes, the union 
directed their energies against newly real and perceived enemies such as undocumented 
workers and other labor unions such as the Teamsters.   
 The UFW insisted that the extraction of “illegals” was indeed an effort to directly 
engage with big capital.  Subsequent to the suspension of the Florida contingent, Mack 
Lyons, who was seemingly an organizer with some influence in Florida, explained the 
decision to punish those sympathetic to undocumented workers.  However, Lyon’s text 
reads as a regurgitation of the long-standing Chavez policy though the letter is to Chavez 
himself.  Lyons wrote that 
the imported workers are being used by the growers against us and our efforts 
to organize and build bargaining power.  We also know that our real enemy is  
the grower and all of the tools that his wealth and power can buy—including  
Border Patrol indifference to the importation of illegal strikebreakers. 107   
 
Again, the state is deemed the pawn of powerful capitalists—“Border Patrol indifference” 
is a buy off from the growers.  This characterization of undocumented labor echoes the 
very sentiment that Chavez had in his description of Bracero workers in Chapter 3.  
These workers, almost all Mexican nationals, drove down wages and increased levels of 
violence around strike activity. 
 As the union embarked on lettuce strikes during the late 1970s in the Salinas and 
Imperial Valleys, California Assemblyman Richard Alatorre, a Mexican American, 
proposed a bill and attempted to push it through the Assembly’s Criminal Justice 
Committee.  The bill’s apparent intent was to expand legislation, which codified 
strikebreaking as an illegal activity.  The Alatorre proposition would bar strikebreakers 
                                                 
107 Marshall Ganz Papers, Reuther Library, letter to Cesar Chavez from Mack Lyons, August 9, 1974, (Box 
7, Folder 31). 
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who originated from outside of California—an obvious allusion to workers from Mexico.  
On the heels of some violent outbreaks in Salinas, Alatorre insisted that “Anytime you 
import strikebreakers there is a great potential for violence.  We’re trying to do way 
[with] the practice of strikebreaking.”108  The Assemblyman’s effort to nudge the bill 
through a legislative committee was in concert with the UFW agenda that defined 
undocumented workers as adverse to farm worker wages and successful strike actions.  
Moreover, these efforts attributed violence and supposedly any kind of strikebreaking to 
be a direct effect of undocumented workers.109   
 This conception of Mexican national laborers as threats to the well-being of farm 
workers had deep roots dating back to the days in which farm worker activists voiced 
deep opposition to the Bracero Program.  Invoking this sentiment into UFW policy, the 
union valorized Mexican workers as a threat to the survival and success of Mexican 
Americans.  The state agreed.  In 1971, a California Department of Labor official, Joseph 
Flores, insisted “that the group harmed most by the illegal work force in this area is the 
Mexican American community.”110  The movement to exclude workers from Mexico as 
put forth by the Alatorre proposition coupled with the UFW’s own anti Mexican worker 
sentiment exposes the intra-Mexican origin divisions along lines of national origins. The 
union frequently invoked farm worker struggle as constituting part of the broader struggle 
of the American worker.  Asserting their rights as hard working laborers was one matter 
but the Mexican nationals were “personas non grata.”  Workers from outside of the US 
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not only corrupted the movement’s efforts and lowered wages, they inhibited this 
initiative to bring farm workers under the rubric of being Mexican Americans who were 
simply American workers that clearly belonged.   
 Though wary, if not downright hostile to workers from Mexico, the UFW 
oscillated in its attitude toward the workers from south of the border.  As Chavez 
persisted that Mexican nationals were owner-controlled peons used as strikebreakers, he 
also voiced criticism of the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (INS) failure to 
stop illegal border crossings.  One Border Patrol official described UFW policy on 
Mexican workers as operating “like a yo-yo.”  The official contended that the UFW 
excused “illegal aliens” in times of “labor peace” but “lambastes the Border Patrol during 
a strike for failing to round up such workers.”  The union departed from the official’s 
assessment of union practices and stated that Mexican workers could join the union.111  
 Thus, Mexican workers were to be initially regarded as strikebreakers until their 
acquiescence to union membership.  But for undocumented laborers, aligning themselves 
with a well known, infamous (in many cases), and controversial organization was a 
dangerous decision.  The UFW drew strict lines around Mexican origin workers: 
Mexican American workers could be strikebreakers (the union would find it disagreeable 
but they could not threaten them with deportation) but undocumented workers who did 
scab work were under threat of deportation.  Certainly, the union preferred that these 
workers be deported at the bequest of the UFW.  Such a constrictive categorization of 
undocumented workers and by implication of Mexican origin identity would not bode 
well for the organization.  Scholars on Mexican American history such as George J. 
Sanchez (1994) and David G. Gutiérrez (1995) illustrate the complexities and struggles 
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of “becoming” a hyphenated Mexican-American and the ambiguities and intra-group 
diversity that exists among Mexican origin people in the US.  
 The previously noted Mr. Lyons from Florida expressed condescension for the 
Florida contingent that had infamously espoused support for the undocumented laborers.  
Lyons clarifies union policy with some sense of hopefulness that he is actually correct in 
his clarification.  In his note to Chavez, he determines that support for the UFW and for 
inclusion of undocumented workers are mutually exclusive pursuits; thus the 
undocumented cannot be categorized as labor union eligible because they are not 
“Mexican American eligible.”  To fuse Mexican Americans and undocumented Mexican 
workers was interpreted to “be hypocritical at worst and ineffective [sic] at best.”112  Two 
years previous, the union opposed a proposal from the presidential administration of 
Jimmy Carter that would criminalize the act of knowingly hiring undocumented 
employees.  As they supported “amnesty for illegals with no apparent time limitations,” 
the union would not agree to a proposed statue that would bar growers from hiring 
undocumented workers—in their estimation this would engender racial profiling.  The 
argument went that with the implementation of the new “illegal alien plan,” there would 
be a promotion of “wholesale discrimination in employment against all workers who 
have dark skin and speak languages other than English.”113  The union would therefore 
take a wait and see approach.  Their strategy was to first build a union for citizen workers 
and thereafter seek to include the undocumented in that union.  That is, assimilate 
Mexican national workers when the union had cemented the rights of those workers who 
possessed citizenship.   
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 Lyons’ letter reiterates this point by deducing that the Florida contingent’s 
strategy of recruiting illegal workers was a strategy couched in naïveté.  Lyons reckoned 
that “it may be difficult for some of the staff to understand that we don’t have the 
resources or the power yet to win the necessary civil rights of the workers who are 
imported from Jamaica or Mexico114 (illegally or under a legal fiction) because we are 
still struggling desperately to establish our own rights.”115  Therefore, the union’s survey 
of the labor and capital “geography” was shortsighted.  Illegal workers from Mexico were 
regarded as people worthy of having amnesty but should not be allowed to work in the 
fields—the very industry and labor sector, which a substantial number of Mexican 
workers had occupied since 1910. 
 Lyons concludes by assessing that indeed the movement’s main tormentors were 
the usual suspects such as “growers…The Teamsters…The Farm Bureau…the 
government, as an agent of the growers.”  However, danger seemed to approach from all 
sides as Lyons suspected that “some people from our staff of volunteers…whose idealism 
lacks the tempering of a large dose of reality”116 also posed a serious challenge to 
successful mobilization.  While these varying groups could be described as coming at the 
union from various angles, I propose that Lyons’ formidable list demonstrates how 
threats emanated from inside and outside of the UFW organization—both from within the 
union (naïve supporters) and outside of it (The Teamsters—yet still within the labor 
union world). 
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 Additionally, the split of Mexican origin workers along the lines of citizen and 
illegal workers (or as anti-citizens as described in Chapter 3) proved to be disconcerting 
for some parties.  Based in Texas with Todos Unidos-Centro de Accion Social Autonomo 
[Everyone United-Center for Socially Autonomous Action], Ramon Mata, the group’s 
president, denounced UFW activity, which scapegoated undocumented workers.  
Nevertheless, Mata calls out for dialogue with Chavez over the matter and pledges his 
full support “regardless of what action you and la migra [the INS/Border Patrol] may 
take against our brothers” (emphasis added).  Significantly, while the UFW cited 
“illegals” as tools of the growers to combat wage increases and strike activity, President 
Mata attributes the anti-undocumented activity to a takeover of the UFW “by 
opportunistic reactionaries who dominate other ‘labor unions’.”117  Mata’s letter 
illustrates another survey of the landscape of power relations within the agricultural 
industry and the farm workers movement.  He notes the broader labor union power 
structure, perhaps embodied by Reuther and the UAW.  Furthermore, Mata’s letter of 
protest signifies the cracks in racial and ethnic identity among Mexican/Mexican 
Americans and Chicanos. 
 In order to stave off powerful agribusiness and opposing forces within “the house 
of labor,” the UFW was successful in seeing to it that the state of California create a labor 
adjudication system represented by the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB).  The 
ALRB was to be the referee, so to speak, in regards to which unions could represent 
workers and oversee the process of labor union elections.  At the time of the ALRB’s 
inception in August 1975, the UFW and the Teamsters had waged battle with each other 
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as to which union would be the rightful representative of farm workers.  But growers, 
deeming the ALRB an offshoot of the UFW, would not relent so easily.  Little more than 
a week after the founding of the ALRB, a major grower outfit, the Western Growers 
(WG), procured a restraining order that would prevent Board representatives from 
overseeing union elections on their membership’s farms and ranches.118  The WG argued 
that a master contract would be an allowable vote.  In other words, rather than divvying 
up their membership’s workforces at various properties into individual voting units which 
would cause mini-competitions between the UFW and the Teamsters, the WG and, 
interestingly the Teamsters, advocated for a “multiemployer” agreement in which the 
vote from all WG ranches would be tallied up and decide which union would represent 
workers at all WG units.  That is, winner takes all.  It seemed that the WG and the 
Teamsters were on the same page—a point of suspicion for the UFW. 
 Two years earlier in May 1973, as landmark contracts signed with grape farmers 
arrived at their expiration dates, the Teamsters had considerable success in supplanting 
the UFW among farm workers.  The Los Angeles Times reported that “growers make no 
secret of their preference for the Teamsters Union, say they regard the [UFW] as too 
inexperienced and radical to negotiate or maintain a regular union contract.”119  However, 
Chavez portrayed the UFW/Teamsters battle as a window of opportunity for the farm 
workers union.  He argued that, as opposed to the years between 1965 and 1970 when the 
union stratagy consisted of strikes and secondary boycotts, the UFW could embark on a 
“real strike for the first time.”120  Tellingly, Chavez was clear on what had occurred in the 
1960s—secondary boycotts, which were controversial as they were not legitimated as 
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“true” labor union tactics, had been essential to the success.  Additionally, Chavez 
recognized the importance of cross-racial cooperation in fomenting success—a point that 
will be covered later.  But as the Teamsters challenged the UFW in the 1970s, Chavez 
asserted that this was an opportunity to become a “real” labor union.   
 Chavez deemed strike action necessary because of Teamster efforts to become 
farm labor representatives—there was a recognition the UFW was in a weakened 
condition.  But it should also be pointed that farm workers were simply an easy target—
difficult to mobilize but also easy to take advantage of as their constituency relied on 
seasonal employment and shifted from place to place in order to work.  Indeed, the tense 
situation between the UFW and the Teamsters reflects the subjugated and downgraded 
status of farm workers.  Passed legislation that engendered the ALRB was intended to 
solve the problem of fair union votes and labor union access for farm workers.  The 
protective cover of a state-mandated agency was supposed to be the salve for the UFW 
and their struggles.  However, social movements, particularly if led by people of color, 
will often produce counter-movements.  Opposition from the WG and from the 
Teamsters is indicative of these kinds of counter-mobilization mechanisms.  The 
Teamsters seemed to be a particularly debilitating obstacle—it is one matter for the 
counter-movement to be big capital and it is another for that opposition to emanate from 
within the labor union structure. 
 Furthermore, the forces of racism and intra-minority (Filipino/Mexican) divisions 
also proved to be roadblocks to successful mobilization maintenance.  Chavez, in an 
April 1973 newspaper article, “alleged that part of the reason for the alliance of the 
Teamsters and growers is their ‘racist’ attitude.”  Chavez’s accusations formed a response 
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to a high-ranking Teamsters official who stated that “as [agricultural] jobs become more 
attractive to Whites, then we can build a union that can have structure and that can 
negotiate.”121  Therefore, the long history of anti-Mexican racism and the racialization of 
Mexican workers as dim-witted persisted.  Per the usual racist discourse, the Teamsters 
official ascribed to Mexicans a deficient capacity to be “good” labor union members and 
existing outside of the industrial working class masses that belonged to upstanding, all-
white labor unions.  Even when Mexican workers did participate in labor activism, which 
they had a long history of doing by the 1960s, they were deemed gullible captives of left 
wing extremists—that is, never to be trusted since Mexicans were either incompetent or 
easily susceptible. 
 As they commenced to quell the encroachment of the Teamsters on the sites of 
their greatest victory, Chavez maintained that prospects were good for the UFW.  In 
1974, the UFW leader insisted at a union Executive Board Meeting that “The Teamsters 
did not hold any ground anywhere” (obviously untrue) and that further “they [The 
Teamsters] have to do in one year what it has taken us 10-11 years to do.”122  The sense 
of optimism that the Teamsters would be unable to match the deftness and strength level 
that UFW put forth in its great successes would not bear out.  Indeed, if the decade long 
struggle that Chavez alludes to had developed such a strong infrastructure, then why were 
the Teamsters able to move into UFW territory?  One possible explanation is that the 
UFW simply could not sustain stamina among such an impoverished labor force to strike 
once again.  Additionally, the UFW required substantial amounts of cash to fund its 
operations.  In the same meeting, President Chavez predicted the union would spend 
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nearly $750,000 on strikes by October 1974.  The expulsion of such substantial sums of 
money would perhaps fall into the growers’ strategy to “drain us [the UFW] dry.”123   
 Moreover, other forms of support were running dry as well.  In particular, the 
reservoir of interracial cooperation between workers in the union was in a state of 
dissolution.  Meanwhile, Chavez cited Filipino workers as indispensable to the 
mobilization efforts in grapes.  However, other crops represented greener pastures for the 
UFW since they were composed of a mostly Mexican labor force and thus more 
amenable to a Mexican-centric labor union.  The struggle in the grape fields, if Filipinos 
deserted the UFW for the Teamsters, was a lost cause.  But why would desertion occur?  
One reason was Filipino alienation from the union after the initial victories in which both 
Filipinos and Mexicans had played key roles.  In the previously cited Executive Board 
meeting, Chavez opined “if we could get all the Filipinos to join us, we could win [in 
grapes].”124  He argued for, in effect, leaving behind Delano and the grape vineyards and, 
in so many words, Filipino participation in the UFW.  The union’s new direction, as 
noted in the earlier parts of this chapter, led them to the bountiful lettuce crops around 
Salinas in the north and the Imperial Valley in the south.  Therefore, quite remarkably, in 
1974, the UFW leadership recognized the very place in which success was achieved as 
“the hardest place to strike” and that “a new place is easiest to organize.”125 
 In the same year, many Filipinos began their departure from the confines of the 
UFW.  If not resorting to outright withdrawal from the union, some Filipinos posted 
complaints about treatment of their small but significant presence.  As part of the 
program of moving to more opportune sites for organizing, the union actively sought 
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areas where they might find success.  One union report commented that the Rio Grande 
Valley of South Texas and regions of Washington State offered potential regions in 
which to organize farm workers.  The same report also mentioned citrus strikes in 
Arizona, to which the UFW had sent representatives.  While it is not entirely clear what 
the role of the UFW was in these strikes, it is clear that either there was direct 
sponsorship of these strikes or at least an offer of moral support.  Also quite important 
were the lettuce crops of Arizona—along with the lettuce industry and its workforce in 
California.  UFW leadership had ascertained that the industry held some promise for 
future prospects.126   
 Ever cognizant of the Teamsters presence in the Arizona lettuce fields, the UFW 
received a report from Chris Braga, who was assigned to three Filipino lettuce camps in 
Bodine, Woods, and Cactus.  As he embarked on his mission to organize workers in 
Arizona, Braga sent back word to union headquarters that the “older men were very 
stubborn and some were hostile.”  Overall, there were a host of grievances, which the 
Filipino laborers lodged against the UFW.  These workers’ “major complaint against the 
UFW centered around the hiring hall, the seniority system, and the dispatch.  Other 
complaints were about being called names, having rocks thrown at them and their cars 
[sic] getting messed up while working a ‘struck field.’  A few guys wanted to know why 
Larry Itliong had left the UFW.”  The objections from the Filipino lettuce workers were 
varied, but Braga concludes that “more organizing” was necessary particularly among 
younger Filipino workers.  His final assessment is simplistic as he determines that less 
organizable manongs “were all in their 60s [sic].  In 10 years they will have disappeared 
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from the labor force.”127  Braga envisions a future when Filipino workers would not 
matter any longer to the farm workers union.  However, considering his post among 
Filipino lettuce workers in Arizona, these workers were estimated as crucial to farm 
workers just as they had been in the grape strikes of the Coachella Valley.  Furthermore, 
if the Teamsters were moving in these circles, then the UFW reckoned that their own 
organizing strategy would have to include Filipinos as well. 
 Back in California, the union had expended energy and resources to aid the 
elderly manongs as they retired and required housing, food, and health care.  In the early 
1970s, the union founded a retirement home for aged manongs known as Paulo Agbayani 
Village.  In October 1974, applications to reside in the Village from manong were 
submitted to the union.  An overview of initial applicants demonstrates the dire 
circumstances, which the elderly Filipinos found themselves in the final years of their 
lives. 
 The most flush member of these applicants was George Ebale, seventy-four years 
old at the time.  Mister Ebale subsisted on a monthly stipend of $270.90 before expenses 
were deducted.  In contrast, Mister Ruben Geroche, sixty-four years old, survived on 
$106 per month before the subtraction of monthly living expenses.  However, Mister 
Geroche and Mister Ebale were unique from half of their Filipino applicants to Agbayani 
Village.  Twelve of the applicants, even in retirement, sent significant portions of their 
retirement income back home to the Philippines.  In fact, the reports states that many of 
these manongs maintained “dreams of going back to the Philippine and getting 
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married.”128  These transnational connections—desiring to return to a place that one left 
long ago—are in stark contrast to the Chicano and Mexican identity which Mexican 
origin workers constructed for themselves.  Additionally, the relationship seemed one-
sided.  For example, correspondence from Filipino participants in the union may offer 
salutations such as “Viva La Causa” [Long Live the Cause] or “Viva La Huelga” [Long 
Live the Strike].  That is, Filipinos had to, at some level, partake of Chicano/Mexican 
identity by invoking these phrases.  But Mexican workers need not familiarize 
themselves with the substance of Filipino identity and the Filipino struggle.  Filipino 
ethnic identity and its roots in the union received cursory attention and little 
reinforcement from UFW “cultural” practices.  
 This concern was not simply about advertising or “showing off” the farm workers 
movement’s Filipino roots.  Even at union meetings, Filipino workers had been displaced 
and sometimes ignored.  In his biography, Philip Vera Cruz testifies to the fact that many 
union meetings were held in Spanish and English—languages that manongs either could 
not speak or spoke at levels of intermediate competency.129  Unfortunately, at a practical 
level, Filipinos were being cut out by union practices by 1974.  The report on Agbayani 
Village details progress on building of the retirement home.  However, the report’s final 
take is that the manongs were in a state of anxiety about committing to a life in the 
complex until it was complete.  One reason for this anxious state of existence was that 
manongs could not be informed of what their monthly rent bill would amount to.   
Taking this into account along with Chavez’s comments on Filipinos and the lost 
cause of grapes, uncertainly in regards to the Village, and linguistic exclusion from some 
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meetings, it is clear that the UFW, consciously or unconsciously, forged a union that 
would only serve Mexican workers.  The momentous merger, which occurred in 1965, 
was set to unravel by 1974 and the UFW leadership and organizers in the field were 
helping that process along.  In fact, Chavez, who had founded the NFWA in 1962 and 
whose initial effort was to offer farm workers a modest burial benefit, argued that 
services should not be a primary goal of the union any longer in 1976.  He indicated that 
the UFW was “too concerned with servicing people…we need to cut down on them or 
close them if they aren’t helping to organize workers.”130   
However, the merger and coalition between Filipinos and Mexican had been a 
tenuous one at best.  As noted in preceding chapters, both groups considered their 
interests to be distinct and were in competition for agricultural jobs.  Chapter 4 
demonstrated how the coalition came into being and that assessments of the merger’s 
authenticity was dubious.  As Chavez called for the cutback in services to farm workers, 
the union continued with an uncertain approach to Filipinos.  In 1974, the union 
leadership moved away from Filipino workers—ascribing them as more sympathetic to 
the Teamsters or as the Braga report indicated—too old to be organized into the union 
fold.  But in 1976, the grape crops reemerged into the good graces of the union and were 
judged to be a potential site of rejuvenation for the flagging movement.  One internal 
report showed that at the crop’s peak season, 40,000 workers labored in grapes—the third 
largest group of farm workers after those employed in “tree fruits & nuts” and “lettuce & 
mixed vegetables.”  Obviously, this represented a formidable set of potentially 
(re)organizable workers.  The report includes an assessment that “we could afford to 
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concentrate on and organize well [on] grapes, vegetables, and if this doesn’t drain our 
energy, go into the citrus.”131  Again, Delano could become the focal point of UFW 
efforts but how would Filipinos workers fit into such an endeavor in 1976? 
Twenty-one months prior to the submission of the 1976 reports, prominent 
Filipinos in the union entered into debate and disagreement in regards to how they, as a 
unit, had been treated within the UFW.  Peter Velasco, Third Vice-President of the union 
(only three were in place) and at the time working on the union’s Baltimore boycott staff, 
fired off a letter to Philip Vera Cruz, another Filipino Vice-President of the union.132  
Velasco lays a harsh scolding on Vera Cruz for speaking against Cesar Chavez.  Unhappy 
with some decisions made in connection to Agbayani Village, Vera Cruz had apparently 
criticized Chavez.  Velasco reminds Vera Cruz that it was he who had introduced Chavez 
at “Village dedication ceremonies” as “one of the greatest labor leaders in the country.”  
Velasco essentially claims that it was Chavez who had transformed Vera Cruz into a 
labor organizer.  Moreover, and in the strongest of tones, Velasco portrays his fellow 
manong as “man of words…But never in action…if you pursued your words when you 
speak, we [presumable Filipinos] don’t need Cesar.”133   
Vera Cruz, according to his biography, had envisioned the UFW as an extension, 
rather than an end unto itself, of a broader movement advocating socialist ideals.  To his 
chagrin, the UFW had morphed into the only representative of the farm workers 
movement.  It had grown to encapsulate all the concerns and politics of farm labor in 
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California.  For one such as Vera Cruz, the farm workers movement was to be a 
component of a larger progression toward social justice for workers and the oppressed.  
Therefore, in his purview, a broader socialist movement should draw under its umbrella 
the UFW but not vice versa.  However, Filipino dissatisfaction and internal critiques of 
Chavez and the increasingly Mexican-centric union had roots that went deeper than the 
terse exchange between Velasco and Vera Cruz.  Filipino and Mexican tension after the 
merger is synthesized in the UFW career and departure of Larry Itliong—the Filipino 
organizer who held membership with the union since its inception. 
Itliong, as detailed in several histories of the UFW, was integral to the success of 
the strikes, which occurred in the Delano grape vineyards.  Rooted in the AWOC and 
with a background in trade unionism, he proved to be indispensable to the movement and 
was arguably the most important Filipino organizer.  Still, Itliong was more likely to 
clash with UFW leadership though he himself became a Vice-President of the union.  
While an advocate for and a participant in the union, Itliong viewed his involvement and 
role in the farm workers movement as a voice for Filipinos.  This strong sense of 
commitment and Filipino ethnic consciousness is manifest throughout much of the 
available primary data written by and to Itliong.  Indeed the farm workers movement 
chiseled out a pathway of opportunity for Filipinos to take political, social, and economic 
action on behalf of themselves.  This had been the pattern of Filipino political activism 
since the 1930s—they voiced their demand for equality by forming farm labor unions.   
Itliong’s notes, letters, and other bits of correspondence, after his resignation in 
October 1971, demonstrate the frequent frustration in giving voice to Filipino concerns 
and needs.  This broader, and perhaps primary, agenda that could not be expressed by the 
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UFW is evident in a note from Itliong to a friend a few weeks after his departure.  Itliong 
wrote: 
 As for your problem in making our Pinoy cabayans [sic] to see  
 the light of the importance [sic] of our involvement [sic] in the 
 political system of our Country the good USA, I can very well 
 understand.  I did face the same kind of problem when [sic] I  
 started organizing farm workers extensively beginning [in] 1960.134 
 
The letter continues on to lie out various initiatives which Itliong had devoted his time to 
such as the problems of Filipino immigrants and job placement.  By why is it that 
programs such as these could not become part and parcel of a farm workers union?  One 
answer is touched upon in previously cited comments from Chavez in which he argues 
that the UFW need not provide services to the union membership.  This moved the union 
toward having one of two mutually exclusive choices as to which direction the union 
could pursue. 
 One option was to cut back on services—to change what constituted the original 
mission of the UFW—to procure equality and social justice for farm workers.  
Achievement of this goal would require much more than simply striking labor deals with 
big capital.  Indeed, services, beyond bargaining contracts and setting up labor shops in 
the fields, were necessary for farm workers.  The other option was to continue with the 
work of providing services to farm workers in general while also attempting to convene 
those workers under the protective cover of a labor union.   
In particular, for Itliong, Filipinos represented a group of people who required 
these kinds of services such as the retirement home of Agbayani Village.  Services and 
attention to the various concerns and needs of farm workers had to be included with the 
goal of labor justice.  This was especially important for Filipinos, as they were an older 
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and more destitute group among the workers.  A letter to Itliong, while he was still 
employed by the UFW, exhibited the dubious feeling that the UFW or any other 
organization could carry water with Filipinos.  The letter write, Nick Delara, pronounced 
“there is no movement which our people [Filipinos] can relate to.  We have…no 
movement.  The truth [sic] of the matter is that the Delano issue is too far reached for our 
people to relate to at this time.”135   
Taking together the perspective of Filipino leaders such as Vera Cruz and Itliong 
and activists such as Delara, clearly these individuals were perceptive of the momentous 
and small bits of change that were necessary for Filipinos.  A truly comprehensive social 
movement would need to be inclusive of a host of concerns and needs for a deprived 
population.  These activists desired a broad, all-encompassing movement that would 
deliver the little services that a deprived group required and operated from a socialist 
base, which would endeavor to alter the social system so that poor people, such as farm 
workers, could be provided with necessary resources.  Indeed, they envisioned a 
successful end result as one in which an apparatus which produced and maintained social 
equality was in place for Filipinos.  
 For Itliong, the UFW was not the venue or perhaps an inadequate conduit to 
funnel those services and represent a productive and egalitarian social movement 
structure.  Interestingly, Itliong and Delara did not necessarily maintain that the UFW 
abused or ignored Filipinos (although Itliong would after his departure); they had a self-
critique of the Filipino community as well.  Itliong contended that “our people 
are…know it all type…jealous with each other” and “are great for destructive [sic] 
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criticism.”136  Delara echoed these feelings and denoted the lack of “emotion or 
profoundness within our ranks…Our fight is no different from the fight of the Chicano, 
yet, we have no real zeal in the approach.”137  But in fact, the “fight” did seem different 
for each group—the merger of the AWOC and the NFWA was, in part, so significant 
because it recognized that the divisions between Chicano and Filipino workers needed to 
be bridged.  Their struggles were “different” and would turn out differently for each.   
 For Chavez and the Mexican membership, there was no need to chisel out a place 
for Mexicans “at the table” within the union.  But as a distinct but smaller racial/ethnic 
group within the UFW Itliong concluded in 1971 that Filipinos “are not getting a fair 
shake…I think I could fight and protect our rights by getting out and speak on our 
problems.”138  Remaining mindful of Chavez’s suggestion to scale back services for the 
union membership—an action that could be adduced as the intentional marginalization or 
“doing away” with the union’s Filipino contingent—perhaps Itliong was responding to a 
new direction which excluded Filipinos.  Thus, Filipinos may never have been overtly 
forced out of the union, but simply ignored and their interests phased out as the union 
moved on to organizing efforts that excluded Filipinos and undocumented Mexican 
workers.  Indeed, the UFW had slowly built itself into a union that was to be for Mexican 
Americans only. 
 The composition and portrayal of the union as one for Mexican American workers 
was obviously rooted in a long process.  Indeed, Itliong had made attempts to resign prior 
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to 1971.  In September 1967, Itliong informed Chavez that “I do not have anything more 
I could contribute to help the Union.”139  There is no mention in the letter, which was 
either withdrawn by Itliong, never sent, and/or rejected by Chavez since Itliong would 
continue working with the union, of the Filipino plight and role within the UFW.  
However, in the 1971 resignation note, Itliong simply bids Chavez adieu and quits “for 
the sake of the farm workers.”140  However, these communications between Chavez and 
Itliong are along the lines of official communiqués between high-ranking members of the 
union membership and it seems as a result precludes any mention of Filipino 
marginalization.  Strikingly though, in messages to his fellow “kabayans,” Itliong’s 
message is straightforward and complains extensively about the neglect of Filipino 
concerns.   
 A letter to Itliong from Bill Berg, over a year after the resignation, indicates “that 
more Filipinos are leaving the union…The Filipino farm worker—I don’t need to tell you 
this—were the backbone of the strike…without the Filipino, there would not have been a 
strike…and the strike…would have never been won.”141  The note asserts the prominent 
role of Filipinos within the grape strikes of the 1960s.  It thus seeks to restore credit due 
to a group that, by this time, was minimized by union leadership.  Still, Itliong 
maintained his support of the farm workers movement after leaving the UFW.  He had 
become active with the Filipino American Political Association (FAPA) and encouraged 
the organization to stand behind striking farm workers.142  Such an approach in his post-
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UFW life points to a desire to back the movement but from a position within an 
organization that is ethnic-specific in its identity. 
 Indeed, Filipinos and Mexicans were both rooted in different identities beyond 
ethnic self-categorization; they were also from distinct generations and, it seems, had 
different connections to trade union organizing.  As Chapter 2 revealed, both Filipinos 
and Mexicans engaged in labor agitation dating as far back, if not longer, to the 1930s.  
However, Chapter 4 teased out the essential role of Filipino labor organizing skills and 
knowledge, which had been brought to the fields of California.  For Itliong, he protested 
that by 1971, the union had been subjected to “the influence on union policy of a group of 
‘intellectuals’ who form a ‘brain trust’ around Chavez.”  A report from the Fresno Bee 
wrote on how Itliong had organized 1,500 Filipino workers as grape strikes commenced 
in Delano.  Since those strikes in 1965, it was Chavez who had “catapulted” into national 
stardom while “Itliong remained in the background.”143  In fact, Chavez, by training, was 
no labor union organizer.  For him, the organization of farm workers in Delano was a 
starting point for community development among Mexican Americans.  This approach 
was couched in his own background of organizing in the northern city of San Jose with 
the Community Services Organization.         
 Therefore, discord within the union is attributable to not only racial/ethnic tension 
but to organizational approaches.   That is, workers had to be organized to strike and gain 
contracts, but once the union was formed, this necessitated a solid philosophical approach 
to administering the UFW.  In March 1972, Itliong conveyed to Bill Kircher that 
“many…Filipinos and Chicanos are very unhappy on how the Union is being operated.”  
He reiterated his moral and ideological commitment to the union and informed Kircher 
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that his message of discontent within the ranks was the doing of a favor.  Moreover, 
Itliong’s critique was not steeped in the grievances of Filipino exclusion from the union, 
but of poor trade union leadership style which Chavez employed.  The letter warns that 
“whether brother Chavez…is aware or not he better start looking into the better 
administration of his field offices.  It is well and good to go all over the place and build 
Unions for the farmworkers but if you do not take care of what you build then it will 
tumble down on you.”144  The Itliong criticism elucidates the problem and challenges of 
mobilization maintenance.  That is, after descending from the peak era between 1965 and 
1970, how could the UFW maintain what had been created?  Soon after Itliong’s piece of 
advice, the union proved unable to renew contracts that had reached points of termination 
and also lost influence to the Teamsters.   
 However, what also emerges from Itliong’s warning is the tone of an experienced 
trade union field hand.  He had oriented himself in the labor battles of Filipino cannery 
workers in the Pacific Northwest in earlier decades.  He understood that a union had to 
maintain its base and develop trade union locals throughout that would operate in line 
with headquarter directives.  But what was becoming Chavez’s union began to walk a 
haphazard and convoluted path as it struggled to achieve mobilization maintenance.  
Though concerned with and cognizant of the UFW’s struggles and even if attempting to 
be helpful, the UFW was not the typical labor union even if it desired to be so. 
 It would have been quite difficult to develop a traditional, “locals-based” labor 
union for a labor force that found it necessary to work in seasonal crops that were 
scattered over a geographical region.  Along with the nature of its constituency’s work 
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schedule, the group also had to play the role of civil rights organization for working 
people of color.  Bill Kirchner communicated that George Meaney, AFL-CIO President, 
was “uncomfortable” with the UFW because its practices (i.e. boycotts) “are different 
than [sic] the things that unions usually do.”  As a traditional trade union man, even 
Kirchner, along with Itliong, expressed that he was “a little disgusted with some of the 
practices, but I keep trying to remember that the important thing is for there to be a union 
for farm workers.”145  This type of correspondence, expressing doubt and even agony, 
had a long history between the two men.  They had spoken many times about Itliong’s 
dissatisfaction and Kirchner, in the post-Itliong years, expressed his own ambivalence 
about the union’s ability to have success.146     
 As pressure from within the union increased, the UFW also confronted external 
distress.  Obviously, the Teamsters formed a portion of these external adversarial forces 
as they usurped the UFW’s position as the collective bargaining agent for some farm 
workers.  Thus, the combination of external and internal pressure moved the union 
toward, if not implosion, a slow and deteriorative decline.  The union did not rely on the 
usual or typical tactics that enabled labor movement success.  Most notably, they utilized 
secondary practices such as boycotts to secure labor victories.  For the labor union power 
structure, the state, and big capital, boycotts were an unacceptable practice.  Labor union 
practices of strikes, walkouts, berating of scab workers had all become, if not accepted, 
expected parts of the labor union repertoire.  But boycotts especially by supposedly 
leftist, radical farm workers of color moved outside of practices deemed allowable.  
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Indeed, labor union leaders such as Meaney, Kirchner, Itliong and Chavez counted on 
ultimately making a deal with a profitable agribusiness industry.  They could not work 
against the idea of making money; at some point, concessions had to be made and those 
concessions had to be drawn from agribusiness profit margins.  What the UFW had done, 
via the boycott strategy, was to work against this motive of profit, to appeal to consumers 
to resist certain products.  However, to depart from boycott tactics was to leave behind a  
proven means to an end.   
 In the late 1960s, in the midst of a formidable boycott campaign, the state of 
California questioned boycott tactics—recognizing perhaps that it was an effective tactic.  
Reporting to Governor Ronald Reagan, the Agriculture and Services Agency of 
California (ASA) informed the governor that “the table grape boycott is causing 
considerable difficulty to the California grape industry.”  The report attaches a proposed 
resolution from the California Board of Agriculture contending that the boycotts 
constitute “harassment” of the workers by the UFW as the union called for workers to 
walk off the job.  Nevertheless, the “cabinet issue memo” deemed strike action a 
nonstarter to any negotiations between growers and the workers and argued that boycotts 
should be defined as an infringement on consumers’ rights—an obvious move to conflate 
the interests of big capital and consumers as one in the same.  Moreover, the memo 
proposed that farm workers should not take up membership in a union that would be 
effectively forced on the workers (in the state’s estimation).147   
 The Reagan administration’s take on the strikes is, without self-consciousness, 
ironic in the span of California agriculture’s history of strife between capital and labor.  
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The labor movement headed by the UFW is depicted as an organization, which 
victimized workers and consumers.  However, by the 1960s, the state comprehended that 
the farm workers movement held some credence with the workers and among some 
sectors of the general public.  In 1968, the ASA noted a proposal to create “an 
Agriculture Employment Relations Board.”  This request had been submitted from 
landowners as the communiqué indicates that the request “has been forwarded by 
‘California Agriculture’ to [US] Senator [George] Murphy.  He has agreed to handle this 
legislation.”  Therefore, big capital and the state agreed to pass such “agricultural labor 
legislation” that would enact an agricultural labor board.148  While seemingly a step in the 
right direction for labor, the UFW was not quick to take to the proposal.   
   Margarita Arce Decierdo (1999) asserts that the UFW’s wariness of the 
proposed labor board was warranted.  Her study (Ibid.: 85) describes how the UFW, in 
1968, as the ASA relayed its memo to Governor Reagan, equated the creation of an 
agricultural labor board with the elimination of “the Union’s right to boycott—the most 
powerful and effective tool against the growers.”  The boycotts had been the primary 
device among UFW tactics and the boycotts had been artfully orchestrated across the 
nation.  Via boycotts, the union convinced many consumers to refuse DiGiorgio grapes or 
to drink wine from non-union grapes.  Prominent Democratic Party politicians such as 
Robert F. Kennedy vowed allegiance to the farm worker struggle as the union gained 
national recognition.   
 By the early 1970s, the growers ramped up efforts to bring farm workers under 
the cover of the Wagner Act.  Again, in irony, defining agricultural workers as industrial, 
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union-eligible laborers was in the best interest of big capital.  All concerned parties 
played a hand in the contentious battle over the creation of the Agricultural Labor 
Relations Board (ALRB)—growers, the UFW, the state government, and the Teamsters.  
The state and the growers, as the overseers and profiteers of the economy, were in 
absolute agreement in their opposition to boycotts.  Earl Coke, the ASA secretary, 
expressed concern that boycotts “can have serious effect on the agricultural industry and 
thus on the economy of the state.”149  Little regard is ever shown for the condition of the 
laborers who moved the industry along to such immense profitability. 
 For the UFW and the Teamsters, the divide existed over ideology and tactics.  
Decierdo argues that growers possessed a preference for the Teamsters.  In agreement 
with the UFW assessment that the Teamsters were conjoined to the growers, the AFL-
CIO funded efforts to stifle inroads the Teamsters made among farm workers.  Growers, 
the UFW, and the Teamsters sponsored bills that contained proposed designs for what 
would become the ALRB.  The UFW advocated for secret ballot elections and access to 
farms in order to politick with workers.  Growers wished to block access while the 
Teamsters were content with a cordoned off area where workers could meet with union 
officials.  The final compromise enacted a piece of legislation known as the Agricultural 
Labor Relations Act thus providing the statutory basis for the ALRB.   
 In tracing out the history and creation of the ALRB, Decierdo delineates how this 
state-mandated regulatory board for California agricultural labor proved to be another 
force to operate against farm labor unionism.   Ironically, conservative, anti-labor 
individuals were placed on the ALRB thus making the Board decidedly anti-farm worker 
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rather than operating to ensure a decent, safe workplace.  As they had struggle for 
decades to make inroads, farm workers seemed to have finagled a sliver of influence on 
the state but as Decierdo demonstrates this is not the case with the ALRB.  Indeed it is a 
tragic note that portends labor union decline.  Further, it suggests that the struggle to 
sustain a farm labor union is a complicated venture that took the UFW into a game 
(though it is hardly a game) that was rigged against them. 
CONCLUSION 
The UFW would continue to flounder.  Chavez took on new efforts to infuse energy into 
the movement:  direction of efforts to Texas, a visit to the Philippines to appease some 
portion of the Filipino membership, a campaign against pesticides and their detrimental 
effects on farm workers’ health. But most significant was Chavez’ solidification as the 
iconic figure of Chicano struggle though there is little evidence that Chavez ever 
considered himself a Chicano.  The union was unable to form a solid, reliable 
organization able to play the role of farm worker labor union representative.  This was 
due to both internal and external factors as the chapter has sought to demonstrate.   
 Ultimately, there were perhaps too many obstacles in the form of racial/ethnic 
identity (Filipinos and Mexicans), debates over citizenship (Mexican vs. Mexican 
American), antagonistic labor unions (the Teamsters), and an antagonistic state.  But is it 
surprising that any social movement, particularly a poor one, would ultimately 
deteriorate?  Perhaps the answer is “no,” but I offer that comprehension of the unraveling 
of internal ties and the pressure from external forces may be instrumental in 
comprehending how to create social movement maintenance.   
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However, social movements in general must contend with unintended 
consequences.  Indeed all the problems that the UFW confronted were probably matters 
and concerns, which they had not seen coming.  Charles Tilly (1999: 599) writes that 
when social actors (dare we add social movements) engage in activity those actions are 
subject to “consequences of all social interaction” and they must “pass through powerful, 
systematic constraints, modifying established patterns instead of striking out alone in an 
empty causal space.  Even revolutions depend heavily for their form and content on the 
regimes they replace.”  Initially, farm workers did not find success in the 1930s but did so 
in the 1960s.  They may have modified “established patterns,” but those modifications 
did not necessarily bode well down the line, as they did not engage with an “empty causal 
space.”   
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE REMAINS IN 
THE “POST-RACIAL” ERA 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As I write these concluding remarks, Barack Obama has become the first US president of 
color.  For many observers in the various media, they have hailed the ascent of President 
Obama as an indication of a post-racial era.  It is curious and even disheartening that the 
election of one person of color to executive office would cause some to think that the 
conflicts and complications of race can now be regarded as resolved issues.  I would 
argue that President Obama’s emergence offers an opportunity not to dispose of race but, 
in fact, to place it at the center of our considerable problems in the country.  That is, the 
newly elected President is indeed a landmark moment in our racial history, but a sole 
election, even one as significant as this one, does not address the structural problems of 
race and racism. 
RACE MATTERS AS MUCH AS EVER 
Moving toward a more sociological comprehension of racial dynamics in the 
contemporary USA, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva’s research has parsed out the various 
workings of a historically rooted and ever relevant racialized social system in the US.  
For Bonilla-Silva (1997), racism is only one portion of a set of racialized/racist practices 
in place.  Within the racialized social system of the US, racial groups are placed within 
materially superior and inferior positions.  Along with overt acts of racist 
discrimination—which is seemingly the only occasion in which racism is acknowledged 
these days—Bonilla-Silva uncovers covert forms of racism and, perhaps most important, 
the previously mentioned materially unequal distribution of resources to racial groups—
more for Whites and less for everyone else.  In order to correct such inequities, a 
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restructuring of society is necessary.  The solution is clear enough: provide historically 
deprived groups of color with the necessary resources they need to thrive—just wages, 
health care, child care, top-notch public education, and gainful employment.  But how are 
groups of color to work toward a point in which they have more of these resources and 
opportunities when they must make the journey beginning with less in the first place? 
 This dissertation has attempted to illustrate how groups of color mobilize by 
tracing the ebb and flow of the farm workers movement from the 1930s to the 1980s.  A 
focus on agricultural laborers is significant as it instructs the sociologies of race, 
inequality, and social movements on how some of the most deprived workers of color 
succeeded in procuring more resources.  Indeed, the following statement is a well-
founded one for the study’s coclusion: The farm workers movement was successful, 
interracial, working class collective action.   
 Consequently, I offer an approach to farm workers movement analysis that takes 
care to be inclusive of the dynamics of race and ethnicity within the movement’s history.  
One question I have not ventured to answer within the dissertation’s substantive chapters 
is why race has been ignored in historical and sociological studies of the movement.  One 
possible response to the query is that class has often taken precedence over race in 
understanding the causes and effects of stratification.  Certainly, this seems to have been 
the case in farm worker scholarship.  Time and again, scholars who focus on the 
movement offer little on race.  This study is proactive in securing focus on the 
inextricable hinge which links race and class in the perpetuation of inequality for workers 
of color.  To exclude one (race or class) at the expense of the other produces a short 
sighted view of the sources of stratification, which groups of color must act against. 
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INTERMINORITY CONFLICT AND COOPERATION 
In The Wages of Whiteness, David Roediger (1991) critiques previous Marxist work for 
their prioritizing of class over race; that is, class divisions are too often taken to be the 
root of racism.  Thus, the solution to racial inequality lies in resolving class stratification.  
Roediger offers that in the development of working class White identity, we witness 
oppression flowing “from below.”  White workers actively constructed anti-Black racism 
around labor.  Working class people would therefore be implicitly, if not explicitly, 
defined as being White.  Thus, class and race are bound to each other, but if the 
relationship between the two is taut, how can working people of color break through?  
One way workers of color have done so is to avoid disposal of racial identity within 
social movements. 
 In Reworking Race, Moon-Kie Jung (2006) also illustrates how race and class are 
held together in a mutually constitutive relationship in interwar Hawaii.  While in the 
case of Roediger’s study, this interdependency fostered racial exclusion, Jung provides a 
historical sociological portrait of a racially affirmative relationship.  That is, race need 
not be excluded but rather should be affirmatively included in a successful cross-racial 
movement.  Therefore, Filipino and Japanese workers, long before the dawn of pan-
ethnic terms such as “Asian American” (see Espiritu 1992), which sought to encompass 
such a diverse range of groups from Chinese to Japanese and Filipino, forged (see Jung 
1999) an interracial labor union that affirmed the social reality of Filipino and Japanese 
class differences and race consciousness.   
 Groups, such as mobilized Filipino and Japanese workers in Hawaii and the 
workers under examination in this study, undergo processes of what I term identity 
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formation and identification.  The latter process is one in which the powers that be—
landowners, the state, the White majority—are able to define groups as they wish.  
Therefore, Mexicans are deemed dutiful and dumb workhorses of farm labor.  
Meanwhile, Asian origin workers are characterized as wily, deceitful labor agitators or a 
sexual threat to White women.  The former is a process whereby groups of color wield 
agency; they are able to exert their power within a racialized social system by relaying to 
others, such as powerful landowners, what and how they are to be identified.  While both 
processes are simple enough to separate out and define, tension is produced when groups 
of color aim to move against the powers of identification and what could also be 
understood as White supremacy.  
 Time and again, this is the predicament that farm workers confronted.  The 
problem presented to Mexican and Asian origin workers was not one in which both 
groups had to “get over it” and accept each other as partners in struggle.  That was, 
certainly, a productive goal and a necessary one as I have argued.  Analysis of the strike 
waves in the 1930s shows farm worker collective action and attempts to foment 
interracial labor unionism.  However, the structure of racial hierarchies position racial 
groups of color in such a way that their material interests and relationship vis-à-vis 
employers and the state are not identical.  Filipino and Mexican workers held variant 
positions as colonial subjects in the case of the former and subservient, docile workers in 
regards to the latter.  Though in an elevated hierarchical position in the 1930s, Japanese 
tenant farmers are subjected to mass internment in the 1940s.  As the state imported 
Bracero labor in the 1940s and two decades afterward, farm worker organizers faced a 
tall order.   
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 As the movement takes hold in the 1960s, Filipinos and Mexicans forge 
interracial labor union success.  How did they accomplish such a feat?  First, the extant 
scholarship on farm workers never seems to position interracialism as central to 
successful farm worker collective action.  Second, much of the scholarship examines 
external, rather than internal, forces which produced landmark collective bargaining 
agreements.  Last, the coming together of Filipinos and Mexicans is regarded as 
seemingly inevitable—it is deemed a “natural fit” between oppressed groups, which, for 
whatever reason, never took hold in the previous decades of struggle.  Therefore, I focus 
upon internal, racial dynamics to the movement that facilitated the merger of Filipino and 
Mexican workers into what would become the UFW.  Certainly, external facilitative 
factors and resources mattered a great deal.  I contend that the confluence of forces from 
without and within aided in social movement victories for farm workers.  The study 
emphasizes how Filipinos and Mexicans bridged the historically rooted and perpetuated 
chasm of race and class inequality, which separated them within California’s agricultural 
labor force.   
 However, the relationship between Mexicans and Filipinos becomes frayed.  
Indeed, if the merger of Filipinos and Mexicans deserves explanation then so too does the 
erosion of said merger.  Again, the study takes care to note the internal and external 
causal factors of the union’s demise. 
   I propose that inter-minority conflict, and its persistence within the farm workers 
movement, is an outcome of what Claire Jean Kim (1999, 2000) conceptualizes as a 
triangulated condition of race relations.  As noted with introductory comments on Kim’s 
model, groups are defined as insiders/outsiders and superior/inferior.  Consequently, 
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interactions between groups of color are embedded in a conflictive set of social relations 
in which some are able to obtain more access to resources as compared to others.  Does 
this mean that racial minorities are in competition with each other?  In part, the answer to 
the question seems to be yes.  However, the more significant portion of the answer is that 
all groups of color are subjected to racism fostered by White supremacy.  Throughout, the 
dissertation demonstrates the sources and consequences of differentiated race and class 
positions for Asian and Mexican origin workers within California agriculture.  Japanese 
workers were commonly farm operators until internment.  As for Filipinos, they were 
disallowed labor union membership by White unions in the 1930s, made less money than 
Mexican workers in the 1960s, and became a neglected constituency within the 
movement in the1970s.  The long historical path upon which these groups traveled and 
experienced interminority relations within California agriculture—negatively or 
positively—requires investigation and affords an opportunity to extend the theoretical 
model of racial triangulation. 
 The triangulation model exhibits interminority separateness.  That is, Kim’s work 
is helpful in demonstration of how and why groups of color may have competing 
interests, still be subjected to White domination, and though holding in common 
subservient racial positions remain racially unequal in relation to each other.  However, 
the gap between groups of color within a triangulated condition of race relations does not 
preclude the possibility of closing the chasm.  Filipinos and Mexicans are able to bridge 
the divide and create, for a temporary set of years in the farm workers movement, a state 
of interminority cohesion.  Indeed, workers of color struggled to close this gap in the 
1930s and were unable to do so.  However, the 1960s held promise as internal and 
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external factors allowed cohesion to occur and thereafter move against White race and 
class domination in California.        
KEY POINTS OF THE STUDY 
The dissertation begins in the 1930s, but the farm worker movement’s roots in California 
are traceable back to the late nineteenth century.  For example, Stuart Jamieson’s Labor 
Unionism in California Agriculture, upon which the dissertation heavily relies, reports 
that Japanese and Chinese workers walked off their citrus orchard jobs in Orange County 
during the 1880s.  Certainly, such labor agitation, even such short-lived episodes that 
were not parlayed into a sustained movement, could be deemed as part of the farm 
workers movement.  Yet, they hardly, if ever, appear in the extant literature.  The glaring 
weakness of such an omission is how it excludes Asian origin workers from farm worker 
history.  As the study begins the 1930s—mostly because substantial strike waves take 
hold of California agriculture—I maintain that previous to that time, and throughout, 
Asian origin farm workers were central to the movement both in their presence and later 
absence from the United Farm Workers of America. 
 Social movement failure, success, and decline are interrelated and thus should not 
be analyzed in isolation from each other.  Unfortunately, the farm workers movement’s 
success in the 1960s and 1970s is seldom understood against the backdrop of failed labor 
unionization attempts in the 1930s.  The study’s second chapter aims to deliver analysis 
of this failure three decades before a period of momentous success.  Additionally, it 
demonstrates how both race and class coextend from the 1930s and thereafter within the 
farm workers movement. 
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 The chapter provides an explanation of how White supremacy prevented the 
formation of an interracial farm labor union.  Filipino, Japanese and Mexican workers 
sought labor unionism but landowners, the state, White labor, and a racist general public 
would not allow such a venture to take hold.  Two main conclusions can be drawn from 
the chapter.  First, the three main groups of color that did farm labor worked in the fields 
but were not perceived by landowners as one in the same; they were not all simply 
laborers.  That is, the Japanese were deemed superior to other groups of color.  Second, 
these groups did not hold the same class position within the California agricultural labor 
market as the Japanese were represented quite heavily among tenant farmers. 
 Though the state played a role in quelling some of the strike activity that occurred 
in the 1930s, it was in the 1940s when the state apparatus became a key operator and 
even manager of race and labor relations within California agribusiness.  Chapter three 
illustrates how two state-managed programs moved stage center in this decade: the 
Bracero Program and the internment of Japanese origin people on the West Coast of the 
US.  The extraction of the Japanese from California subtracted a group in an intermediary 
race and class position from the agricultural industry.  Further, it allowed the state to 
provide a significant addition of Mexican workers to the labor supply. 
 Two main points arise from the chapter.  First, big capital was not all-powerful—
at least not any longer as of the 1940s—in directing the affairs of agribusiness.  More 
classical theories of capital and labor supply would proffer that a program such as the 
Bracero initiative is resultant of capital’s power over the state.  Thus, the state simply 
does the bidding of the power elite by providing them with a convenient supply of cheap 
Mexican workers.  However, the chapter points out that the state did not simply carry out 
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the bidding of powerful agribusiness.  It played a central role in managing a guest worker 
program that was integral to the agricultural industry.  However, I also offer that the 
Bracero program was coterminous with Japanese internment.  Indeed, their superior 
position on the racial and class hierarchy did not offer Japanese tenant farmers protection 
from racism, particularly a racist state.  In fact, the opposite occurred; Japanese were 
defined as enemies of the state.  Last, a key consequence of the subtraction of Japanese 
workers was the reshaping of the farm labor force in terms of racial identity and/or 
national origins.  Thereafter the three central groups were Filipinos, Mexican Americans, 
and workers from Mexico.   
 While the main focus of chapter three is on the state and its role in California 
agriculture, the shift in racial composition affected how workers would coalesce into a 
successful interracial labor union in the 1960s.  In that decade and into the 1970s, chapter 
four illustrates how Filipinos and Mexican workers originating from two farm labor 
organizations would carry out a merger.  I demonstrate that this process consisted of far 
more than mutual recognition from both groups that they were “in the same position.”  
That is, they did not simply recognize a common class position and “get over” their racial 
differences.  The opening portion of the chapter lays out real income differences between 
Filipino and Mexican workers.  I show that the stratification between these groups, dating 
back to the 1930s, persisted into later decades.   
 Moreover, both groups expressed their variant racial identities.  These differences 
in terms of class and race could not be ignored.  Unfortunately, the social movement 
literature, in which much of the sociological analysis of the farm workers movement 
resides, often ignores the dynamics of racial identity.  I demonstrate that indeed race 
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mattered in this time period and how the creation of the UFW melded Filipinos and 
Mexicans into a farm labor union that became successful. 
 The signing of farm labor contracts in the 1970s was path breaking for the history 
of poor peoples’ movements.  But sustenance of this success was tragically not possible 
for farm workers.  Other analysts may simply conclude that poor peoples’ organizations 
are not able to hold up under the barrage of pressure and more powerful forces constantly 
working against them.  Certainly, I find this to be the case in chapter five.  But if social 
movement failure and success are important to analyze then post-success decline is 
significant as well.  I offer that explanation of negative outcomes such as social 
movement deterioration may prove helpful.  Most important from the chapter is that 
following on chapter five’s point that the creation of the UFW is hardly ever recognized 
as a racial merger in the first place, analysts hardly touch upon how Filipinos, once a 
major force within the movement, suffered displacement.   
STUDY IMPLICATIONS: HISTORICAL ROOTS, CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 
Taking the study together, there are a few implications for future research on race, social 
movements, and working people of color.  First, the study’s theoretical treatment of race, 
though historically based, should not be restrained to purely historical analyses.  Second, 
as to social movements, there is much more to be carried out specifically on the case of 
the farm workers movement and attempts to create inter-minority social movements 
currently.  Third, even today the term working class remains configured so as to exclude 
people of color.  Specifically, I have a particular interest in the inclusion of Asian and 
Mexican origin workers into this category.  Indeed, both groups’ perpetual foreignness 
(this is often recognized by scholars as an ascription directed toward Asians, but it seems 
 174 
 
pertinent to Latinos as well) seems to preclude them from being identified as working 
class since they are often foreign-born.  Even for native-born, US citizen Asian and 
Mexican origin people, their bodies are designated with a social meaning, which fosters 
exclusion. 
 As the title of this concluding chapter indicates, my assessment of race and ethnic 
relations in the US is that they necessitate, as much as ever, an astute historical and 
contemporary scholarly analysis, which intertwine so that the past can inform the present.  
I anticipate that the theorizing based around historical evidence presented here on race is 
helpful in explication of contemporary situations as well—and not necessarily situations 
in which interracial cooperation occurs.  For example, recent reports post-Katrina 
indicate that within the last few years, the racial composition of the New Orleans 
workforce has evolved into a heavily Latino labor force.150  How does such a 
transformation impact the position of the Black population that remains deeply rooted yet 
perpetually marginalized in the city?   
 A National Public Radio broadcast on July 14, 2008 expounded on 
Black/Mexican tension in New Orleans.  Mayor Ray Nagin is quoted in the report as 
asking “How do I make sure that New Orleans is not overrun by Mexican workers?”  A 
Latino employer interviewed in the report offered that African American employees 
“want the easy way out…they don’t work long hours,” yet maintained that his views 
were “not a racial thing.”  A sociological analysis of the shifting situation in New Orleans 
would, most likely, consist of ethnographic data.  However, some theories on 
differentiated racial position for Blacks vis-à-vis Latinos (and vice versa) particularly in 
regards to their competition over jobs would expand some of the ideas and concerns 
                                                 
150 See the Los Angeles Times, “Migrants Find a Gold Rush in New Orleans,” April 4, 2006. 
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presented in the dissertation.  Further, such an analysis would move us away from 
making simplistic declarations that some US workers will not labor in some types of jobs.  
Indeed, we must be cognizant of and strive to understand how competition and clashes 
between groups of color is a distinct form of racial conflict as contrasted to interactions 
between Whites and people of color. 
 Additionally, there could be some extension of this type of research to 
comprehend the need to foster more inter-minority social movements; indeed as the 
demographics shift within the country then much of this mobilization would need to be 
carried out by groups of color.  Take for example the mass gatherings of Latinos around 
the country to protest the implementation of oppressive immigration laws in 2006.  The 
country may have been taken aback at the substantial brown-skinned crowds in San 
Diego, Los Angeles, Chicago and other cities throughout the country.  While I have no 
demographic profile of these crowds, the gatherings seemed overwhelmingly Latino.   
 A potential area of research here is to understand who participates in these types 
of events and why—certainly there is social movement research on how and why people 
participate in certain social movements and gatherings.  However, the sociologies of race 
and social movements should address how and why some racial groups engage in 
collective action and others do not—and is such collective ventures are able or willing to 
draw an interracial constituency.  Further, we should inquire as to how citizenship affects 
levels and types of participation.  This is particularly pertinent for Latinos and Asians in 
contemporary US society.  For example, Roberto G. Gonzales’ (2008) ethnographic 
studies of undocumented youth in California illustrates that even unauthorized 
immigrants desire to engage in collective action.   Moreover, Gonzales (2007) notes that 
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Asian origin groups represent 13% of the undocumented immigrant populace in the 
nation.   
 Certainly, race is conjoined to the condition of citizenship that propels and 
restrains Whites and groups of color as they do or do not engage in mobilization.  In 
regards to the immigration rallies, why would non-Latinos be less likely to engage in 
such gatherings?  Why would White Americans, often invoking their pride in immigrant 
roots, not come to the aid of a new wave of immigrants from Mexico and elsewhere?  I 
suspect that much of that divide is structured along lines of race. 
 Mary Waters delineates (1990) the symbolic yet deeply held connection that 
suburban Whites have with their ethnic and immigrant roots.  Yet Waters points out that 
while taking pride in ethnic heritage, White ethnics persistently refuse to allow interracial 
marriage in their families or dismiss the idea of living in racially mixed neighborhoods.  
That is, there is room to celebrate ethnicity (food, religious practices, family traditions) 
but race is a non-starter.   
 Sociologist Tomas Macias’ (2006) complementary work to Waters’ study, but not 
nearly as heralded, reveals that Latinos find it hard to ever escape race.  People of color 
certainly can attain Whiteness (see Twine 2004), but it is no clear and wholly secured 
space for them.  From interviews with third-generation Mexican Americans, a Macias 
interviewee reports that a co-worker tells them (Macias 2006: 109) “don’t feel bad…you 
know, you don’t look Mexican…At a minimum you look Spanish.  So, you know, don’t 
worry.”  Discouragingly, groups of color have plenty to worry about.  Whites have ethnic 
options which Waters’ data exemplifies.  However, they have a “race option” as well that 
simultaneously exerts the power of a racially privileged position as they are able to access 
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a state of racelessness.  Conversely, Latinos are almost always expected to “sound” or 
“look” Mexican or have some deep, innately rooted understanding of Mexican culture.  
Further, their White coworkers are genuinely surprised to see Mexican origin people in 
professional positions as one white collar interviewee relays in Macias’ study how he was 
mistaken for the janitor his first day on the job. 
 Even if he were that janitor, little room is made for Latinos and other groups of 
color such as Asians to be defined as working class people.  Nor are they seen as 
sympathetic to working class causes.  Jake B. Wilson’s (2008) ethnographic study of 
recent supermarket strikes in Southern California focuses upon the racist perceptions that 
striking White workers express in regards to groups of color.  Specifically, White 
workers hold a strong aversion to Asians.  The White picketers express resentment 
toward upper middle class Asian customers that violate the picket line.  However, White 
customers are excused from suffering any penalties when they commit the same 
violation.  If forming wholly interracial (the racial spectrum of White and groups of 
color) coalitions and social movements is to be possible then those kinds of perceptions 
need to change.  But the reasons those perceptions exist require investigation and 
sociological explanations as well. 
 We require, as much as ever, analysis of any interracial movement—even if it 
fades into decline—that aims to fuse groups together.  Such efforts are not only of 
sociological interest, but I believe may be determinative of what steps we take so as to 
avoid any semblance of a post-racial future in sociological analysis and in U.S. society. 
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APPENDIX: HISTORICAL METHODS IN SOCIOLOGY AND IN FARM 
LABOR MOBILIZATION STUDIES 
 
Drawing from primary documents remains the least employed methodological approach 
in sociology and for study of the farm workers movement as well.  Generally speaking on 
methods, many in sociology divide methodological approaches into the broad categories 
of qualitative and quantitative research.  Both terms seem inadequate in describing the 
rich array of methodologies that sociologists draw from to produce empirical analyses.  
My own estimation of sociological methods is that sometimes, and increasingly so, 
researchers draw on both in their work.  Most sociological methodological practices 
generate data specifically obtained to answer a question.  Historical methods lie outside 
of these data-generating practices.  But what must be true about historical sociological 
work, as with any other type of sociological research, is that the method(s) must be 
appropriate for the research question. 
 British sociologist John Goldthorpe (1991) maintains that sociologists have, 
could, and should be in the business of generating current data to answer questions of 
sociological import.  In what is an articulate essay, though mean-spirited because of its 
dismissal of the necessity of historical methods for most sociological studies, Goldthorpe 
warns social scientists to ensure that their methods fit their research problem.  His 
conclusion is that often the historical method is the wrong path to choose for sociological 
research.  Historians are concerned with “relics,” that is old primary documents, as 
Goldthorpe terms them, and sociologists need not rely on older pieces of data. 
 To avoid being snatched up into extreme positions, one which orders a movement 
away from historical methods and another which renders indistinguishable history and 
sociology (see Abrams 1983), we turn to the process of analysis.  That is, development of 
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research questions, engagement in methods, and analysis of findings are distinct yet 
interrelated parts of sociological research.  In describing the sociological research process 
as such, there seems to be little difference between history and the social sciences.  
Indeed, historians have questions, seek to answer them, and draw up theses.   
However, for historical sociologists, our findings are couched in theoretical 
projects.  Our findings must inform theoreticians and theory, in general, as to how our 
historical case is indicative of some process or reality that social actors have confronted.  
Moreover, there is some application and/or development of models in historical 
sociology.  These models indeed can be tested or applied to other cases.   If those models 
prove helpful in analysis of other time periods, events, or organizations then it can be said 
that while historical sociologist do not generate data, they most certainly are in the 
business of theory generation.  For my purposes, the dissertation’s goal is to complement 
some of the comparative models of race relations that historians and sociologists have 
offered recently.  Moreover, I aim to add to the small, but hopefully growing, set of 
historical sociological work on people of color by scholars of color. 
 Moreover, the historical approach in sociology is helpful in mapping out long-
term processes of social change, particularly in relation to social movements, and allows 
for analysis of events and time periods about which no survey research was conducted or 
living informants are no longer available to be interviewed.  Certainly, as Nicky Hart 
concedes (1994), historical materials are “fragmentary.”  However, that is not to infer that 
they are “dead” documents that reveal little—nor are they “relics” which implies that 
they are curious, old objects that should be set up as exhibits to simply be observed.  This 
point is particularly important for the farm workers who labored and struggled for justice 
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in the fields of California.  Indeed, invaluable archival collections are seldom utilized in 
sociological studies of the farm workers movement.   Moreover, as we move deeper into 
the twenty-first century, these documents will be more necessary to study periods of the 
farm workers movement, which date back to the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. 
 For the most part, the sociology of the farm workers movements is nested in the 
literature on social movements.  J. Craig Jenkins (1985) and Marshall Ganz (2000) have 
utilized the case of the United Farm Workers of America (UFW) to sociologically 
comprehend the underlying process of social movement success.  Other writings on the 
UFW are exclusively about the UFW and the decades of the 1960s and 1970s.  Many of 
these works, while informative, come across as pieces of work done in conjunction with 
the UFW, at the union’s behest, or by a participant-observer journalist.  Again, much of 
this work is celebratory, and often rightfully so, but several of these pieces do not closely 
analyze events leading up to and following the crest of UFW success.  Therefore, 
historical methods enable a sociological analysis of the long-term development of a farm 
workers movement in California.  Indeed, a historical perspective allows me to 
demonstrate that the farm workers movement constituted bona fide collective action long 
before it is often recognized as such in the literature.  Moreover, primary source materials 
offer the only way by which to trace the trajectory of farm worker mobilization and 
working people of color in the range of years from the 1930s to the 1960s. 
 For portions of this dissertation subsequent to the 1950s, in-person interviews 
would have constituted a feasible, though limited because of the passage of four decades 
since, methodological approach.  However, by drawing upon the materials presented in 
this dissertation, I believe that this study represents one of the first, if not one of the few, 
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studies of farm worker mobilization that is reliant upon such extensive, of-the-moment, 
primary documents.  That is to say that the bulk of work on the farm workers movement 
and the UFW depends on newspapers articles (which I use as well) and most 
prominently, retrospective interview data.  I propose that the historical pieces of evidence 
presented here are complementary to the existent scholarship on farm workers.  
Moreover, of-the moment historical documents enable a critical perspective and analysis 
of California’s agricultural labor strife, which is distinct from examinations based on 
interviews.   
 One shortcoming of interview-based studies is their reliance on memory, which 
can be faulty, but often this has been taken care of in previous studies by confirming 
interview data with newspaper reports and other interviews.  The more critical 
shortcoming in relation to farm worker scholarship is that much of the analyses are 
concerned with the same period of years, the 1960s or 1970s, and the same outcome: the 
successful moment in which farm labor agreements were agreed upon after years of strike 
action.  Therefore, interviews concerned with the same events conclude with what seems 
to be a historical script of the farm workers movement.  We know it ends with the 
contract agreements but have only competing explanations of what produced that success.  
This study provides perspective on what happened before, during, and after the victorious 
moment for farm workers. 
 Last, much of this literature set is not deeply concerned with the sociology of race 
and class.  Racial politics and tensions are not part of the evaluative mission and thus the 
workers are cast as a group of laborers versus powerful landowners and nothing more.  
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Or they are portrayed monolithically as an underemployed, exploited labor force for 
which race and racial identity takes a backseat to their class status. 
ARCHIVAL VISITS AND DATA 
In doing the study, I traveled to several archival locations and my movement from site to 
site is indicative of how the dissertation evolved.  Initially, I focused on the official 
archives of the UFW housed at the Walter P. Reuther Library of Urban and Labor Affairs 
at Wayne State University in Detroit.  The fact that these papers are reposited in Detroit 
is telling of the early relationship that was forged between Reuther, head of the United 
Auto Workers, and Cesar Chavez.  Long before any California University could or would 
even consider reposing the UFW papers, a deal was signed in the 1970s to make the 
Reuther library the official repository for the documents.  Within this massive collection, 
I was able to access the papers of Chavez, Larry Itliong—a central Filipino labor activist 
and UFW Vice President, Marshall Ganz—another activist and UFW Executive Board 
member, and more general papers emanating from a variety of administrative sections 
within the union.  
My original intent was to only collect data at the Reuther library—as this 
collection alone was ample—and I believed the dissertation like other studies of the UFW 
would run from the 1960s to the 1980s.  However, references to “the past” in various 
documents, allusions to the Bracero Program and workers from Mexico required a 
historical sociological analysis of not the UFW, but of a social movement of farm 
workers that went further back than the 1960s.  I admit that I was resistant initially.  I 
reset the starting point to 1959 with the founding of the Agricultural Workers Organizing 
Committee and then further back to the 1930s.  Thereafter, I was clued into the fact that 
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the Bracero Era deserved a chapter all its own after writing up the chapter on the 1930s 
labor agitation.    
As the dissertation grew into something I did not expect it to become, travel to 
other archives became necessary.  For chapter 3, I visited the Japanese American 
Research Program collection at UCLA as the role of Japanese tenant farmers in the farm 
labor strife of the 1930s became evident.  Additionally, by visiting these papers, the 
dissertation was able to sharpen its point that Asian Americans are simply ignored in 
most of the sociological analyses on farm labor history.  I collected transcripts of 
interviews conducted with farm workers in the 1970s who had witnessed the labor strife 
of the 1930s from San Francisco State University’s J. Paul Leonard library.  Stanford 
University also offered some important documents from the papers of Ernesto Galarza, a 
legendary Mexican American activist and labor organizer—a definitive biography of his 
academic and activist work is yet to be written into the literature.  I also spent some 
research time at UC-Berkeley’s Bancroft Library to look into the papers of economist and 
activist Paul S. Taylor—his documents also shed light on the role of Asians in California 
agriculture.   
Finally, as I considered the role of the state during the Bracero era in procurement 
of Mexican workers, it brought to bear the role of the state government and wider state 
apparatus in their engagement with farm labor affairs.  Therefore, I also visited the 
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California.  It is peculiar that Reagan 
is almost never invoked into studies of the battle for farm workers, as his administration, 
both gubernatorial and presidential, were vehemently anti-labor and he presided over 
California from 1967 to 1975.   
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 The task of neatly categorizing and indexing the documents in the study is 
difficult to accomplish.  This is no understatement as the documents are spread across the 
nation and are generally processed in the various archives, with the exception of Detroit, 
as “farm worker” or “farm labor” papers.  In essence, the dissertation offers data that is 
taken from memos, letters, telegrams, bulletins, labor union newspapers, interviews, 
newspaper articles, published primary sources, census data, government and labor union 
reports, and even notes scribbled out on bits of paper.  These “fragmentary” bits of 
evidence are woven together, as best I could, to present an analysis of social movement 
dynamics and the struggle and strife which working people of color have played out in 
the fields, ranches, farms, packinghouses, cities, towns, churches, and government halls 
of California.   
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